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Abstract 
The definition of the beginning of life and the protection of the right to life 
when conflicting entitlements and interests emerge are highly disputed issues 
worldwide, and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACtHR) and the 
European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) have been called to tackle these 
questions in their jurisprudence, especially when reproductive rights were at 
stake. In this respect, this paper focuses on the status of human embryo and 
on prenatal life and provides an assessment of the approaches that the two 
Courts have developed when dealing with such delicate issues as in vitro 
fertilization (IVF) and abortion, respectively through the pervasive scrutiny 
of the San José Court and its purposeful impact on the domestic sphere and 
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usually through the recognition of a wide margin of appreciation by the 
Strasbourg Court. In this regard, this paper provides an analysis of the Courts’ 
most significant case law, as Artavia Murillo v. Costa Rica and ‘Beatriz’ cases, 
with reference to the IACtHR, and the ECtHR’s decisions Vo v. France, Evans 
v. the United Kingdom, S.H. and Others v. Austria, Costa and Pavan v. Italy, 
Parrillo v. Italy and A, B, C v. Ireland, while considering the peculiarities of 
the systems of the American Convention on Human Rights and the European 
Convention on Human Rights and the role of the Convention on Human Rights 
and Biomedicine and its Protocols in Strasbourg jurisprudence. Moving from 
this assessment, this paper aims to suggest possible solutions to improve the 
results achieved by the two Courts, also through judicial cross-fertilization and 
through reference to the relevant international instruments according to Article 
31(3)(c) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of the Treaties, for example the 
right to enjoy the benefits of scientific progress enshrined in the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.
Key-words: Embryo, prenatal life, reproductive rights, abortion, European 
Court of Human Rights, Inter-American Court of Human Rights, right to enjoy 
the benefits of scientific progress.
Resumen
La definición del comienzo de la vida y la protección del derecho a la vida 
cuando surgen derechos e intereses contradictorios son cuestiones altamente 
controvertidas en todo el mundo, y la Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos 
(CIDH) y el Tribunal Europeo de Derechos Humanos (TEDH) han abordado estas 
cuestiones en su jurisprudencia, especialmente cuando los derechos reproductivos 
estaban en juego. En este sentido, este trabajo se centra en el estatus del embrión 
humano y en la vida prenatal y evalúa los enfoques que los dos tribunales han 
desarrollado cuando se trata de cuestiones tan delicadas como la fertilización in 
vitro (FIV) y el aborto, tanto el de la Corte de San José, con su severo escrutinio 
y su poderoso impacto sobre la esfera nacional interna, cuanto el del Tribunal 
de Estrasburgo, basado por lo general en un amplio margen de apreciación. En 
este sentido, el presente artículo aporta un análisis de los casos que sentaron 
jurisprudencia, como Artavia Murillo contra Costa Rica y los casos ‘Beatriz’, 
en relación con la CIDH, y en el marco del TEDH, en Vo contra Francia, Evans 
contra el Reino Unido, S. H. y Otros contra Austria, Costa y Pavan contra Italia, 
Parrillo contra Italia y A, B, C contra Irlanda, teniendo al tiempo en consideración 
las particularidades de los sistemas de la Convención Americana sobre Derechos 
Humanos y del Convenio Europeo sobre Derechos Humanos, así como el papel 
de la Convención sobre Derechos Humanos y Biomedicina y sus Protocolos en 
la jurisprudencia de Estrasburgo. Partiendo de la citada evaluación, el presente 
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artículo aspira a sugerir soluciones posibles que mejoren los resultados alcanzados 
por ambos Tribunales, sea por medio de la influencia recíproca judicial o a través 
de la referencia a instrumentos internacionales relevantes según el artículo 31(3)
(c) de la Convención de Viena sobre el Derecho de los Tratados, como, por 
ejemplo, el derecho a gozar de los beneficios del progreso científico, consagrado 
en el Pacto Internacional sobre Derechos Económicos, Sociales y Culturales.
Palabras-clave: embrión, vida prenatal, derechos reproductivos, aborto, 
Tribunal Europeo de Derechos Humanos, Corte Interamericana de Derechos 
Humanos, derecho al goce de los beneficios del progreso científico.
Introduction
“We made history”.
These are the words by which Irish women welcomed the results of the 
referendum that took place last May 2018 on the removal of the prohibition of 
abortion from the Irish legal order.
What constitutes a revolution for Ireland after the ban on abortion was 
enshrined in the Constitution thirty-five years ago, also represents a strong 
indicator of the importance that the debate on the beginning of life and 
reproductive rights has assumed worldwide, also propelled by the relentless 
scientific progress. The debate on these questions has assumed unprecedented 
proportions around the world, and Europe and Latin America appear to be in the 
front line, although their historical and legal background is often quite different. 
The time for reform seems to have eventually come: Ireland and Poland, 
in Europe, and Argentina and Chile, in Latin America, offer paradigmatic 
examples of how change is simmering globally. However, the sensitive nature 
of the issues at stake cannot be overlooked and common legal standards are 
to be sought in order to accommodate the legal, ethical and cultural pluralism 
that characterizes them. In this respect, a bioethical and human rights-based 
approach seems to provide the adequate forum for a constructive discussion 
and for ensuring appropriate protection for the often conflicting rights at 
stake. Indeed, it is not unusual that the safeguarding of prenatal life clashes 
with various entitlements of the mother, ranging from life, physical integrity, 
health, self-determination and private life and, from a wider perspective, also 
the right to enjoy the benefits of scientific progress and its applications. In fact, 
the gap can be hard to bridge when some of the reproductive horizons offered 
by scientific progress, of which in vitro fertilization and embryo manipulation 
are prime examples, are taken into account. 
This study focuses on how the judicial bodies of two major regional human 
rights systems, namely the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) within 
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the Council of Europe (COE) and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights 
(IACtHR) within the Organization of the American States (OAS) have tackled 
the definition of the beginning of life and its interplay with reproductive rights 
offering, through their case law, an important and innovative interpretation 
of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR)2 and the American 
Convention on Human Rights (ACHR).3
This paper primarily analyses the scientific framework concerning the 
beginning of life and the definition of the different stages of the development of 
the human embryo, from conception and implantation to the evolution into the 
foetus, along with the evolution of the philosophical thought on these issues. A 
reconstruction of the legal evolution of the status of embryo and of reproductive 
rights and their conceptualization as “non-independent human rights”, also 
through analysis of some interesting national experiences, brings the reflection 
to its international dimension. The scientific complexity of the question and 
the difficulty to deal with the pluralism of views worldwide is reflected by the 
landscape of international law, whose approach is assessed through analysis 
of the most significant human rights generalist and thematic treaties, ranging 
from the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)4 to 
the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC)5 and the Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW).6 
Under this premise, the focus is set on the respective case law of the 
ECtHR and of the IACtHR through analysis of their significant decisions 
concerning the status of human embryo and prenatal life when human rights 
issues related to in vitro fertilization (IVF) and abortion were raised before 
them. Specifically, this study addresses the approach adopted by the Strasbourg 
Court in the judgments Vo v. France, Evans v. the United Kingdom, S.H. and 
Others v. Austria, Costa and Pavan v. Italy, Parrillo v. Italy and A, B, C v. 
Ireland, and by the Court of San José in the cases of Artavia Murillo v. Costa 
2  Council of Europe, European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms, as amended by Protocols Nos. 11 and 14 (adopted 4 November 1950, entered into force 3 
September 1953) ETS 5availbale at https://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Convention_ENG.pdf last 
accessed 4 June 2018. 
3  Organization of American States (OAS), American Convention on Human Rights, “Pact of San 
Jose”, Costa Rica (adopted 22 November 1969, entered into force 18 July 1978) OAS, Treaty Series, 
No. 36, available at https://www.cidh.oas.org/basicos/english/basic3.american%20convention.htm 
last accessed 4 June 2018.
4  UN General Assembly, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (adopted 16 
December 1966, entered into force 23 March 1976) United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 999, p. 171, 
available at https://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/ccpr.aspx last accessed 4 June 2018.
5  UN General Assembly, Convention on the Rights of the Child (adopted 20 November 1989, 
entered into force 2 September 1990) United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 1577, p. 3, available at 
https://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/crc.aspx last accessed 4 June 2018.
6  UN General Assembly, Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against 
Women (adopted 18 December 1979, entered into force 3 September 1981) United Nations, Treaty 
Series, vol. 1249, available at http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/cedaw.htm last accessed 
4 June 2018.
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Rica and ‘Beatriz’. Again, the judgment issued by the IACtHR in the case of 
the Comunidad Indígena Xákmok Kásek c. Paraguay is considered as a missed 
opportunity to provide some important reading of the scope of the right to life 
with respect to the nasciturus, and some better understanding of the pluralism 
within the OAS and the possibility to reconcile the different views is sought 
by expanding on the case of Baby Boy v. the United States, when the Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights faced with the challenges related 
with prenatal life for the first time in the Inter-American system in 1981. Some 
explanations are sought for the different approach of the two Courts and the 
distinct results achieved through critical, comparative analysis: in this regard, 
whilst the ECtHR seems to valorise pluralism through a careful application 
of the margin of appreciation, the IACtHR does not apply this doctrine in the 
Artavia Murillo judgment, and offers some interesting examples of an evolutive 
reading of States’ duties under the ACHR with regard to reproductive rights, 
in line with its wide use of international binding and non-binding reference 
instruments pursuant to Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
the Treaties (VCLT).7 It is particularly significant for this study that the San 
José Court theorized a right to enjoy the benefits of scientific progress and 
its application in the field of reproductive rights. The comparative assessment 
of the approach of the two bodies paves the way to the elaboration of some 
proposals aimed at enhancing the theorization and the judicial protection 
of reproductive rights, for the purpose of theorizing a possibly generalized 
access to the applications offered by biomedical progress capable of ensuring 
appropriate respect for prenatal life. Interventions on human embryos are the 
main focus, and the reconstruction of a suitable international framework is 
developed by relying on Article 15 of the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR)8 and the relevant soft law, legal sources 
elaborated in the framework of the UNESCO, especially the regime of 
sharing of benefits contemplated in Article 19 of the UNESCO International 
Declaration on Human Genetic Data.9 At the same time, the limitations to 
viable and promising applications of scientific progress set by international 
law are analysed, with particular regard to the prohibition of human germline 
editing that, along with the prohibition of reproductive cloning, represents one 
7  United Nations, Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (adopted 23 May 1969, entered into 
force 27 January 1980) United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 1155, p. 331, available at https://treaties.
un.org/doc/publication/unts/volume%201155/volume-1155-i-18232-english.pdf last accessed 4 June 
2018.
8  UN General Assembly, International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (adopted 
16 December 1966, entered into force 3 January 1976) United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 993, p. 3, 
available at last https://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/cescr.aspx accessed 4 June 2018. 
9  UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO), International Declaration 
on Human Genetic Data (adopted 16 October 2003), available at http://portal.unesco.org/en/ev.php-
URL_ID=17720&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL SECTION=201.html last accessed 4 June 2018.
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of the two biomedical practices about which the international community has 
expressed a convergence of views.
In particular, the present study aims at identifying some common guarantees 
for reproductive rights, without disregarding prenatal life and the delicate 
pluralism of views in this field. This is also an exigency of social justice: whilst 
wealthy women can easily circumvent the preclusions met in their countries by 
seeking access to cross-border reproductive health care, the only option for poor 
women is often relying on clandestine remedies, that pose their health and even 
their life at serious risk. Besides “reproductive tourism”, one of the main concerns 
is the risk of distorted and even eugenic uses of biomedicine, biotechnology and 
bioengineering, for examples those risks related to human embryo manipulation. 
Whilst such practice as mitochondrial replacement techniques (MRTs) and 
gene editing for preventing the onset of some genetic diseases may be fruitful 
therapeutic solutions, human germline alterations, now viable thanks to such 
promising techniques as CRISPR-Cas9, are seen as worrisome by the international 
community as they might jeopardize the essence of the human nature. 
The approach, as to the legal area of reference, is based on international law, 
although some questions of constitutional law are tackled for complementing 
the view. The methodology adopted primarily relies on a multidisciplinary 
approach, in particular law and bioethics. However, also the interaction between 
law and medicine, law and biology, law and philosophy are considered, for the 
purpose of assessing the various factors that affect the approach to the beginning 
of life, the protection of the unborn and reproductive rights, especially in the 
framework of the COE and of the OAS. In this regard, also an integrative 
approach is adopted, since, the various implications – ethical, medical, 
biological, philosophical, social, cultural, historical - were considered in their 
interconnection and holistically. In particular, the research was carried out by 
primarily analysing the comprehensive understanding of the protection of the 
unborn and reproductive rights, in order to focus, subsequently, on the human 
rights systems of reference, in relation to their normative and jurisprudential 
landscape and possible weaknesses and strengths, for the purpose of advancing 
viable solutions as judicial cross-fertilization and interpretive paths consistent 
with the Vienna Convention on the Law of the Treaties.
1. The status of human embryo and reproductive rights at the 
intersection between science and law
Analysis of the legal perspective concerning prenatal life needs to move 
from the medical and biological premise, which plays a basic role in the framing 
of the legal regulation in this field at all levels of governance. Adequate debate 
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between law and science is not always an easy task, especially in those cases 
where scientific progress has pushed so far to “overcome” the natural rule, 
which clearly leaves a regulatory gap that needs to be filled. Late Professor 
Stefano Rodotà, in one of his masterpieces, “Il dirito di avere diritti”, has 
tackled the role of law in trying to describe and set the appropriate rule where 
the natural one requires to be somehow replaced. In particular, the role of the 
legal rule is supposed to be the “artificial reconstruction” of the natural bond 
that science and technology have extinguished.10 In fact, as was affirmed by 
Professor Daniel García San José,11 law usually lags behind science, as the 
latter is evolving at an impressive rate.
However, the risks of an inappropriate interference of the legislator when 
reproductive rights are at stake is not a remote possibility, and experience in the 
field shows this emblematically. Many examples may be recalled: sometimes 
the legislator criminalizes abortion, as it often happens in Latin America. In 
other cases, the legislator fails to translate social and scientific instances into 
an appropriate normative response, as it was interestingly the case of Italian 
Law No. 40/2004 on assisted reproductive technology (ARTs).12 In this respect, 
the role of protection and regional harmonization of human rights Courts is 
particularly important, and they can also help to provide the appropriate 
responses for replacing the legal rules that scientific progress may sweep away.
In this regard, it seems interesting to recall the metaphor used by Professor 
Roberto Cippitani in relation to the role of judicial scrutiny in “rejuvenating” 
anachronistic legal rules, uncapable of keeping the pace with scientific 
progress.13 Such rules are comparable to the protagonist of Scott Fitzgerald’s 
story “The Curious Case of Benjamin Button”, who was born old and got 
10  Rodotà, S., Il diritto di avere diritti, Editori Laterza, Roma-Bari, 2012, p. 285.
11  GarcÍa San José, D.I., International Bio Law. An International Overview of Developments in 
Human Embryo Research and Experimentation, Murcia, Ediciones Laborum, 2010, pp. 149, 164, 179, 
189, 192. Also see: García San José, D. I., European Normative Framework for Biomedical Research 
in Human Embryos, Cizur Menor, Aranzadi, 2013.
12  For a wider analysis of the early version of Italian Law n. 40/2004, see Boggio, A., “Italy enacts 
new law on medically assisted reproduction”, Human Reproduction, no. 20(5), (2005), pp. 1153–
1157. See Penasa, S., “The Italian Law on assisted reproductive technologies N. 40 of 2004, facing 
the European Court of Human Rights: the case of Costa and Pavan v. Italy”, Revista de Derecho y 
Genoma Humano/Law and the Human Genome Review, n°37, (2012), pp. 155-178, and Tigano, V., “La 
dichiarazione di illegittimità costituzionale del divieto di fecondazione eterologa: i nuovi confini del 
diritto a procreare in un contesto di perdurante garantismo per i futuri interessi del nascituro”, Diritto 
Penale Contemporaneo, (13 June 2014) available at <https://www.penalecontemporaneo.it/d/3141-la-
dichiarazione-di-illegittimita-costituzionale-del-divieto-di-fecondazione-eterologa-i-nuovi-conf> last 
accessed 28 May 2018. Corte Costituzionale, Judgment n. 162 of 9 April 2014, para. 6.
13  Cippitani, R., “The “curious case” of Italian Law no. 40 of 2004: how the dialogue between 
judges is modifying legislation on medically-assisted reproduction”, Rights and Science: R&S, Vol. 0, 
(2017). Also see: Riezzo, I., Neri, M., Bello, S., Pomara, C., Turillazzi, E., “Italian law on medically 
assisted reproduction: do women’s autonomy and health matter?”, BMC Women’s Health , n° 16(1), 
(2016), pp. 16-44. For early analysis of Law n. 40/2004, see Fineschi, V., Neri, M., Turillazzi, E., “The 
new Italian law on assisted reproduction technology (Law 40/2004)”, Journal of Medical Ethics, n° 
31(9), (September 2005), pp. 536–539.
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younger through his life. In a similar fashion, judicial scrutiny can rejuvenate 
old-fashioned and inadequate legal rules, and adjust them according to scientific 
evolution. Although Professor Cippitani referred to the impact of the decisions 
of the Italian Constitutional Court in relation to above-mentioned Law No. 
40/2004, his reflection may reasonably be extended to international Courts. 
Of course, this reflection applies also the field of the protection of the unborn 
and reproductive rights. 14”.15 Nevertheless, judicial scrutiny of the interplay 
between law and science is not an easy task in this regard, first of all because 
the biological debate on the beginning of life is still open. The pluralism of 
views in the biological and in the legal landscape, especially with regard to the 
distinct views adopted by the national legal orders, makes the role of human 
rights Courts delicate. Some considerations on the issue seem necessary from 
this perspective.
The evolution of prenatal life follows three different stages after the 
moment of fecundation: the pre-embryonic,16 the embryonic and the foetal 
phase. After the fecundation,17 the union of the sperm and the egg triggers the 
process of the integration of both parents’ DNA into the nucleus of the cell so 
created, the zygote, which begins to divide into undifferentiated cells that have 
totipotent nature. It means that each of these cells has the capacity of evolving 
into a separate embryo,18 a characteristic that is lost in only three-four days. 
During this pre-embryonic stage, that is set at the fifth-seventh day, the zygote 
evolves into the morula19 and, finally, into the blastocyst, which is made up of 
about one hundred pluripotent cells, each of which has the potential to develop 
into one of the two hundred types of cells of the human body. For evolving, the 
14  See: Casonato, C., “21st Century Biolaw”, Biolaw Journal – Rivista di Biodiritto, n° 1, (2017); 
Casonato, C., “La scienza come parametro interposto di costituzionalità”, Rivista dell’Associazione 
Italiana dei Costituzionalisti, n° 2, (2016).
15  Breyer, S., “Science in the Courtroom”, Issues in Science and Technology, n° 16(4), (Summer 
2000), available at http://issues.org/16-4/breyer/ last accessed 28 May 2018 (the article is adapted from 
the introduction to the Reference Manual on Scientific Evidence, Second Edition (Federal Judicial 
Center, 2000). Also see Casonato, C., “La scienza come parametro interposto di costituzionalità”, 
cited above n. 13. For a careful analysis on the precautionary principle in international jurisprudence, 
see CORTI, J., “El principio de precaución el la jurisprudencia internacional”, Revista Epañola de 
Derecho Internacional, n° 69(1) (2017), pp. 219-243.
16  The conception of pre-embryo was advanced by the developmental biologist Anne Laura 
Dorinthea McLaren in 1986. See López Moratalla, N., “Fecundación” (Enciclopedia de Bioderecho 
y Bioética) available at https://enciclopedia-bioderecho.com/voces/134 last accessed 28 May 2018; 
Khokhar, A., “Anne Laura Dorinthea McLaren (1927-2007)”, The Embryo Project Enciclopedia, 
available at https://embryo.asu.edu/pages/anne-laura-dorinthea-mclaren-1927-2007 last accessed 28 
May 2018. See Jones, G., Telfer, B., “Before an embryo I was a pre-embryo: or was I?”, Bioethics, n° 
9(1) (January 1995), pp. 32-49.
17  López Moratalla, N., “Fecundación”, cited above n. 15.
18  Laurie, G., “Patenting Stem Cells of Human Origin”, Property Review at [2004] EIPR pp. 59 
ff.; Femenía López, P.J., “Embrión (jurídico)” (Enciclopedia de Bioderecho y Bioética) available at 
https://enciclopedia-bioderecho.com/voces/135 last accessed 28 May 2018.
19  The morula is an early stage embryo made of cells called blastomeres, contained within the zona 
pellucida.
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blastocyst needs proper environment, that provides it with appropriate nutrition: 
that means that it needs the implantation20 in the lining of the womb, a process 
that begins at about day eight21 and terminates at about day fourteen-fifteen, 
20  During the process of implantation, the trophoblasts, namely the cells constituting the external 
layer of the blastocyst, adhere to the endometrium, and are destined to concur to form the placenta. 
The blastocyst also contains other two types of cells: those that form the primitive endoderm, on 
which the proper development of foetus’ organs will depend and which will ensure that essential 
nutrients are provided. Moreover, the inner cell mass of the blastocyst, the epiblast is made up of 
the cells that will constitute the future body of the foetus, that are embryonic stem cell which will 
differentiate in the three germ layers, endoderm (inner layer, that will form many of the inner lining 
of the body, as the lungs, the liver and the pancreas), the ectoderm (outer layer, which will form the 
outer lining of the body, as the epidermis, the hair, but also the peripheral nervous system), and the 
mesoderm (middle layer, which is set between the endoderm and the ectoderm and which will form 
other tissues of the body, as the heart, the bone marrow and, thus, the blood, the muscle system, the 
dermis). See “Embrione” in Enciclopedia Treccani available at http://www.treccani.it/enciclopedia/
embrione-umano_%28Enciclopedia-Italiana%29/ last accessed 28 May 2018. “Scientists develop 
human embryos beyond implantation stage for first time” (University of Cambridge, 4 May 2016) 
available at https://www.cam.ac.uk/research/news/scientists-develop-human-embryos-beyond-
implantation-stage-for-first-time last accessed 28 May 2018. Again, see: See YU, J., Thomson, 
J.A., “Human embryonic stem cells”, available at https://stemcells.nih.gov/info/Regenerative_
Medicine/2006Chapter1.htm last accessed 28 May 2018. See: Kiessling, A. A., Anderson, S. C., 
Human Embryonic Stem Cells: An Introduction to the Science and Therapeutic Potential, Sudbury, 
Boston, Toronto, London, Singapore, Jones and Bartlett Publishers, 2003; National Research Council, 
Institute of Medicine, Board on Health Sciences Policy, Division on Earth and Life Studies, Board 
on Life Sciences, Committee on Guidelines for Human Embryonic Stem Cell Research, Guidelines 
for Human Embryonic Stem Cell Research (The National Academies Press, 2005); Masters, J. R., 
Palsson, B. O., Thomson. J. A., (eds.), Embryonic Stem Cells, Dordrecht, Springer, 2007; TURKSEN, 
K., (ed.), Adult and embryonic stem cells, New York, Dordrecht, Heidelberg, London, Human Press, 
Springer, 2012. It seems interesting to remind here that adult stem cells and blood cordon stem cells, 
otherwise, are multipotent, which means that they have the capacity to develop into more than one 
cell type. For deepening the analysis, see: DODET, B., VICARI, M., (eds.), Pluripotent Stem Cells: 
Therapeutic Perspectives and Ethical Issues, Montrouge, John Libbey Europext, 2001, pp. 42 ff. It 
could be interesting to have a closer look to two important functional properties of the embryonic 
stem cells, namely the asymmetric division, which produces two distinct daughter cells, in particular 
one copy of the original stem cell and second daughter programmed to differentiate into a non-stem 
cell fate, and the clonogenic capacity, that means they can divide infinitely. In this respect, see: 
Knoblich, J. A., “Mechanisms of Asymmetric Stem Cell Division”, Cell, n° 132(4), (22 February 
2008), pp. 583–597; Lusis, M., Li, J., Ineson, J., Christensen, M.e., Rice, A., Little, M.h., “Isolation of 
clonogenic, long-term self-renewing embryonic renal stem cells”, Stem Cell Research, n° 5(1), (July 
2010), pp. 23-39; Gómez-López, S., Lerner, R. G., Petritsch, C., “Asymmetric cell division of stem 
and progenitor cells during homeostasis and cancer”, Cellular and Molecular Life Science, n° 71(4), 
(2014), pp. 575–597. Winograd, C., “Germ layer”, Encyclopedia Britannica, available at https://www.
britannica.com/science/germ-layer last accessed 28 May 2018.
21  For an interesting analysis, which highlights the critical aspects and tries to shed some light 
from a close biological viewpoint, see: Findlay, J. K., Gear, M. L., Illingworth, P.j., Junk, S.m., Kay, 
G., Mackerras, A.h., Pope, A., Rothenfluh, H.s., Wilton, L., “Human embryo: a biological definition”, 
Human Reproduction, n° 22(4), (2007), pp. 905–911. De Miguel Beriain, I., ‘What is a human 
embryo? A new piece in the bioethics Puzzle’, Croatian Medical Journal, n° 55, (2014), pp. 669-671. 
Evans, D., Pickering, N., Conceiving the Embryo: Ethics, Law, and Practice in Human Embryology, 
The Hague, London, Boston, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1996. The phase of implantation in the 
lining of the womb is called “implantation window”. The “implantation window” is made of three 
phases: the apposition, which depends on the maturation of the endometrium, the adhesion and the 
embedding in the endometrium. For wider overview, see: Harper, M. J., “The implantation window”, 
Baillière’s Clinical Obstetrics and Gynaecology, n° 6(2), (1992), pp. 351-71; Achache, H., Revel, 
A., “Endometrial receptivity markers, the journey to successful embryo implantation”, Human 
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when the blastocyst can be finally called embryo.22 At about the fourteenth-
fifteenth day two important evolutions occur for the debate on the beginning of 
life, namely the appearance of the first signs of the nervous system, that is the 
primitive streak, and the end of the phase during which the twinning process 
is still possible, since until that moment the embryo can still divide into other 
embryos or the distinct zygotes may recombine into one.23 After implantation, 
the embryo24 continues to develop and, at about eight weeks pregnancy, the 
foetal stage finally begins, to last until the end of pregnancy.25 
In the biological debate, the discussion on some issues is still open: 
the theory of the pre-embryonic stage, which dates back to 1986, when Dr. 
McLaren advanced it, has not received generalized acceptance in the scientific 
community. What is more, possibly even more importantly for our purposes, 
the scientific community is split with regard to the definition of the moment 
when life begins, whether at conception or, otherwise, through a progressive 
process, which would imply growing protection during the evolution from 
conception to birth.26 Again, another view was advanced, in this case mainly 
Reproduction Update, n° 6(12), (2006), pp. 731-746. For a brief description of implantation and its 
different stages, see “Human embryology – Embryogenesis” available at http://www.embryology.ch/
anglais/gnidation/resumenidation01.html last accessed 28 May 2018. See: LORÉ, C., Fra scienza e 
società, Milano, Giuffré, 2008, pp. 22 ff.
22  Andorno, R., La bioética y la dignidad de la persona, Madrid, Editorial Tecnos – Grupo Anaya, 
2012, pp. 120, 121.
23  Shea, M. C., “Embryonic life and human life”, Journal of medical ethics, n° 11, (1985), pp. 
205-209.
24  It seems interesting to recall here that embryonic stem cells represent a particularly valuable 
resource for research and for therapeutic horizons, as they could help to treat various diseases, as 
immune system-related genetic diseases, degenerative diseases and cancer. This is so because of their 
properties: first, they are pluripotent that, as anticipated above, means that they have the potentiality to 
evolve into any of the two hundred cell types that make up the human body. Moreover, they have the 
ability to replicate infinitely. The characteristics of embryonic stem cells allow significant possibilities 
of use in research, for example in the field of regenerative medicine and for tissue replacement. For 
wider analysis, see: ‘Embryonic stem cells’ (Science Daily) available at https://www.sciencedaily.
com/terms/embryonic_stem_cell.htm last accessed 28 May 2018. See: Kiessling, A. A., Anderson, 
S. C., Human Embryonic Stem Cells: An Introduction to the Science and Therapeutic Potential, 
cited above n. 19; Masters, J. R., Palsson, B. O., Thomson. J. A., (eds.), Embryonic Stem Cells, cited 
above n. 19; Turksen, K., (ed.), Adult and embryonic stem cells, cited above n. 19. It is important 
to remind the distinction between stem cells and immortalized cells. See: Freshney, R. I., Stacey, 
G. N., Auberbach, J. M., Culture of immortalized cells, Hoboken, Wiley, 1996; Macieira-Coelho, 
A., Cell immortalization, Verlag, Berlin, Heidelberg, Springer, 2000; Irfan Maqsood, M., Matin, M. 
M., Bahrami, A. R., Ghasroldasht, M. M., “Immortality of cell lines: Challenges and advantages of 
establishment”, Cell Biology International, n° 37(10), (2013), pp. 1038–1045.
25  Laurie, G., “Patenting Stem Cells of Human Origin”, cited above n. 17, pp. 59 ff. Femenía 
López, P.J., “Embrión (jurídico)”, cited above n. 17. 
26  Naturally, the discourse on the definition of the beginning of life has been tackled by 
philosophical thought as well. The beginning of the debate dates back to IV century B.C. and the 
theory of the ensoulment of the embryo elaborated by Aristotle, that encompassed three stages, which 
were respectively characterized by the nutritive, the sensitive and the rational soul. Saint Thomas 
Aquinas took up and enunciated the Aristotelian theory of ensoulment in the Summa Theologica, thus 
reaffirming that ensoulment would occur for baby boys at the fortieth day of pregnancy and for baby 
girls at the eightieth, being quickening an indication of the soul. Abortion was allowed within those 
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from a philosophical viewpoint, according to which the belonging to the human 
species is inscribed in the genome and, therefore, conception is the moment 
to consider for defining the beginning of life.27 The variety of perspectives 
characterizes also the legal debate on the status of the unborn and whether it 
has the right to life according to national law, although, in general, domestic 
legal orders, birth is determinant for the acquisition of personhood28 and the 
unborn receives only limited protection, for example in the field of succession 
terms. On these issues, see: Andorno, R., La distinction juridique entre les personnes et les choses à 
l’épreuve des procréations artificielles, Paris, L.G.D.J., Bibliothèque de droit privé, 1996, pp. 113 ff. 
Andorno, R., La bioética y la dignidad de la persona, cited above n. 21, pp. 109 ff. Also see: Jones, 
D. A., Soul of the Embryo: an enquiry in the status of the human embryo in the Christian tradition, 
London, New York, Continuum, 2004, pp. 225 ff. During the centuries the theory of ensoulment was 
set aside, and States’ relevant approaches were in huge part related to the criminal theories of the 1800. 
For example, Italian positivist school considered abortion and infanticide crimes capable of raising 
limited social concern. In this regard, see: Lombroso, C., Peset Reig, J. L., Peset Reig, M., Lombroso 
y la escuela positivista italiana (Ediciones Castilla, Madrid, 1975). For some comparison between 
naturalism and positivism in relation to abortion: HELLOJ173 “Abortion: Natural vs. Postivist Law”, 
Law and Society@Kwantlen, (1 December 2012) available at https://kpulawandsociety.wordpress.
com/2012/12/01/abortion-natural-vs-postivist-law/ last accessed 28 May 2018. Eventually, the issue 
of ensoulment was reinvigorated in the 1970s by the advent of in vitro fertilization.
27  Andorno, R., La bioética y la dignidad de la persona, cited above n. 21, pp. 110-112. Andorno, 
R., La distinction juridique entre les personnes et les choses à l’épreuve des procréations artificielles, 
cited above n. 25, pp. 113 ff. For further analysis, also see: Crosby, J. B., “The personhood of the 
human embryo”, The Journal of Medicine and Philosophy, n° 18(4), (1993), pp. 399-417. With regard 
to the debate on the stats of the human embryo, Professor Roberto Andorno has stressed that definition 
of this issue is a philosophical rather than biological task, and has expressed some criticism about 
those theories which would condition personhood on the achievement of a given stage of embryonic 
development. In this respect, indeed, four stages were highlighted as suitable moments for affirming 
the acquisition of personhood, first of all the achievement of the fourteenth day since fertilization, as 
finally the primitive streak appears and embryonic tissues begin to differentiate. Moreover, another 
argument for this view is that since this moment twinning cannot occur anymore, which was also 
used as a statement in support of the acquired individuality of the embryo. For wider analysis, see: 
Andorno, R., La distinction juridique entre les personnes et les choses à l’épreuve des procréations 
artificielles, cited above n. 25, pp. 120-123. For analysis of the critics to this view, see again Andorno, 
R., La bioética y la dignidad de la persona, cited above n. 21, pp. 113 ff. Eight weeks is another stage 
that was taken into consideration by the “brain life theory”, which would connect personhood to the 
development of a functioning brain; however, this view is criticized by those who also require the 
development of the “critical system of the brain”, which can be found at twenty weeks and which is the 
substrate for such functions as feeling sensations, memory, self-consciousness and learning. Finally, 
another theorization suggested that personhood would be acquired some time after birth, when the 
child develops his or her own self-awareness. For further analysis see SHEA, M. C., “Embryonic life 
and human life”, cited above n. 22, who embraces the view that human life begins “when the newly 
developing body organs and systems begin to function as a whole […] [that] is symmetrical with the 
death of an existing human life, which occurs when its organs and systems have permanently ceased 
to function as a whole”.
28  It is interesting to recall here that roman law recognized the ‘conceptus’ as a person, with 
considerable consequences, since important legal institutions and effects, as the acquisition of 
citizenship and of the status of free man, were related to conception and not to birth. Andorno, 
R., La bioética y la dignidad de la persona, cited above n. 21, p. 120. Also see: Mousourakis, G., 
Fundamentals of Roman Private Law, Heidelberg, New York, Dordrecht, London, Springer, 2012, 
pp. 85 ff. For widening the analysis: Westra, L., Environmental Justice and the Rights of Unborn 
and Future Generations: Law, Environmental Harm and the right to health, Abingdon, New York, 
Earthscan, 2006, pp. 32 ff.
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law.29 Some important attempts to that attempts to define the legal status of 
the unborn in relation to reproductive rights can be found in the jurisprudence 
of the Constitutional Courts around the world. In this regard, the principle of 
human dignity has played a basic role. An emblematic example is offered by 
the French Conseil Constitutionel,30 when it was called on to express its view 
on abortion rights in relation to Article 16 of the Code Civil,31 which protects 
life since conception.32 The Court clarified that the Code Civil grants protection 
to the human embryo and, then, to the foetus in light of the potential of life they 
embody, which justifies constitutional protection in relation to the principle of 
human dignity. At the same time, the Conseil Constitutionel also specified that 
this does not change the fact that legal personhood is acquired at the moment of 
birth, nor it precludes the protection of the right to abortion of the mother.33 In a 
similar vein, with regard to ARTs, the Italian Corte Costituzionale clarified that, 
29  Italy, Poland and South Africa could be cited as examples in this regard. More in particular, 
in this respect it is interesting to highlight a peculiar jurisprudential elaboration that emerged in 
Italy, until the United Chambers of the Supreme Court of Cassation (Corte di Cassazione, Sezioni 
Unite, Judgment n. 25767, of 22 December 2015) denied its existence, due to an intimate ontological 
contradiction. In Italy, the right not to be born if not healthy began to emerge jurisprudentially: in case 
of missed diagnosis of the disease affecting the foetus, the doctor was to be held responsible towards 
the child borne in a condition of impairment, as the mother had not had the chance to abort. The Court 
of Cassation, in late 2015, has put in evidence the contradictions of such conception, stressing that 
Italian law does not contemplate the right not to live and the eugenic risks that a similar view would 
entail. It goes without saying that no right nor protection was accorded to the nasciturus. Again, 
affirmation of medical responsibility towards the child in case of pregnancy damages postulates 
birth. In this regard, see Gaudino, F., “Responsabilità medica: è inesistente il diritto a non nascere 
se non sano”, Diritto 24, (9 February 2016) available at <http://www.diritto24.ilsole24ore.com/art/
dirittoCivile/responsabilita/2016-02-09/responsabilita-medica-e-inestistente-diritto-non-nascere-
se-non-sano-180126.php?refresh_ce=1> last accessed 28 May 2018. In relation to abortion and the 
nasciturus from an Italian perspective, see: La Civiltà cattolica, Edizioni 3043-3048, Anno 128 - 
Volume II - Quaderno 3043 – 2, (Aprile 1977), pp. 3 ff.
30  Conseil Constitutionel, 21 janvier 2016, n° 2015-727 DC: «Considérant, d’une part, qu’en 
supprimant le délai d’une semaine entre la demande de la femme d’interrompre sa grossesse et la 
confirmation écrite de cette demande, le législateur n’a pas rompu l’équilibre que le respect de la 
Constitution impose entre, d’une part, la sauvegarde de la dignité de la personne humaine contre toute 
forme de dégradation et, d’autre part, la liberté de la femme qui découle de l’article 2 de la Déclaration 
de 1789, dès lors que l’article L. 2212-5 du code de la santé publique dans sa rédaction résultant de 
l’article 82 fait obstacle à ce que la demande d’interruption de grossesse et sa confirmation écrite 
interviennent au cours d’une seule et même consultation.»
31  Article 16 of the Code Civil provides that: «La loi assure la primauté de la personne, interdit 
toute atteinte à la dignité de celle-ci et garantit le respect de l’être humain dès le commencement de 
sa vie».
32  Hartman, F., “Conciliation entre l’interruption volontaires de grossese et le respect de la vie et 
de la dignité humaine”, Le droit des personnes et de la famille à l’épreuve des droits fondamentaux 
présenté par l’IEJ de Paris 1 (Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne, 20 July 2016) available at 
<https://iej.univ-paris1.fr/openaccess/libertes-famille/lecon1/sect1/i/a-ivg-respect-vie-dignite/> last 
accessed 28 May 2018.
33  Furthermore, French abortion law, liberalized by the Veil Law in 1975, is a permissive one: 
abortion is legal on demand up to twelve weeks after conception, and it is allowed at later stages 
of pregnancy whether two physicians certify that it aims to prevent grave permanent injury to the 
physical or mental health of the mother or in case her life is at risk, and again if the child will suffer 
from a particularly severe illness recognized as incurable.
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as the human embryo enshrines the beginning of life, it deserves constitutional 
protection on the grounds of Article 2 of the Italian Constitution, which as to 
be read as granting constitutional relevance to human embryo’s dignity.34 In a 
similar fashion, in the American continent, Judge Sergio Valls distinguished the 
right to life and life as a moral good in his Concurring Opinion in the joined 
cases No. 146/2007 and No. 147/2007 before the Colombian Suprema Corte 
Constitucional, and clarified that the right to life, as a subjective right, refers 
to the human person as a rights-bearer, contrarily to “the protection of life in 
general, which also concerns those who still have not [the capacity to hold and 
exercise subjective rights], including the unborn, thus it consists in potential 
life”.35 Interestingly, the Spanish Tribunal Constitucional ,36 that has embraced 
the conception of the progressive development of life,37 has affirmed that 
human embryo should enjoy a specific status.38 Although the human embryo, 
34  Corte Costituzionale, Judgment n. 84 of 13 April 2016, para. 8.2, available at http://www.
federalismi.it/ApplOpenFilePDF.cfm?artid=31711&dpath=document&dfile=13042016135147.pdf
&content=Corte+Costituzionale,+Sentenza+n.+84/2016,+in+tema+di+procreazione+medicalmente
+assistita,+sperimentazione+sugli+embrioni+umani.+-+stato+-+documentazione+-+ last accessed 1 
June 2018. In this regard, also see: Corte Costituzionale, Judgment n. 151 of 1 April 2009, available 
at https://www.cortecostituzionale.it/actionSchedaPronuncia.do?anno=2009&numero=151 last 
accessed 1 June 2018; Corte Costituzionale, Judgment n. 229 of 21 October 2015, available at https://
www.cortecostituzionale.it/actionSchedaPronuncia.do?anno=2015&numero=229 last accessed 1 
June 2018. 
35  Concurring Opinion of Judge Sergio Valls Hernández, Suprema Corte Constitucional, joined cases 
n° 146/2007 and n° 147/2007 (Voto concurrente que formula el Ministro Sergio Valls Hernández, en la 
acción de inconstitucionalidad 146/2007 y su acumulada 147/2007), p. 2. The Mexican Constitutional 
Court has been interestingly proactive in the affirmation and the protection of reproductive rights. In this 
regard, an overview of the Court’s jurisprudence can be found in Madrazo, A., Vela, E., “The Mexican 
Supreme Court’s (Sexual) Revolution?”, Texas Law Review, n° 89, (2011), pp. 1863-1893.
36  In this regard see: Tribunal Constitucional, Judgment n. 53 of 11 April 1985, available at 
http://hj.tribunalconstitucional.es/ca/Resolucion/Show/433 last accessed 28 May 2018; Tribunal 
Constitucional, Judgment n. 212 of 19 December 1996, available at http://hj.tribunalconstitucional.es/
ca/Resolucion/Show/3264 last accessed 28 May 2018; Tribunal Constitucional, Judgment n. 116 of 
17 June 1999, available at http://hj.tribunalconstitucional.es/gl/Resolucion/Show/3858 last accessed 
28 May 2018.
37  The Spanish debate is particularly interesting. Authoritative scholarship has called for a more 
specific definition of the status and the personhood of the human embryo, since its lack may pose the 
risk that embryo is considered as a material thing, if its evolution is intended as the “development 
towards being a human being” instead of the “development of a human being”. This view was held 
also with particular reference to the embryo in vitro, whose personhood was affirmed by those scholars 
who prioritize the protection of its life and was denied by those who support freedom of research and 
identify a set of prevalent entitlements related to the enjoyment of scientific progress for the future and 
possibly also the current generations. In this regard, for a wider analysis, see: Ruiz de la Cuesta, A., 
“El debate doctrinal sobre el principio de la protección de la vida humana. Una lectura crítica desde 
la concepción gradualista o progresiva”, in García San José, D. I., (ed.), Marco Jurídico Europeo 
relativo a la Investigación Biomédica en Transferencia Nuclear y Reprogramación Celular, Sevilla, 
Thomson Reuters-Aranzadi 2012, pp. 25 ff. Also see: Romeo Casabona, C. M., “El estatuto jurídico 
del embrión humano”, Revista de Humanidades Médicas, n° 8(4), (2007), pp. 111-124 and Ollero, A., 
“El estatuto jurídico del embrión humano”, in Ballesteros Llompart, J., Fernández Ruiz-Gálvez, E., 
(eds.), Biotecnología y posthumanismo, Burgos, Thomson Reuters-Aranzadi, 2007, pp. 339 ff.
38  For deeper analysis see Romeo Casabona, C. M., “El estatuto jurídico del embrión humano”, 
cited above n. 36.
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including the embryo in vitro, does not have the right to life, protected under 
Article 15 of the Spanish Constitution, nor it has legal personhood, it cannot 
be compared to material things as to its status, therefore the protection granted 
to constitutionally protected legal goods has to be ensured. This affirmation is 
all the more significant when one considers that Spanish legislation concerning 
human embryo research is one of the most advanced in the world and, for 
instance, allows the use of supernumerary embryos for research purposes.39 
In Latin America, a similar view can be found, emblematically, in the 
jurisprudence of the Corte Constitucional de Colombia, that distinguished 
life as a “moral good” from life as a “legal good”.40 In some countries, the 
protection of the unborn is enshrined in the Constitutional texts and affects the 
margin of discretion of the legislator when dealing with reproductive rights: for 
example the Constitution of Ecuador41 protects the right to life from conception 
and the Constitution of Chile42 protects the life of the “one who is going to be 
borne”. Again, the Irish Constitution43 ensures protection to the right to life of 
39  Vicente Giménez, T., Marzocco, V., Pozzolo, S., Farano, A., “La Subjetividad Político-Jurídica 
de Las Mujeres y La Biotecnología Como Política De Reproducción”, Revista Bioderecho.es - 
Revista Internacional de Investigación en Bioderecho, n°. 3, (2016), available at http://revistas.um.es/
bioderecho/article/view/260301 last accessed 28 May 2018.
40  C-355/2006 de la Corte Constitucional de Colombia. See Javier Aguirre Román, “Análisis de la 
sentencia C-355 de 2006 de la Corte Constitucional sobre la liberalización del aborto en Colombia: 
argumentos iusfilosóficos que sustentan el debate en el marco de la perspectiva de Habermas sobre 
el rol de la religión en la esfera pública. Estudios Socio-Jurídicos”, Estudios Socio-Jurídicos, [S.l.], 
17(2) (2015), 167-198.
41  Article 45 of the Constitution of Ecuador provides that: “[...] El Estado reconocerá y garantizará 
la vida, incluido el cuidado y protección desde la concepción [...]”.
42  Article 19 of the Constitution of Chile – adopted under the regime of Augusto Pinochet, in 1980 - 
provides that “1° El derecho a la vida y a la integridad física y psíquica de la persona. 2° La ley protege 
la vida del que está por nacer”. The second paragraph is the relevant one where it foresees that “[t]he 
law protects the life of those about to be born”. Abortion for medical reasons was legalized in Chile 
in 1931, but an absolute ban on it was set under Pinochet’s regime in 1989. Now, in Chile, abortion 
is allowed in three cases: 1) when mother’s life is at risk; 2) in case of rape during the first 12 weeks 
of pregnancy (14 weeks, if the woman is under 14 years old); 3) when the foetus will not survive the 
pregnancy. The bill decriminalizing abortion under those circumstances was approved by the National 
Congress in August 2017 and become law one month later. The role of President Michelle Bachelet 
was of primary importance in the promotion of a bill that reflected the view of the vast majority of the 
Chilean people – about the 70%, according to an opinion poll conducted by the research firm Cadem. 
Reuters, “Chile passes bill to legalize abortion in certain cases”, The Guardian, 19 July 2017 available 
at https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/jul/19/chile-abortion-mother-rape-life-legalization 
last accessed 15 June 2018; SUMMERS, H., “Endgame nears in Chile president’s fight to temper 
draconian abortion ban”, The Guardian, 16 August 2017, available at https://www.theguardian.com/
global-development/2017/aug/16/chile-abortion-ban-constitiutional-tribunal-michelle-bachelet last 
accessed 15 June 2017; Kozak, O., “‘A triumph of reason’: Chile approves landmark bill to ease 
abortion ban”, The Guardian, 22 August 2017, available at https://www.theguardian.com/global-
development/2017/aug/22/chile-abortion-bill-michelle-bachelet-a-triumph-of-reason-ease-abortion-
ban last accessed 15 June 2018.
43  The relevant provision is Article 40(3) of the Irish Constitution, which provides that: “the State 
acknowledges the right to life of the unborn and, with due regard to the equal right to life of the 
mother, guarantees in its laws to respect, and, as far as practicable, by its laws to defend and vindicate 
that right”. In this regard see: Lawson, R., “The Irish abortion cases: European limits to national 
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the unborn and to “the equal right to life of the mother” and the Constitution of 
Venezuela44 provides some conceptualization of parenthood and reproductive 
rights and protects the rights of the mother since conception.45
Moreover, the nature of reproductive rights itself determines some 
pluralism in their implementation at the domestic level:46 in fact, as some 
scholars have stressed, “conceptually, they are not independent rights, but 
are drawn from other recognized human rights”.47 In particular, reproductive 
rights, which encompass both the right to reproductive health care and the right 
to reproductive self-determination,48 are drawn from the right to health, the 
right to physical integrity, the right to private life, the right to autonomy, the 
right to equality.49 In this regard, it is interesting to recall the words of Sofia 
sovereignty?”, European Journal of Health Law, n° 1, (1994), pp. 167-186.
44  The Constitution of Venezuela protects the right to life at Article 43, which affirms its inviolability 
(“El derecho a la vida es inviolable”). The more targeted provision, for our purposes has to be sought 
at Article 76, which protects paternity and maternity, with a provision that reminds of the tenor of the 
1994 International Conference on Population and Development (ICPD) and of the Cairo Conference 
on Population and Development where it affirms parents’ right to decide the number of their children 
and right to access to the information and the means necessary for this purpose. Namely, Article 76 
foresees that: “La maternidad y la paternidad son protegidas integralmente, sea cual fuere el estado 
civil de la madre o del padre. Las parejas tienen derecho a decidir libre y responsablemente el número 
de hijos e hijas que deseen concebir y a disponer de la información y de los medios que les aseguren 
el ejercicio de este derecho. El Estado garantizará asistencia y protección integral a la maternidad, en 
general a partir del momento de la concepción, durante el embarazo, el parto y el puerperio, y asegurará 
servicios de planificación familiar integral basados en valores éticos y científicos”. This clause can be 
translated in English as follows: “Motherhood and fatherhood are fully protected, whatever the marital 
status of the mother or father. Couples have the right to decide freely and responsibly how many 
children they wish to conceive, and are entitled to access to the information and means necessary 
to guarantee the exercise of this right. The State guarantees overall assistance and protection for 
motherhood, in general, from the moment of conception, throughout pregnancy, delivery and the 
puerperal period, and guarantees full family planning services based on ethical and scientific values”.
45  With regard to the protection of the unborn and reproductive rights in Latin American, with 
particular reference to abortion, it is interesting to listen to the conference held by Dr. Sonia Corrêa 
on the topic “Abortion frontlines: the Latin American context” at the London School of Economics 
and Political Science (LSE Law), in the academic year 2016/2017, available at https://www.youtube.
com/watch?v=WdT06QW26Tg last accessed 28 May 2018. Also see: ARCHIMEDES, S., Gendered 
Pathologies: The Female Body and Biomedical Discourse in the Nineteenth Century English Novel, 
London, New York, Routledge, 2005, p. 114.
46  In this regard, it may be interesting to recall a passage from the above-mentioned Judgment n. 
164/2014 of the Italian Constitutional Court (namely, an excerpt from para.6 of the decision), where 
it clarified that “the choice […] to become parents and to found a family that includes the offspring 
constitutes the expression of the fundamental and general freedom of self-determination which, as 
this Court has affirmed although with regard to distinct ends and in a different context, can be drawn 
from articles 2, 3 and 31 of the Constitution, since it concerns the private and family sphere [of an 
individual]” (the passage from the Italian text of the Judgment reads: “la scelta […] di diventare 
genitori e di formare una famiglia che abbia anche dei figli costituisce espressione della fondamentale 
e generale libertà di autodeterminarsi, libertà che, come questa Corte ha affermato, sia pure ad altri 
fini ed in un ambito diverso, è riconducibile agli artt. 2, 3 e 31 Cost., poiché concerne la sfera privata 
e familiare”.
47  Stopler, G., “Reproductive rights”, Max Planck Encyclopedia of Comparative Constitutional 
Law [MPECCoL], 2017.
48  Ibid. 
49  Ibid.
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Gruskin, who held that “human rights provide an international legal framework 
within which the sexual and reproductive health needs and aspirations of all 
people can be considered”.50
It is in this pluralistic and sensitive scenario that international law and 
international human rights bodies are called on to provide some shared 
standard and adequate responses in order to foster a conceptualization and an 
implementation of reproductive rights respectful of the unborn and capable of 
keeping the pace with scientific progress. It is a basic goal for ensuring a human 
rights-consistent scientific evolution.
2. The status of human embryo and reproductive rights in international law
The pluralism of views that emerges from the biological debate and the 
legal domestic scenario has made and still makes hard the elaboration of shared 
human rights conceptualization and standards for reproductive rights. However, 
some common understanding can be found in international hard and soft law, 
especially thanks to the interpretive efforts of human rights bodies. This is so 
notwithstanding international law offers scant targeted references. An early 
attempt of conceptualization of reproductive rights was made in the context 
of the 1994 International Conference on Population and Development (ICPD), 
held in the framework of the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), also 
known as the Cairo Conference on Population and Development. The 1994 
Cairo Programme of Action,51 when defining reproductive health as “a state of 
complete physical, mental and social well-being and not merely the absence 
of disease or infirmity, in all matters relating to the reproductive system and 
to its functions and processes”, also specified that it implies the capability and 
freedom to reproduce if and when desired.52 This notion also clarified that 
reproductive rights “rest on the recognition of the basic right of all couples and 
individuals to decide freely and responsibly the number, spacing and timing of 
their children and to have the information and means to do so, and the right to 
attain the highest standard of sexual and reproductive health”. This statement 
is particularly important and induced Barbara Crossette, former United Nations 
50  Gruskin, S., (ed.), Perspectives in Health and Human Rights (Taylor and Francis, Routledge, 
London, 2005).
51  United Nations Population Fund, Programme of Action – Adopted at the International Conference 
on Population and Development (ICPD), 5-13 September 1994 (United Nations Population Fund, 
2004) available at https://www.unfpa.org/sites/default/files/event-pdf/PoA_en.pdf last accessed 28 
May 2018.
52  This definition of sexual health was provided on the occasion of 1994 International Conference 
on Population and Development (ICPD). See World Health Organization, Sexual health and its 
linkages to reproductive health: an operational approach, (World Health Organization, Geneva, 
2017), available at http://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/258738/9789241512886-eng.pd
f;jsessionid=5AAD8749B3FEAC851C874B9E1C6816E1?sequence=1 last accessed 28 May 2018.
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Bureau Chief of The New York Times,53 to say that “out of Cairo came no 
less than a revolution”.54 The “revolution” lies in the recognition that “people 
- women and men, mothers and fathers - not governments were the best judges 
of how many children to bring into the world, and where and when”.55 This 
statement represents an acknowledgment of the prevalence of individual 
autonomy over State’s interference in the reproductive field, an interference 
occasionally consisting in the imposition of an ethics conceived as a State 
prerogative.56 Moreover, consistently with their nature of “non-independent 
rights”, the 1994 Cairo Programme of Action also clarifies that “[r]eproductive 
rights embrace certain human rights that are already recognized in national 
laws, international human rights documents and other relevant UN consensus 
documents”. A similar definition of reproductive rights can be found in the 
framework of the World Health Organization (WHO) that, in the 2000s, made 
an important effort to conceptualize reproductive rights through the elaboration 
of the working definitions of “sexual health” and of the related conceptions 
of “sex”, “sexuality” and “sexual rights”.57 The conception of “sexual 
rights” elaborated reminds of the 1994 Cairo Programme of Action where it 
contemplates “the right to decide the number and spacing of one’s children” 
53  In particular, Ms. Crossette made this remark on the occasion of the thirty-seventh session of the 
Commission on Population and Development.
54  See ‘1994 Cairo Conference prompted ‘No Less than a Revolution’, Population and Development 
Commission told’ (United Nations – Press Release, Pop 897, 24 March 2004) available at https://
www.un.org/press/en/2004/pop897.doc.htm last accessed 28 May 2018. It seems relevant to recall 
here that the United Nations have prioritized reproductive rights and, more in general, sexual rights in 
their agenda as one of the Sustainable Development Goals. Indeed, Goal 3.7 requires that “universal 
access to sexual and reproductive health-care services, including for family planning, information 
and education, and the integration of reproductive health into national strategies and programmes” be 
achieved by 2030. For further information and for an overview of the Sustainable Development Goals, 
see the website http://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/sustainable-development-goals.html last 
accessed 28 May 2018. In particular, with reference to Goal 3.7 concerning universal access to sexual 
and reproductive health-care services, see http://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/sustainable-
development-goals/goal-3-good-health-and-well-being/targets/. The commitment of the UN has 
also led to the creation of the UNDP/UNFPA/UNICEF/WHO/World Bank Special Programme of 
Research, Development and Research Training in Human Reproduction (HRP), a concerted multi-
partner programme which plays a fundamental role in gathering various types of expertise, as policy-
makers, scientists, health care providers, clinicians, consumers and community representatives, and in 
promoting research and dissemination and effective application of its results in order to ensure sexual 
and reproductive health all over the globe, especially in developing countries. For further information, 
see the HRP website at http://www.who.int/life-course/partners/human-reproduction/en/ last accessed 
28 May 2018.
55  See ‘1994 Cairo Conference prompted ‘No Less than a Revolution’, Population and Development 
Commission told’ (United Nations – Press Release, Pop 897, 24 March 2004) available at https://
www.un.org/press/en/2004/pop897.doc.htm last accessed 28 May 2018.
56  RODOTÀ, S., Il diritto di avere diritti, cited above n. 9, pp. 86, 87.
57  The efforts for conceptualization of sexual health within the WHO began in 2002 and the 
working definitions elaborated were published in 2006 and updated in 2010. For an overview of 
the WHO’s Working Definitions on sexual health, see the WHO website at http://www.who.int/
reproductivehealth/topics/sexual_health/sh_definitions/en/ last accessed 28 May 2018.
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among the rights “critical for the realization of sexual health”.58 Both the WHO 
working definitions and the 1994 Cairo Programme of Action are sources of 
soft law, thus, they are not binding. What is more, the WHO does not produce 
such “general normative frameworks of a predominantly philosophical and 
legal nature” as, for example, the UNESCO.59 However they are relevant from 
58  From a wider perspective, the WHO has developed several initiatives in the framework of 
reproductive rights. An interesting example is: World Health Organization (WHO), Safe abortion: 
technical and policy guidance for health systems (World Health Organization, Geneva, 2012), 
available at http://www.who.int/reproductivehealth/publications/unsafe_abortion/9789241548434/
en/ last accessed 28 May 2018 . For further information, see the website For an overview of 
the commitment of the WHO and its initiatives and publications, see http://www.who.int/
reproductivehealth/topics/unsafe_abortion/en/ last accessed 28 May 2018. In particular, on unsafe 
abortion: http://www.who.int/bulletin/volumes/92/3/14-136333/en/ last accessed 28 May 2018. The 
World Health Organization (WHO), which participates in UN HRC Programme, that was mentioned 
previously in the footnotes, has adopted several initiatives in the field of reproductive rights, being 
the WHO meeting on education and treatment in human sexuality of 1974 one of the earliest steps. 
The WHO’s commitment in the field of sexual health has grown through the decades, especially after 
the 1994 International Conference on Population and Development (ICPD), under the impulse of 
the acknowledgment of the important health burden that several sexual and reproductive conditions 
imply. Some reference in this regard can be found in World Health Organization, Sexual health and 
its linkages to reproductive health: an operational approach, 2017, available at http://apps.who.int/
iris/bitstream/handle/10665/258738/9789241512886-eng.pdf;jsessionid=5AAD8749B3FEAC851C8
74B9E1C6816E1?sequence=1 last accessed 28 May 2018. During the 2000s the WHO’s commitment 
in this field has intensified and has led to such outcomes as the WHO’s global “Reproductive health 
strategy to accelerate progress towards the attainment of international development goals and targets”, 
endorsed by the World Health Assembly in 2004, and the Framework for action on developing sexual 
health programmes, adopted in 2010. What is more, the WHO has explicitly acknowledged the 
interrelationship between human rights and the achievement of sexual health on several occasions, 
one of the most recent examples is the Report of Sexual Health, Human Rights and the Law, issued in 
2015, that assessed how States’ tackle sexual health and their compliance with human rights standards 
and obligations. For further analysis and consultation, see: World Health Organization, Reproductive 
health strategy to accelerate progress towards the attainment of international development goals and 
targets. Global strategy adopted by the 57th World Health Assembly (World Health Organization, 
Geneva, 2004) For more information and to access the text of the publication see http://www.who.int/
reproductivehealth/publications/general/RHR_04_8/en/ last accessed 28 May 2018.
World Health Organization, Developing sexual health programmes. A framework for action (World 
Health Organization, Geneva, 2010). For more information, see http://www.who.int/reproductivehealth/
publications/sexual_health/rhr_hrp_10_22/en/ last accessed 28 May 2018 and for accessing the text of 
the Framework see http://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/70501/WHO_RHR_HRP_10.22_
eng.pdf?sequence=1 last accessed 28 May 2018. The Framework identified five domains in relation to 
States’ programming for sexual health, namely laws, policies and human rights, education, society and 
culture, economics, and health. Moreover, “using a multisectoral rights-based approach, it outlines 
elements of a programme-based response, together with key entry points for the promotion of sexual 
health by providing information and support for both broad based and targeted community education 
initiatives”. World Health Organization, Sexual health, human rights and the law, June 2015, available 
at http://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/175556/9789241564984_eng.pdf?sequence=1 last 
accessed 28 May 2018.
59  Andorno, R., “Global bioethics at UNESCO: in defence of the Universal Declaration on 
Bioethics and Human Rights”, Journal of Medical Ethics, n° 33(3), (March 2007), pp. 150–154, 152; 
Emanuel, E.j., Grady, C., “Four Paradigms of Clinical Research and Research Oversight”, Cambridge 
Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics, 16, (2006), 82–96, Emanuel, E.j., Wendler, D., Killen, J., Grady, 
C., “What Makes Clinical Research in Developing Countries Ethical? The Benchmarks of Ethical 
Research”, The Journal of Infectious Diseases, n° 189, (2004), pp. 930–937. Reference is made here 
specifically to the Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights, the Universal Declaration 
673The protection of the right to life at the intersection between reproductive rights and scientific progress in the jurisprudence of the Inter-American Court of 
Human Rights and the European Court of Human Rights
Araucaria. Revista Iberoamericana de Filosofía, Política, Humanidades y Relaciones Internacionales, año 20, nº 40. 
Segundo semestre de 2018. Pp. 655-732.  ISSN 1575-6823  e-ISSN 2340-2199  doi: 10.12795/araucaria.2018.i40.27
various viewpoints: primarily, because soft law instruments can promote the 
development of hard international law. Secondly, because these instruments are 
indicative of an international convergence of views about reproductive rights. 
This convergence of views can be found in the jurisprudence of 
international human rights bodies, whose basic importance was indirectly 
recalled in the WHO’s working definition on “sexual rights” where it stressed 
that “[t]he fulfilment of sexual health is tied to the extent to which human rights 
are respected, protected and fulfilled”. In the interpretation of their respective 
reference instruments, human rights bodies have shown clear understanding 
of the fact that “[s]exual rights embrace certain human rights that are already 
recognized in international and regional human rights documents and other 
consensus documents and in national laws”60 and their interpretive efforts have 
concurred to elucidate the content of several reproductive entitlements and the 
corresponding States’ duties. The importance of their interpretive role is all the 
more clear when it is observed that international hard law provides very little 
targeted legal bases expressly embodying reproductive rights. In this respect, 
an interesting exception is Article 14 of the Protocol to the African Charter on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa (the so called 
“Maputo Protocol”),61 that expressly protects “health and reproductive rights”. 
In particular, the provision explicitly embodies the right to fertility, to access to 
contraception and to receive information about a woman’s own sexual health 
and the sexual health of her partner, especially whether he is affected by sexually 
transmitted diseases as HIV and the right to self-protection and to protection 
from sexually transmitted diseases, besides the right to decide the number and 
spacing of her children and to have family planning education. The provision 
also defines States duties to provide “adequate, affordable and accessible health 
services, including information, education and communication programmes”, 
which also have to cover all stages of pregnancy and also the post-natal and 
breastfeeding phase. Importantly, Article 14. 2 (c) provides States’ duty “to 
protect the reproductive rights of women by authorising medical abortion”. 
The provision has received some criticism as it does not contemplate that 
access to abortion is ensured in case of socio-economic reasons and on request. 
This concern seems reasonable, especially when one considers that in Africa 
on Human Genome and Human Rights and the International Declaration on Human Genetic Data. 
These instruments constitute soft law sources but at the same time they have legal nature, as they were 
adopted in an intergovernmental context, which grants them a peculiar authoritativeness, and they 
have had the capacity to convey some international convergence of views on their content.
60  This statement, contained in the WHO working definition of “sexual rights”, recalls the non-
independent nature of reproductive rights.
61  African Union, Protocol to the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights on the Rights of 
Women in Africa (adopted 11 July 2003, entered into force 25 November 2005), available at http://
www.achpr.org/instruments/women-protocol/ last accessed 30 May 2018.
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abortion is still generally seen as a taboo.62 However, it may also be argued 
that the relevance of the provision as a targeted legal basis should not be 
underestimated, as well as the express prioritization of mother’s rights over 
those of the unborn that it embodies. Moreover, the scope of the provision 
has to be taken into account in light of the guidance provided by the African 
Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (AfCHPR) that, in its General 
Comment No. 2 on Article 14.1 (a), (b), (c) and (f) and Article 14. 2 (a) and 
(c) of the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on 
the Rights of Women in Africa has improved the threshold of protection to be 
ensured to abortion rights through a combined reading of Article 14(2)(c) of 
the Maputo Protocol with the right to enjoy the benefits of scientific progress 
enshrined in Article 15(1)(b) of the International Covenant on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights (ICESCR). In this vein, the AfCHPR has clarified that “[w]
omen see themselves denied the right to benefit from the fruits of this progress 
as soon as they are denied the means to interrupt an unwanted pregnancy 
safely, using effective modern services”. At the universal level, the Committee 
on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women so far has 
provided a similar but not fully corresponding reading of Article 16(e) of the 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women 
(CEDAW),63 which foresees that women and men have equal “rights to decide 
freely and responsibly on the number and spacing of their children and to have 
access to the information, education and means to enable them to exercise these 
rights”. In this case, the Committee has not defined States’ duties as including 
the obligation to ensure the right to the benefits of scientific progress but, in its 
Concluding Observations addressing Costa Rica, it has expressed its concern 
for the lack of “safest and technologically advanced contraceptive methods” in 
addition to the lack of safe, legal abortion, and has urged the State to “ensure 
access to assisted reproductive services,” which includes IVF. Moreover, in in 
its reports,64 the Committee has usually relied on Article 16(e) of the CEDAW 
for urging States to decriminalize abortion. Interestingly enough, in 2016 the 
Committee has also praised Argentina for passing legislation that regulated and 
62  Indeed, Article 14 of the Maputo Protocol foresees that State shall take all the appropriate 
measures to ensure abortion in case of sexual assault, rape, incest, when it endangers the mother’s 
mental and physical health and the life of the mother and the child. NABANEH, S., “A purposive 
interpretation of Article 14(2)(c) of the African Women’s Protocol to include abortion on request and 
for socio-economic reasons”, A dissertation submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements of the 
degree LLM (Human Rights and Democratisation in Africa).
63  Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, cited above n. 5.
64  Two interesting examples are Chile and, in the United Kingdom, Northern Ireland. The 
Committee addressed the latter quite recently, in early 2018, to ensure access to abortion when it is 
therapeutic and when the mother’s psychical health is endangered. The case of Northern Ireland seems 
particularly interesting as it is comparable to El Salvador, since both countries provide long-lasting 
imprisonment, and these measures are likely to amount to torture or inhuman or degrading treatment, 
besides constituting a gender-based discrimination.
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ensured access to all scientific methods of assisted reproductive technology 
(ART).65
The urge for decriminalization of abortion is a common trait of the 
jurisprudence of also other universal human rights bodies, which shows 
a generalized prioritization of the mother’s rights to life, to physical and 
mental integrity and to private life over the protection of the unborn at the 
international level. In this sense, the Committee on the Rights of the Child, 
in its General comment No. 4 (2003): Adolescent Health and Development in 
the Context of the Convention on the Rights of the Child,66 has stressed that 
adequate protection has to be ensured under the Convention on the Rights of 
the Child (CRC)67 in case of early pregnancy, through access to sexual and 
reproductive health service, including abortion “where it is not against the 
law”.68 Furthermore, the Committee has urged States Parties to decriminalize 
abortion,69 in order to “reduce maternal morbidity and mortality in adolescent 
girls, particularly caused by early pregnancy and unsafe abortion practice”.70 
This reading of States’ duties under the CRC is not precluded by the statement 
contained the Preamble of the Convention, according to which the child “needs 
special safeguards and care, including appropriate legal protection, before as 
well as after birth”.71 Indeed, “it was not [intended] to preclude the possibility 
65  CEDAW Committee, Concluding Observations: Argentina, paras. 4(d), 32, U.N. Doc. 
CEDAW/C/ARG/CO/7 (2016).
66  UN Committee on the Rights of the Child (CRC), General comment No. 4 (2003): Adolescent 
Health and Development in the Context of the Convention on the Rights of the Child, 1 July 2003, 
CRC/GC/2003/4, available at http://www.refworld.org/docid/4538834f0.html last accessed 28 May 
2018, para. 27.
67  Convention on the Rights of the Child, cited above n. 4.
68  UN Committee on the Rights of the Child (CRC), General comment No. 4 (2003), para. 27.
69  For example, see the Concluding Observations adopted by the Committee on the Rights of 
the Child which urged States to decriminalize abortion, as for example Chile, Nicaragua and, more 
recently, in 2016, Ireland and to ensure adequate protection to pregnant young girls in need of a 
therapeutic abortion, as it was the case for Chad and Costa Rica. See: Concluding observations, 
CRC, Chile, CRC/C/15/Add.173, 03 April 2002; UN Committee on the Rights of the Child (CRC), 
UN Committee on the Rights of the Child: Concluding Observations, Chile, 23 April 2007, CRC/C/
CHL/CO/3; UN Committee on the Rights of the Child (CRC), Consideration of reports submitted by 
States parties under article 44 of the Convention : Convention on the Rights of the Child : concluding 
observations : Nicaragua, 20 October 2010, CRC/C/NIC/CO/4; Committee on the Rights of the Child, 
Concluding Observations on Chad, CRC/C/15/Add.107 (1999); CEDAW/C/DOM/CO/6-7 (2013), 
para. 37(c); Committee on the Rights of the Child, Concluding Observations on Costa Rica, CRC 
/C/CRI/CO/4 (2011); UN Committee on the Rights of the Child (CRC), Concluding observations 
on the combined third and fourth periodic reports of Ireland, 29 January 2016, CRC/C/IRL/CO/3-4. 
Also see: Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Concluding Observations on United 
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, E/C.12/GBR/CO/5 (2009).
70  UN Committee on the Rights of the Child (CRC), General comment No. 4 (2003): Adolescent 
Health and Development in the Context of the Convention on the Rights of the Child, 1 July 2003, 
CRC/GC/2003/4, para. 27, available at http://www.refworld.org/docid/4538834f0.html last accessed 
31 May 2018.
71  Declaration on the Rights of the Child, Proclaimed by General Assembly Resolution 1386(XIV) 
of 20 November 1959. This was the basis of the basis of the Convention of the Rights of the Child, 
Preamble. https://www.unicef.org/malaysia/1959-Declaration-of-the-Rights-of-the-Child.pdf last 
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of an abortion”, as clarified during the travaux préparatoires.72 Furthermore, 
this interpretation is consistent with Article 24 of the CRC73 that “ensure[s] 
appropriate pre-natal and post-natal health care for mothers”;74 this is all the 
more true when one considers that the content of this provision was reversed 
during the travaux préparatoires, as the original wording prioritized the 
protection of, the unborn.75
In a similar fashion, the Human Rights Committee (HRC), the monitoring 
body of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR),76 
in its General Comment No. 28 on “The Equality of Rights between Men and 
Women”,77 has clarified that States are bound “to ensure that [women] do not 
accessed 29 May 2018. For wider analysis, see: Joseph, R., Human Rights and the Unborn Child, 
Leiden, Boston, Martinus Nijhoff Publisher, 2009. pp. 5 ff, who otherwise holds that although this 
statement is not binding however, since it is contained in the Preamble, it influences the interpretation of 
the whole CRC according to the interpretive rules enshrined in Article 31(2) of the Vienna Convention 
on the Law of the Treaties. See: Hulme, M. H., “Preambles in treat interpretation”, University of 
Pennsylvania Law Review, n° 164, (2016), pp. 1281-1343.
72  Consideration 1980 Working Group, E/CN.4/L. 1542, PP. 2-5. During the travaux préparatoires, 
it was also clarified that this statement contained in the Preamble of the CRC, which echoes the 
Declaration of the Rights of the Child 1959 and was suggested by the Holy See, did not prejudice the 
interpretation of Article 1 of the CRC, on the definition of childhood, either. In particular, Article 1 
defines a child as “every human being below the age of eighteen years”, a notion that is extended to 
prenatal life. 
73  Convention on the Rights of the Child, adopted and opened for signature, ratification and accession 
by General Assembly resolution 44/25 of 20 November 1989, entry into force 2 September 1990, 
available at http://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/crc.aspx last accessed 29 May 2018. 
74  Meza-Lopehandía G., M., “El aborto en el derecho internacional de los derechos humanos”, 
Biblioteca Nacional del Congreso Nacional del Chile, Departamento de Estudios, Estensión y 
Publicaciones, 7 de noviembre de 2016, p. 7. In this regard, see UN Committee on the Rights of 
the Child (CRC), General comment No. 7 (2005): Implementing Child Rights in Early Childhood, 
20 September 2006, CRC/C/GC/7/Rev.1, available at http://www.refworld.org/docid/460bc5a62.html 
last accessed 28 May 2018. The General Comment, at para. 27(2), has urged States Parties to protect 
mothers’ health by ensuring “[p]riority […] to the provision of appropriate prenatal and post-natal 
health care for mothers and infants”.
75  Indeed, the 1978 Draft of the Convention that, at the then Article IV that provided that Sates 
shall provide special care to both the child and the mother, including of prenatal and postnatal 
nature. Finally, the provision modified, especially in consideration of the fact that many negotiating 
States allowed abortion in their legal order, as the representative of Austria underlined. For wider 
analysis of the travaux préparatoires of the Convention on the Rights of the Child, see Detrick, S., 
Doek, J. E., Cantwell, N., The United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child: A Guide to the 
“Travaux Préparatoires” (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Dordrecht, Boston, London, 1992) and Meza-
Lopehandía G., M., “El aborto en el derecho internacional de los derechos humanos”, cited above 
n. 73, p. 8. In this regard, also see Paulk, L. B., “Embryonic Personhood: Implications for Assisted 
Reproductive Technology in International Human Rights Law”, American University Journal of 
Gender Social Policy and Law, n° 22(4), 2014, pp. 781-823, in particular where the Author stresses 
that “[c]learly, the drafters did not want the Preamble’s language to be interpreted as granting rights 
to the unborn”, at p. 799.
76  International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, cited above n. 3.
77  UN Human Rights Committee (HRC), CCPR General Comment No. 28: Article 3 (The Equality 
of Rights Between Men and Women), 29 March 2000, CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.10, https://adsdatabase.
ohchr.org/IssueLibrary/HRC%20General%20Comment%2028.pdf last accessed 1 June 2018, paras. 
10 and 11, and 20, respectively on safe abortion and doctors’ duty to report cases of women who have 
undergone abortion.
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have to undergo life-threatening clandestine abortions”78 in relation to the 
protection of the right to life, enshrined in Article 6 of the Covenant. The fact 
that the protection of the unborn does not fall within the scope of this provision 
could already be inferred from the travaux préparatoires of the ICCPR: an 
amendment that was aimed at incorporating the specification that life begins at 
conception in Article 6 of the Covenant, which provides that “[e]very human 
being has the inherent right to life”, was rejected.79 Furthermore, in its periodical 
reports, the HRC has exhorted States to decriminalize abortion and ensure that 
women can access it in three cases, namely the existence of a risk for their life, 
rape and incest; the first ground prioritizes the mother’s life over the life of the 
unborn, whilst the other grounds prioritize mother’s mental health, dignity and 
autonomy.80 Moreover, the HRC has deemed that State’s interference due to 
the imposition of doctors’ duty to report cases of women who have undergone 
abortion amounts to a breach of the prohibition of torture or cruel, inhuman 
or degrading treatment under Article 7 of the Covenant.81 The Committee 
had the chance to elucidated further the scope of this provision in relation to 
reproductive rights when, in the K.L. v. Peru case,82 it considered the individual 
communication of a young mother who was pregnant of an anencephalic baby. 
In this case, the HRC found that the denial of therapeutic abortion amounted 
to a breach of Article 7 of the ICCPR, since “[t]he omission on the part of the 
State in not enabling the author to benefit from a therapeutic abortion was, in 
the Committee’s view, the cause of the suffering she experienced” 83 and “the 
right set out in article 7 of the Covenant relates not only to physical pain but 
also to mental suffering, and that the protection is particularly important in 
the case of minors”, which made unnecessary to make a finding on Article 6 
78  Ibid, para. 10.
79  Meza-Lopehandía G., M., “El aborto en el derecho internacional de los derechos humanos”, 
cited above n. 73. The rejection of the amendment intended to introduce the specification “from 
conception” also seems to refute the view that the unborn would be a human rights bearer according to 
the statement, contained in the Preamble, that “rights of all members of the human family … [which] 
derive from the inherent dignity of the human person”. Again, it would not seem convincing the view 
that would conclude for the inclusion of prenatal life within the scope of Article 6 of the ICCPR in 
light of the statement embodied in paragraph 5 thereof, which provides that “[s]entence of death […] 
shall not be carried out on pregnant women”. This provision, indeed, is to be related to the prohibition 
to carry out sentences of death on minor subjects. This reading of the scope of the right to life under 
the ICCPR seems to be consistent with the subsequent interpretation of Article 6 of the Covenant 
offered by the Human Rights Committee (HRC). See: Joseph, R., Human Rights and the Unborn 
Child, cited above n. 70, pp. 135 ff. See also: Yoshihara, S., “Book review of “Human Rights and 
the Unborn Child by Rita Joseph””, available at http://c-fam.org/wp-content/uploads/Q11.3_Joseph_
revYoshihara.pdf last visited 28 May 2018.
80  Meza-Lopehandía G., M., “El aborto en el derecho internacional de los derechos humanos”, 
cited above n. 73, p. 6.
81  K.L. v. Peru, Communication No. 1153/2003, UN Doc. CCPR/C/85/D/1153/2003 (2005).
82 Ibid. The HRC has also clarified that reproductive rights include the right to decide the number 
and timing of children, that was considered especially to the forced sterilization cases, and which 
reflects the generalized view enshrined in the above-mentioned soft law instruments.
83  Ibid., para. 6.3.
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of the ICCPR.84 The refusal to terminate the pregnancy was unjustified, thus 
the Committee also found a breach of the right to private life protected under 
Article 17 of the Covenant.85 The HRC has extended its urge also to ARTs 
and, its Concluding Observations about Costa Rica,86 has called on the State 
to “do all it can to pursue its stated intention to eliminate the ban on in vitro 
fertilization and to prevent excessive restrictions from being placed on the 
exercise of the rights set out in articles 17 and 23 of the Covenant by persons 
who wish to avail themselves of that technology”.87
It is interesting and important to stress that the prioritization of the mother’s 
rights could already be found in the travaux préparatoires of the Universal 
Declaration on Human Rights (UDHR), that is considered the archetype of 
UN human rights instruments and which, moreover, is a basic reference in 
international human rights law despite it is a resolution and not a treaty. Indeed, 
during the preparatory works, the rejection of an amendment that required 
to specify that life begins at conception indicated that where Article 1 of the 
UDHR provides that “[a]ll human beings are born free and equal in dignity 
and rights”, it does not mean that the unborn has the rights enshrined in the 
Declaration.88
Conclusively, it seems of fundamental importance to recall that recently 
General Comment No. 22 (2016)89 on the right to sexual and reproductive health 
84  The HRC had clarified this issue in Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 20: 
Prohibition of torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment (art. 7), 10 
March 1992 (HRI/GEN/1/Rev.7, paras. 2 and 5), available at http://hrlibrary.umn.edu/gencomm/
hrcom20.htm last accessed 28 May 2018.
85  In this regard, see para. 6.4 of the Communication of the HRC. Moreover, the HRC also found 
a breach of Article 2 of the ICCPR, which protects the right to an adequate remedy, and of Article 
24, pursuant to which States are bound to ensure special protection to the rights of the minors. In this 
regard, see paras. 6.6 and 6.5 of the decision of the HRC.
86  Human Rights Committee, Concluding Observations: Costa Rica, paras. 19-20, U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/CRI/CO/6 (2016).
87  Ibid., para. 20.
88  The UDHR foresees that “everyone has the right to life” at Article 3, but the hub of the discussion 
at the intersection between the protection of prenatal life and recognition of reproductive rights has to 
be sought in the above-mentioned Article 1 that, as mentioned, enshrines a quite evocative expression 
where it says that “[a]ll human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights”. Reference to birth 
is evocative in many respects: it may be intended as a reference to the jusnaturalist conception that 
human rights are inborn, which raised some criticism from the then soviet countries, or it may be read 
in light of specific national perspective, as it was the case for Syria, which intended the wording of the 
provision as a form of protection from slavery from birth. As said above, some pressures were made 
for introducing an amendment that extended the protection of life from conception, but it was rejected. 
Again, for instance, France explicitly clarified that the statement contained in Article 1 of the UDHR 
was intended to protect rights “from the moment of birth.” In this respect, it seems at odds with the 
views expressed in scholarship, which argued that UN General Assembly Third Committee invited the 
negotiating States not to use their national laws to water down the content of the UDHR, a statement 
that this scholarship suggested to intend also with regard to the right to life and the possible impact of 
abortion laws on the understanding of its scope. See: Joseph, R., Human Rights and the Unborn Child, 
cited above n. 70, pp. 135 ff. See also: Yoshihara, S., “Book review of “Human Rights and the Unborn 
Child by Rita Joseph””, cited above n. 70.
89  UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General comment No. 22 (2016) on the 
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(article 12 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights) 
of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the monitoring body 
of the ICESCR, has defined reproductive rights as part of the core of “the right of 
everyone to the highest attainable physical and mental health”90 and its enjoyment. 
In particular, it has clarified that “[t]he right to sexual and reproductive health is 
an integral part of the right to health enshrined in article 12 of the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights”.91 What is more, the General 
Comment has incorporated “technological advances and innovations” within the 
standard of “quality”, when dealing with the 4 A-Scheme that characterizes the 
Committee’s approach to the elucidation of several entitlements protected under 
the Covenant, including health. In particular, General Comment No. 22 (2016) 
clarifies that “[t]he failure or refusal to incorporate technological advances and 
innovations in the provision of sexual and reproductive health services, such as 
medication for abortion, assisted reproductive technologies and advances in the 
treatment of HIV and AIDS, jeopardizes the quality of care”.92
Despite the pluralism that characterizes the scientific and the domestic 
legal debate at the intersection between the protection of the unborn and 
reproductive rights, at the international level a shared, core conception can 
be found as to the scope of abortion and reproductive rights and, generally, 
the prevalence of the protection of the mother. Also access to ARTs and, in 
particular, to IVF has achieved generalized understanding and acceptance in 
this framework. Interestingly, the path to affirm the enjoyment of reproductive 
rights and the related technologies under the right to enjoy the benefits of 
scientific progress has been paved at the regional level. That being said, the 
question now is to assess whether also the ECtHR and the IACtHR have 
adopted the same approach and, if so, to which extent.
3. Reproductive challenges in the jurisprudence of the ECtHR
The European Court of Human Rights has developed an advanced approach 
in the field of biolaw which is unique in the international legal scenario and is 
representative of the nature of the ECHR as a “living instrument”,93 capable of 
right to sexual and reproductive health (article 12 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights), 2 May 2016, E/C.12/GC/22, available at http://docstore.ohchr.org/SelfServices/
FilesHandler.ashx?enc=4slQ6QSmlBEDzFEovLCuW1a0Szab0oXTdImnsJZZVQfQejF41Tob4CvIj
eTiAP6sGFQktiae1vlbbOAekmaOwDOWsUe7N8TLm%2BP3HJPzxjHySkUoHMavD%2Fpyfcp3
Ylzg accessed 28 May 2018.
90  Ibid., para 11
91  Ibid., para. 1
92  Ibid., para. 21
93  The conception of the ECHR as a living instrument was first introduced by the ECtHR in the 
Tyrer v. United Kingdom, (Appl. No. 5856/72) Judgment of 25 April 1978, Series A no. 26, para. 
31. For further examples, see: Goodwin v United Kingdom (Appl. No. 17488/90) Judgment of 27 
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keeping the pace with the challenges posed by evolution in all fields including, 
of course, scientific progress. In this regard, the fruitful outcomes of the Court’s 
jurisprudence are clearly helped by the normative framework of the Council of 
Europe in the field of biolaw,94 that represents the most advanced experience at 
both the universal and regional level, and encompasses such areas as euthanasia, 
genetics and biomedical research. 
Reproductive rights were not neglected. The importance of their protection 
was clarified by the Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights Nils 
Muižnieks when he said that “[w]omen’s sexual and reproductive health and 
rights are human rights [and] States must resolutely commit to advancing gender 
equality in this crucial sphere of life. They have the duty to provide all women 
with accessible, affordable, good quality sexual and reproductive health care 
and services”. This view, that is developed from a gender perspective, underlies 
the “Issue Paper on Women’s sexual and reproductive health and rights” which 
clearly affirms States’ duty to ensure the enjoyment of reproductive rights and 
access to abortion. This view is in line with the core conception that can be 
found at the international level. When dealing with the human embryo and the 
foetus, the focus of the COE was principally set on the protection in the field of 
biomedical research, in order to define its possibilities but also its limitations 
and, in this context, some consideration was given to ARTs and especially 
to IVF. In this regard, Recommendation 1046 (1986) of the Parliamentary 
Assembly of the Council of Europe on the use of human embryos and foetuses 
for diagnostic, therapeutic, scientific, industrial and commercial purposes,95 
called on the Governments of Member States “to forbid any creation of human 
embryos by fertilisation in vitro for the purposes of research during their 
March 1996, para. 74; Demir and Baykara v Turkey (Appl. No. 34503/97) Judgment of 12 November 
2008, paras. 68 and 146. Among the decisions related to prenatal life and reproductive rights, a 
remarkable example is Vo. v. France, no. 53924/00, § 35, Judgment of 8 July 2004, para. 82 and 
the Dissenting Opinion of Judge Mularoni, Joined by Judge Strážnická. Letsas, G., “The ECHR as 
a living instrument: Its meaning and legitimacy”, in Constituting Europe: The European Court of 
Human Rights in a National, European and Global Context, Føllesdal, A., Peters, B., Ulfstein, G., 
Cambridge, New York, Melbourne, Madrid, Cape Town, Singapore, São Paulo, Delhi, Mexico City, 
Cambridge University Press, 2010, pp. 106-141.
94  It is undeniable that the experience of the Council of Europe, from a comprehensive viewpoint, 
is more advanced when compared to other regional realities and it also stands out at the universal 
level: it goes without saying that the UNESCO has been capable of adopting very important soft law 
tools, namely “its” Declarations in the field of bioethics, which have legal nature and are significant 
for the understanding of the common international views they enshrine.
95  Council of Europe, Parliamentary Assembly, Recommendation 1046 (1986) of the 
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe on the use of human embryos and foetuses for 
diagnostic, therapeutic, scientific, industrial and commercial purposes, Assembly debate on 19 and 
24 September 1986 (13th and 18th Sittings) (see Doc. 5615Doc. 5615, report of the Legal Affairs 
Committee, Doc. 5628, opinion of the Committee on Science and Technology, and Doc. 5635, 
opinion of the Social and Health Affairs Committee). Text adopted by the Assembly on 24 September 
1986 (18th Sitting), available online at http://assembly.coe.int/nw/xml/XRef/Xref-XML2HTML-en.
asp?fileid=15080&lang=en accessed 2 June 2018.
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life or after death”.96 Some more elucidation is offered by Recommendation 
1100 (1989) of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe on the 
use of human embryos and foetuses in scientific research97 where it calls on 
States “to take steps to guarantee that society is informed simply, accurately 
and sufficiently of activities involving techniques of assisted fertilisation and 
related techniques, and more specifically of fertilisation in vitro and the use 
of human gametes, embryos or foetuses for scientific investigation or other 
purposes”.98 Moreover, the Recommendation provides some clarification in 
relation to the definition of the status of the embryo, where it states that the 
human embryo, from the stage of the zygote to that of the foetus, “displays 
also a progressive differentiation as an organism and none the less maintains a 
continuous biological and genetic identity”.99
Besides the relevant soft law tools, the most interesting references for our 
purposes can be found in the Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine 
(the so called “Oviedo Convention”) and its Additional Protocols, which is 
unique in the landscape of international law, as it is the only existing hard law 
instrument in the field of biolaw. Considering the pluralism that characterizes 
this area, this achievement is a milestone, also because it enshrines a human-
rights based approach. The Oviedo Convention does not expressly address the 
issue of the beginning of life or reproductive rights. Nonetheless, at Article 
14 it specifies that “techniques of medically assisted procreation shall not be 
allowed for the purpose of choosing a future child’s sex, except where serious 
hereditary sex-related disease is to be avoided”100 and, at Article 18, it clarifies 
96  Ibid., see paras. 3 and 14.1.3. It seems interesting to stress here also that, at para. 14.1.7, it has 
called on States “to facilitate and encourage the creation of national multidisciplinary committees 
or commissions on artificial human reproduction involving scientific activities concerning genetic 
material, human embryos and foetuses - to guide and counsel the medical and scientific authorities, to 
follow and control the application of such techniques and to authorise specific projects in the absence 
of concrete legislation or regulation”.
97  Council of Europe, Parliamentary Assembly, Recommendation n. 1100 (1989) “Use of human 
embryos and foetuses in scientific research”, Assembly debate on 2 February 1989 (24th Sitting) 
(see Doc. 5943, report of the Committee on Science and Technology, Rapporteur: Mr Palacios; 
Doc. 5989, opinion of the Social, Health and Family Affairs Committee, Rapporteur: Mrs Hubinek ; 
andDoc. 5996, report of the Legal Affairs Committee, Rapporteur: Mr Elmquist). Text adopted by the 
Assembly on 2 February 1989 (24th Sitting), para. 7, available at http://assembly.coe.int/nw/xml/xref/
xref-xml2html-en.asp?fileid=15134&lang=en last accessed 2 June 2018.
98  Ibid., para. 9.2.2.
99  Council of Europe, Resolution 1352 (2003) of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of 
Europe on human stem cell research, Origin - Assembly debate on 2 October 2003 (33rd Sitting) 
(see Doc. 9902report of the Committee on Culture, Science and Education, rapporteur: Mr Wodarg; 
and Doc. 9942opinion of the Social, Health and Family Affairs Committee, rapporteur: Mr Høie). 
Text adopted by the Assembly on 2 October 2003 (33rd Sitting) that, at para. 10, has held that “[t]he 
destruction of human beings for research purposes is against the right to life of all humans and against 
the moral ban on any instrumentalisation of humans”, available at http://www.assembly.coe.int/nw/
xml/XRef/Xref-XML2HTML-EN.asp?fileid=17158&lang=en last accessed 20 June 2018.
100  Council of Europe, Convention for the protection of Human Rights and Dignity of the Human 
Being with regard to the Application of Biology and Medicine: Convention on Human Rights and 
682 Simona Fanni
Araucaria. Revista Iberoamericana de Filosofía, Política, Humanidades y Relaciones Internacionales, año 20, nº 40. 
Segundo semestre de 2018. Pp. 655-732.  ISSN 1575-6823  e-ISSN 2340-2199  doi: 10.12795/araucaria.2018.i40.27
that research on human embryo “may be performed only for health purposes 
or for scientific research linked to health purposes, and subject to appropriate 
genetic counselling”, and that adequate protection has to be ensured where 
law allows research on embryos in vitro.101 The ECtHR is not competent to 
directly apply the Oviedo Convention and its Additional Protocols in its case 
law; nevertheless, these instruments can provide a helpful support to the 
interpretation of the ECHR, in line with Article 31(3)(c).
In this respect, the jurisprudence of the Court offers an interesting example 
of this use of the Oviedo Convention’s system in relation to its attempt to define 
whether the protection of prenatal life falls within the scope of Article 2 of 
the ECHR, which provides that “[e]veryone as the right to life”, in the case 
of Vo v. France.102 This judgment is a milestone in the Court’s jurisprudence 
on prenatal life and concerns the unwanted loss of the foetus due to medical 
negligence. When assessing whether the unborn was included within the notion 
of “everyone” under Article 2 of the ECHR, the Court underlined that “[t]he 
potentiality of that being and its capacity to become a person” […] require 
protection in the name of human dignity [which is ensured in some cases under 
civil law at the domestic level] without making it a “person” with the “right to 
life” for the purposes of Article 2”.103 In this regard, as a support to its reading, 
the ECtHR recalled that “[t]he Oviedo Convention on Human Rights and 
Biomedicine […] is careful not to give a definition of the term “everyone”, and 
that [t]he same is true of the Additional Protocol on the Prohibition of Cloning 
Human Beings and the Additional Protocol on Biomedical Research, which do 
not define the concept of “human being””.104 The reasons of this approach are 
set out in the “explanatory report [to the Oviedo Convention which] indicates 
that, in the absence of a unanimous agreement on the definition, the member 
States decided to allow domestic law to provide clarification for the purposes 
of the application of that Convention”.105 This statement recalls a basic feature 
of the Court’s approach, that is the doctrine of the margin of appreciation.106 
Biomedicine (adopted in Oviedo, 4 April 1997, entered into force 1 December 1999) ETS No. 164, P, 
available at https://rm.coe.int/168007cf98 accessed 20 June 2018.
101  Ibid., Article 12.
102  European Court of Human Rights (Grand Chamber), Vo v France, Judgment of 8 July 2004, 
Appl. No. 53924/00, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 2004-VIII, available at https://hudoc.echr.
coe.int/eng#{%22fulltext%22:[%22vo%22],%22documentcollectionid2%22:[%22GRANDCHAMB
ER%22,%22CHAMBER%22],%22itemid%22:[%22001-61887%22]} accessed 20 July 2018.
103  Ibid. 84
104  Ibid.
105  Ibid.
106  The doctrine of the margin of appreciation was conceived in the Tyrer case in order to preserve 
regional pluralism and to leave appropriate discretional room to States Parties when implementing 
their obligations under the ECHR. Of course, the margin of appreciation is not unlimited, but its 
extent descends from the scope of application and protection of the entitlements specifically at stake 
time after time. Moreover, as the ECtHR had the chance to clarify in its case law, in particular, in the 
Belgian Linguistic case, “the machinery of protection established by the Convention is subsidiary to the 
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According to this doctrine, the lack of regional consensus on a given question 
increases States’ margin of appreciation whilst its existence narrows States’ 
discretionality. It goes without saying that, usually, in the biolegal field and 
even more in the definition of the beginning of life, States enjoy a wide margin 
of appreciation, due to the intense pluralism in this field. National ethics may 
be quite different in this respect. This is why the Court, in the Vo judgment, 
recognizing that “[a]t European level […] there is no consensus on the nature 
and status of the embryo and/or foetus”,107 “[was] convinced that it is neither 
desirable, nor even possible as matters stand, to answer in the abstract the 
question whether the unborn child is a person for the purposes of Article 
2 of the Convention”108 and that “[a]t best, it may be regarded as common 
ground between States that the embryo/foetus belongs to the human race”.109 
Indeed, the question of the beginning of life is deferred to States’ margin of 
appreciation notwithstanding the Convention [is] a “living instrument which 
must be interpreted in the light of present-day conditions”110 and despite the 
embryo and the foetus “are beginning to receive some protection in the light 
of scientific progress and the potential consequences of research into genetic 
engineering, medically assisted procreation or embryo experimentation”.111 In 
the Vo case, the ECtHR has adopted an approach of self-restraint112 that hugely 
national systems safeguarding human rights”; see: European Court of Human Rights (Court Plenary), 
Case “Relating to Certain Aspects of The Laws on the Use of Languages in Education in Belgium” v. 
Belgium, Judgment (Merit) of 23 July 1968, Appl. No. 1474/62 1677/62 1691/62, 1769/63, 1994/63, 
2126/64, available at https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng#{%22fulltext%22:[%22RELATING%20TO%20
CERTAIN%20ASPECTS%20OF%20THE%20LAWS%20ON%20THE%20USE%20OF%20
LANGUAGES%20IN%22],%22documentcollectionid2%22:[%22GRANDCHAMBER%22,%22C
HAMBER%22],%22itemid%22:[%22001-57525%22]} last accessed 20 June 2018.
 See Council of Europe, “The Margin of Appreciation”, available at https://www.coe.int/t/dghl/
cooperation/lisbonnetwork/themis/echr/paper2_en.asp last accessed 20 June 2018. See: Barbarosa 
Delgado, F. R., “El margen nacional de apreciación en e Derecho Internacional de los Derechos 
Humanos: entre el Estado de Derecho y la sociedad democrática”, México, Universidad Nacional 
Autónoma de México. Instituto de Investigaciones Jurídicas, (2012), pp. 51-82, available at http://
bibliohistorico.juridicas.unam.mx/libros/7/3160/7.pdf last accessed 20 June 2018. The ECHR defines 
minimum common standards of protection, that can be increased – but not diminished - at the domestic 
level. In practice, the scrutiny of the margin of appreciation is carried out by assessing, primarily, that 
a legitimate aim is pursued by the State through the measure challenged; then, the then, the Court 
verifies whether the standard of proportionality was respected. In this regard, see: GARCÍA SAN 
JOSÉ, D.I., International Bio Law. An International Overview of Developments in Human Embryo 
Research and Experimentation, cited above n. 10, pp. 171 ff.
107  Vo v. France, cited above n. 101, para. 84
108  Ibid., para. 85.
109  Ibid., para. 84.
110  Ibid., para. 82.
111  Ibid., para. 84.
112  The jurisprudence of the ECtHR follows the two lines of judicial activism and of judicial 
self-restraint, that were effectively described as two sides of the same coin or as a pendulum, in the 
Court’s approach to human rights protection. GARCÍA SAN JOSÉ, D.I., International Bio Law. An 
International Overview of Developments in Human Embryo Research and Experimentation, cited 
above n. 10, pp. 172. 
Regional pluralism requires judicial restraint, while the Court can be more purposeful in the 
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characterizes its jurisprudence in the field of the definition of the protection of 
the unborn and reproductive rights. Thirteen years later, the Court recalled again 
the conception of the human embryo’s “potentiality of becoming a person” 
when, in the Parrillo v. Italy case,113 it was called on to assess the generalized 
ban posed by Italian Law No. 40/2004 on the donation to scientific research of 
the cryopreserved embryos obtained from in vitro fertilization for originally 
reproductive purposes. The Court recognized that “the embryos contain the 
genetic material of the [mother] and accordingly represent a constituent part 
of [her] genetic material and biological identity”114 and therefore considered 
that the applicant’s “choice regarding the fate of her embryos concern[ed] an 
intimate aspect of her personal life and accordingly relate[d] to her right to 
self-determination [under] Article 8 of the Convention, from the standpoint of 
the right to respect for private life”.115 Notwithstanding this, and despite “the 
sensitive and controversial question of when human life begins as Article 2 of 
the Convention is not in issue in the […] case”,116 the Court acknowledged that 
“the “protection of the embryo’s potential for life” may be linked to the aim of 
protecting morals and the rights and freedoms of others, in the terms in which 
this concept is meant by the Government”.117 Then, despite it did not mean to 
express “any assessment […] as to whether the word “others” extends to human 
embryos”,118 the Court found a violation of Article 8 of the ECHR since “the ban 
definition of the protection to be granted through judicial activism when a regional consensus exists. 
In particular, various factors can enhance States’ margin of appreciation, and moral issues are one 
of them. See: Council of Europe, “The Margin of Appreciation”, cited above n. 105. In this respect, 
emblematic decisions of the application of the margin of appreciation with regard to moral questions 
were adopted by the ECtHR in the judgments issued in the cases: European Court of Human Rights, 
Muller and Others v. Switzerland, Judgment of 24 May 1988, Appl. No. 10737/84, A133, available 
at https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng#{%22fulltext%22:[%22muller%22],%22documentcollectionid2%
22:[%22GRANDCHAMBER%22,%22CHAMBER%22],%22itemid%22:[%22001-57487%22]} 
last accessed 20 June 2018. European Court of Human Rights, Dickson v. the United Kingdom, 
Judgment of 4 December 2007, 44362/04, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 2007-V, available 
at https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng#{%22fulltext%22:[%22dickson%22],%22documentcollectionid2
%22:[%22GRANDCHAMBER%22,%22CHAMBER%22],%22itemid%22:[%22001-83788%22]} 
last accessed 20 June 2018; European Court of Human Rights, Handyside v. the United Kingdom, 
Judgment of 4 November 1976, Appl. No. 5493/72, A24, available at https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng#{
%22fulltext%22:[%22handyside%22],%22documentcollectionid2%22:[%22GRANDCHAMBER%
22,%22CHAMBER%22],%22itemid%22:[%22001-57499%22]} last accessed 20 June 2018. 
113  European Court of Human Rights (Grand Chamber), Parrillo v. Italy, Judgment of 27 August 
2015, Appl. No. 46470/11, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 2015, available at https://hudoc.
echr.coe.int/eng#{%22fulltext%22:[%22parrillo%22],%22documentcollectionid2%22:[%22GRA
NDCHAMBER%22,%22CHAMBER%22],%22itemid%22:[%22001-157263%22]} last accessed 
20 June 2018. See Poli, L., “La sentenza Parrillo c. Italia e quello che la Corte (non) dice sullo 
status dell’embrione”, Quaderni di SIDIblog, (2015), pp. 511-516 and “Bioethics, human rights and 
their interplay in the legal reasoning of ECtHR’s case law on artificial reproductive technologies”, 
Federalismi.it, Focus on Human Rights, n° 1, (2017).
114  Ibid., para. 158.
115  Ibid., para. 159.
116  Ibid., para., para 215.
117  Ibid., para. 167.
118  Ibid.
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was ‘necessary in a democratic society’ to protect the rights and freedoms of 
others within the meaning of Article 8(2) of the ECHR”.119 In this regard, 
Italy had not overstepped the – wide120 - margin of appreciation granted under 
these circumstances121 and, again, regional consensus lacked on the issue 
“of the donation of embryos not destined for implantation [which] clearly 
raises “delicate moral and ethical questions”.122 Beyond the pluralism of 
views, however, the Court could exclude that human embryos can be reduced 
to “possessions” within the meaning of [Article 1 of Protocol No.1 to the 
Convention on the protection of property]”.123
However, on some occasions the ECtHR has adopted an approach of self-
restraint even in cases where a clear regional consensus existed, and under 
some circumstances States have been allowed a wide margin of appreciation 
due to the moral vision that was rooted in the country and in the society. The 
reason for this has to be sought in the role of the Court to provide guidance 
and harmonization between forty-seven States, whose legal, ethical and social 
landscape can be very different. The ECtHR, thus, aims to provide some 
common minimum standards of protection of human rights and, when pursuing 
this objective, it also tries to avoid a clash with States, as the system is founded 
on national consent. Therefore, it has to preserved, and wise use of the doctrine 
of the margin of appreciation is a helpful means.124
Abortion is a remarkable example, and it is interesting to consider how the 
Court usually exercises its scrutiny in this field and provides protection under 
the procedural limb of private life. In the early Nineties, when the ECtHR was 
called on to take its decision in the case of Open Door and Dublin Well Woman 
v. Ireland judgment,125 the Court “acknowledge[d] that the national authorities 
119  Ibid., para. 197.
120  Ibid., para. 174. In particular, the Court allowed a wide margin of appreciation because “the right 
invoked by the applicant to donate embryos to scientific research is not one of the core rights attracting 
the protection of Article 8 of the Convention as it does not concern a particularly important aspect of 
the applicant’s existence and identity”. In fact, the importance of the right for the individuals is one 
of the factors that narrow State’s margin of appreciation, as well as the lack of regional consensus. 
The other factors are represented by the teleological interpretation of the ECHR and the model of 
democratic society considered under the Convention. See: García San José, D.I., International Bio 
Law. An International Overview of Developments in Human Embryo Research and Experimentation, 
cited above n. 10, pp. 177. 
121  Parrillo v. Italy, cited above n. 112, para. 197.
122  Parrillo v. Italy, cited above n. 112, para. 176.
123  Parrillo v. Italy, cited above n. 112, para. 215.
124  García San José, D.I., International Bio Law. An International Overview of Developments in 
Human Embryo Research and Experimentation, cited above n. 10, pp. 188 ff.; Council of Europe, 
“The Margin of Appreciation”, cited above n. 105. 
125  European Court of Human Rights, Open Door and Dublin Well Woman v. Ireland, Judgment of 
23 September 1992, Appl. Nn. 14234/88 14235/88 , 64/1991/316/387-388, available at https://hudoc.
echr.coe.int/eng#{%22fulltext%22:[%22open%20doors%22],%22documentcollectionid2%22:[%22
GRANDCHAMBER%22,%22CHAMBER%22],%22itemid%22:[%22001-57789%22]} last visited 
11 July 2018. LAWSON, R., “The Irish abortion cases: European limits to national sovereignty?”, 
cited above n. 42.
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enjoy a wide margin of appreciation in matters of morals, particularly in an 
area such as the present which touches on matters of belief concerning the 
nature of human life”. 126 With regard to Ireland,127 the legal, ethical and social 
implications of abortion are particularly sensitive: in fact, Article 40(3)(3) of 
the Irish Constitution equalizes the right to life of the unborn and the right to 
life of the mother and, what is more, abortion is prohibited under criminal law 
by section 58 of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861, which provides as 
penalty “penal servitude for life”. The only exceptional case in which abortion 
is allowed is the existence of a risk for the mother’s life. Nearly twenty years 
after the Open Door judgment, in the A, B, C v. Ireland case,128 the Court 
reiterated its view. In particular, it clarified that it “[did] not consider that the 
prohibition in Ireland of abortion for health and well-being reasons, based as it 
is on the profound moral views of the Irish people as to the nature of life […] 
and as to the consequent protection to be accorded to the right to life of the 
unborn, exceeds the margin of appreciation accorded in that respect to the Irish 
State”.129 In fact, “[s]ince the rights claimed on behalf of the foetus and those 
of the mother are inextricably interconnected […] the margin of appreciation 
accorded to a State’s protection of the unborn necessarily translates into a margin 
of appreciation for that State as to how it balances the conflicting rights of the 
mother”.130 Under similar circumstances, the regional “consensus cannot be a 
decisive factor in the Court’s examination of whether the impugned prohibition 
on abortion in Ireland for health and well-being reasons struck a fair balance 
between the conflicting rights and interests, notwithstanding an evolutive 
interpretation of the Convention”.131 It can be argued that the reason for this 
approach is that if the ECtHR assumed the task of striking the balance between 
the conflicting right to life of the unborn and the right to life of the mother, it 
would have to define the question of the beginning of life. In this regard, the 
view set out in the Vo case is well-settled, and the Court expressly recalled it in 
the A, B, C v. Ireland judgment when it held that “the question of when the right 
to life begins came within the States’ margin of appreciation because there was 
no European consensus on the scientific and legal definition of the beginning 
of life, so that it was impossible to answer the question whether the unborn was 
126  Open Door and Dublin Well Woman v. Ireland, cited above n. 124, para. 68.
127  Lawson, R., “The Irish abortion cases: European limits to national sovereignty?”, cited above 
n. 42. 
128  European Court of Human Rights Court (Grand Chamber), A, B and C v. Ireland, Judgment 
(Merits and Just Satisfaction) of 16 December 2010, Appl. No. 25579/05, Reports of Judgments and 
Decisions 2010, available at https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng#{%22fulltext%22:[%22A,%20B%22]
,%22documentcollectionid2%22:[%22GRANDCHAMBER%22,%22CHAMBER%22],%22item
id%22:[%22001-102332%22]} last accessed 20 June 2018.
129  Ibid., para. 241. 
130  Ibid., para. 237. 
131  A, B and C v. Ireland, cited above n. 127, para. 237.
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a person to be protected for the purposes of Article 2”.132 Nevertheless, when 
assessing the alleged violation of applicant C’s right to respect for her private 
life under Article 8 of the ECHR under the procedural limb, the Court found 
that a violation had occurred, basically because Ireland had failed to implement 
the Constitutional ban on abortion through legislation “and [because] more 
particularly [...] the lack of effective and accessible procedures to establish 
a right to an abortion under that provision [had generated an uncertainty 
resulting] in a striking discordance between the theoretical right to a lawful 
abortion in Ireland on the ground of a relevant risk to a woman’s life and the 
reality of its practical implementation”.133 This view is settled in the Court’s 
case law and another example is offered by Tysiac v. Poland case,134 where the 
ECtHR clarified that “once the legislature decides to allow abortion, it must 
not structure its legal framework in a way which would limit real possibilities 
to obtain it.”135 In the same vein, in the R.R. v. Poland judgment,136 the ECtHR 
specified that “[w]hile a broad margin of appreciation is accorded to the State 
as regards the circumstances in which an abortion will be permitted in a State, 
once that decision is taken the legal framework devised for this purpose should 
be “shaped in a coherent manner which allows the different legitimate interests 
involved to be taken into account adequately and in accordance with the 
obligations deriving from the Convention”.137 Therefore, although the Court 
has not come to affirm that States have a conventional a duty to ensure abortion, 
however, it has recognized that States are under some procedural obligations, 
in relation to the right to respect for private life, to ensure access to abortion if 
legislation allows it.
It is interesting to consider the Court’s approach to ARTs and, in particular 
to IVF, and how the doctrine of the margin of appreciation interrelates with 
scientific progress. A relevant but also quite disputed example is offered by 
the case of S.H. and Others v. Austria,138 where the Grand Chamber held that 
132  Ibid. 
133  Ibid., para. 264.
134  European Court of Human Rights, Tysiac v. Poland, Judgment of 20 March 2007, Appl. No. 
5410/03, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 2007-I, para. 116 available at https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/
eng#{%22itemid%22:[%22001-79812%22]} last visited 12 July 2018.
135  Ibid., para. 116.
136  European Court of Human Rights, R.R. v. Poland, Judgment of 26 May 2011, Appl. No. 
27617/04, 
Reports of Judgments and Decisions 2011 (extracts), available at https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng#{
%22fulltext%22:[%22R.R.%22],%22documentcollectionid2%22:[%22GRANDCHAMBER%22,%
22CHAMBER%22],%22itemid%22:[%22001-104911%22]} last accessed 21 June 2018. 
137  Ibid., para. 187.
138  European Court of Human Rights (Grand Chamber), S.H. and Others v. Austria, Judgment of 
03 November 2011, Appl. No. 57813/00, 
Reports of Judgments and Decisions 2011, available at https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng#{%22fulltex
t%22:[%22s.h.%22],%22documentcollectionid2%22:[%22GRANDCHAMBER%22,%22CHAMBE
R%22],%22itemid%22:[%22001-107325%22]} last visited 21 June 2018. See TIMMER, A., “S.H. 
and Others v Austria: margin of appreciation and IVF”, Strasbourg Observers, available at https://
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the “emerging consensus [about sperm and ova donation for the purposes 
of in vitro fertilization] is not, however, based on settled and long-standing 
principles established in the law of the member States but rather reflects a 
stage of development within a particularly dynamic field of law and does not 
decisively narrow the margin of appreciation of the State”.139 The words of the 
Court raise some perplexity. The reasoning here sounds quite at odds with the 
Court’s usual and settled view as the ECtHR does not neither highlight the lack 
of consensus, nor excludes that settled consensus is a decisive factor in light of 
prevalent moral reasons or due to the specific balance to be stricken between 
conflicting interests; furthermore, of course, the approach that emerges is far 
from proactive. The contradiction did not go unnoticed even within the Court 
itself and Judges Tulkens, Hivelä, Lazarova Trajkovska and Tsotsoria, in their 
Dissenting Opinion, stressed that “[t]he Court thus takes the unprecedented 
step of conferring a new dimension on the European consensus and applies a 
particularly low threshold to it, thus potentially extending the States’ margin 
of appreciation beyond limits”.140 However, this is not the only statement in 
the judgment that raises some perplexity. The Court has observed that “there 
is no prohibition under Austrian law on going abroad to seek treatment of 
infertility that uses assisted procreation techniques not allowed in Austria and 
that in the event of a successful treatment the Civil Code contains clear rules 
on paternity and maternity that respect the wishes of the parents”.141 Arguably, 
this statement appears at odds with the – praiseworthy – purpose to protect 
women, especially the most socially and economically vulnerable, from the 
exploitation and the humiliation to which ova donation might expose them, 
which Austria included among the reasons for the blanket ban contained in its 
legislation.142 It seems hard not to argue that the statement of the Court may 
cause some discriminatory impact on women’s health. In other words, mainly 
if not exclusively wealthy couples are likely to afford the costs related to cross-
border healthcare, with a consequence that sounds more like “reproductive 
tourism”.143 Access to cross-border healthcare was a basic point also in the 
Court’s jurisprudence on the “Irish cases” on abortion,144 where it said that 
strasbourgobservers.com/2011/11/09/s-h-and-others-v-austria-margin-of-appreciation-and-ivf/ last 
accessed 18 July 2018.
139  Ibid., para. 96.
140  Ibid., Joint Dissenting Opinion of Judges Tulkens, Hivelä, Lazarova Trajkovska and Tsotsoria, 
para. 8.
141  Ibid., para. 114.
142  Ibid., para 66. 
143  Farnós Amorós, E., “¿Debe permitirse la gestación por sustitución en España? Estado de la 
cuestión y algunas reflexiones”, in De la solidaridad al mercado: el cuerpo humano y el comercio 
biotecnológico, Casado, M., (ed.), Barcelona, Universitat de Barcelona, Edicions de la Universitat de 
Barcelona, 2017, pp. 195-234, 200.
144  See LAWSON, R., “The Irish abortion cases: European limits to national sovereignty?”, cited 
above n. 42. 
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“[h]aving regard to the right to travel abroad lawfully for an abortion with 
access to appropriate information and medical care in Ireland, the Court [did 
not consider] that the prohibition in Ireland of abortion for health and well-
being reasons, based as it is on the profound moral views of the Irish people as 
to the nature of life […] and as to the consequent protection to be accorded to 
the right to life of the unborn, exceeds the margin of appreciation”. Indeed, the 
“impugned prohibition […] struck a fair balance between [the conflicting right] 
to respect for [the applicants’] private life and the rights invoked on behalf of 
the unborn”.145 
Thus, the situation is quite different. On the one hand, the Court has never 
affirmed a right to abortion under the substantial limb of Article 8 of the ECHR 
because, despite the existing regional consensus, the peculiar domestic moral 
vision, that is deeply rooted, requires to reconcile the conflicting rights at stake 
in a specific, consistent way. What is more, the affirmation under the ECHR of 
the right to abortion under the substantial limb of the right to private life, as 
stressed above, would require to define the issue of the beginning of life. And, 
in that respect, the lack of consensus does not allow it. On the other hand, in 
the S.H. ruling,146 although the Court had recognized “the right of a couple to 
conceive a child and to make use of medically assisted procreation for that 
purpose is also protected by Article 8, as such a choice is an expression of 
private and family life”, it concluded that no violation had occurred because 
of the “particularly low threshold” applied to the emerging regional consensus, 
with its consequences on the width of State’s margin of appreciation. The view 
of the Court in the S.H. ruling is clearly at odds with its usual approach to 
scientific progress and reproduction, which is consistent in the other rulings. 
In the Evans v. the United Kingdom case,147 in which the ECtHR was called 
to decide on the withdrawal of parents’ consent as to the implantation of the 
embryos created in vitro, the Court affirmed that the right to respect for the 
decision to become a parent in the genetic sense is protected under Article 8 of 
the ECHR.148 Nevertheless, in the case, the Court acknowledged that “it cannot 
145  A, B and C v. Ireland, cited above n. 127, para. 241.
146  S.H. and Others v. Austria, cited above n. 137, para. 82.
147  European Court of Human Rights (Grand Chamber), Evans v. the United Kingdom, Judgment 
of 10 April 2007, Appl. No. 6339/05, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 2007-I, available at https://
hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng#{%22fulltext%22:[%22evans%22],%22documentcollectionid2%22:[%22G
RANDCHAMBER%22,%22CHAMBER%22],%22itemid%22:[%22001-80046%22]} last accessed 
21 June 2018.
148  Ibid., para. 71. Few months later, in the Dickson v. the United Kingdom case, the Court 
reaffirmed the right to become genetic parents when it held that “Article 8 is applicable to the 
applicants’ complaints in that the refusal of artificial insemination facilities concerned their private 
and family lives, which notions incorporate the right to respect for their decision to become genetic 
parents” (Para. 66). The case concerned reproductive rights of the prisoners and of the detainees and 
conjugal visits. In this regard, “[t]he Court note[d], as to the European consensus argument, that 
the Chamber established that more than half of the Contracting States allow for conjugal visits for 
prisoners (subject to a variety of different restrictions), a measure which could be seen as obviating 
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be said that there is any consensus as to the stage in IVF treatment when the 
gamete providers’ consent becomes irrevocable”149 and consequently “since the 
use of IVF treatment gives rise to sensitive moral and ethical issues against a 
background of fast-moving medical and scientific developments, and since the 
questions raised by the case touch on areas where there is no clear common 
ground amongst the member States, the Court considers that the margin of 
appreciation to be afforded to the respondent State must be a wide one”.150 
The embryos were destined to destruction but, once more, the Court recalled 
the Vo judgment to reiterate that “the embryos […] do not have a right to life 
within the meaning of Article 2 of the Convention”.151 The Evans judgment is 
in line with the Court’s application of the doctrine of the margin of appreciation 
and with its approach of self-restraint in front of ethical pluralism and strong 
domestic morality. 
It is interesting to notice that the Court has so far tended to recognize and 
protect the rights related to prenatal and preimplantation diagnosis: this 
jurisprudence is limited to only two cases, but the approach of the Court is 
promising. The R.R. v. Poland judgment,152 the Court found that the denied access 
to amniocentesis for the mother whose baby was born severely disabled amounted 
to a violation of Article 3 and Article 8 of the ECHR. In particular, the Strasbourg 
Court held that the right to private life encompasses access to prenatal genetic 
testing that, in the case, was the precondition for the applicant to get the necessary 
information to know whether she met the requirements set for lawful abortion 
under Polish law. In this regard, the Court clarified that “[t]he right of access to 
[the information on a person’s health] falling within the ambit of the notion of 
private life can be said to comprise […] a right to obtain available information on 
the need for the authorities to provide additional facilities for artificial insemination. However, while 
the Court has expressed its approval for the evolution in several European countries towards conjugal 
visits, it has not yet interpreted the Convention as requiring Contracting States to make provision for 
such visits […]. Accordingly, this is an area in which the Contracting States could enjoy a wide margin 
of appreciation in determining the steps to be taken to ensure compliance with the Convention with 
due regard to the needs and resources of the community and of individuals” (Paras. 81). However, the 
Court also found “that the Policy as structured effectively excluded any real weighing of the competing 
individual and public interests, and prevented the required assessment of the proportionality of a 
restriction, in any individual case” (Para. 82) and, therefore, it “[found] that the absence of [required 
proportionality assessment in an individual case] as regards a matter of significant importance for 
the applicants […] must be seen as falling outside any acceptable margin of appreciation so that 
a fair balance was not struck between the competing public and private interests involved. There 
has, accordingly, been a violation of Article 8 of the Convention.” (Para. 84). See European Court 
of Human Rights (Grand Chamber), Dickson v. the United Kingdom, No. 44362/04, Judgment of 
4 December 2007, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 2007-V, available at https://hudoc.echr.coe.
int/eng#{%22fulltext%22:[%22dickson%22],%22documentcollectionid2%22:[%22GRANDCHAM
BER%22,%22CHAMBER%22],%22itemid%22:[%22001-83788%22]} last accessed 21 June 2018.
149  Evans v. the United Kingdom, cited above n. 146, para. 79.
150  Evans v. the United Kingdom, cited above n. 146, para. 81.
151  Evans v. the United Kingdom, cited above n. 146, para. 56.
152  R.R. v. Poland, cited above n. 135.
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one’s condition [and] during pregnancy the foetus’ condition and health constitute 
an element of the pregnant woman’s health”. Then, the Court went on and further 
held that “the effective exercise of [the] right (of access to information about her 
or his health) is often decisive for the possibility of exercising personal autonomy, 
also covered by Article 8 of the Convention, by deciding, on the basis of such 
information, on the future course of events relevant for the individual’s quality of 
life (e.g. by refusing consent to medical treatment or by requesting a given form 
of treatment).”153 In the judgment, the Court relied on the doctrine of the margin 
of appreciation, not only when recalling the considerations made in the Vo 
judgment to stress that the unborn does not have the right to life, but also with 
reference to the procedural guarantees to be ensure under the procedural limb of 
private life, when it held that “[if] the State, acting within the limits of the margin 
of appreciation, […] adopts […] [a] domestic law [that] allows for abortion in 
cases of foetal malformation, there must be an adequate legal and procedural 
framework to guarantee that relevant, full and reliable information on the foetus’ 
health is available to pregnant women”.154 One year after the R.R. ruling, in the 
Costa and Pavan v. Italy judgment,155 the Court basically relied on proportionality 
when it held that the applicants, who were both healthy carrier of a genetic 
disease, had a right to access to prenatal genetic diagnosis under Article 8 of the 
ECHR in the context of in vitro fertilization. The Court acknowledged that “the 
question of access to PGD raises sensitive moral and ethical questions” but it also 
recognized that “the solutions reached by the legislature are not beyond the 
scrutiny of the Court”,156 in so far as its task was “to verify the proportionality of 
the measure in question in the light of the fact that termination of pregnancy on 
medical grounds is an option for the applicants”.157 The Second Section adopted 
a pervasive view that, nevertheless, does not clash with the fact that the “Court’s 
task is not to substitute itself for the competent national authorities in determining 
the most appropriate policy for regulating matters of assisted procreation, 
observing in particular that the use of in vitro fertilisation techniques raised 
sensitive moral and ethical questions [in an area that was constantly evolving]”, 
153  R.R. v. Poland, cited above n. 135, para. 197.
154  R.R. v. Poland, cited above n. 135, para. 200.
155  European Court of Human Rights, Costa and Pavan v. Italy, Judgment of 28 August 2012, 
Appl. No. 54270/10, available at https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng#{%22fulltext%22:[%22costa%2
2],%22documentcollectionid2%22:[%22GRANDCHAMBER%22,%22CHAMBER%22],%22it
emid%22:[%22001-112993%22]} last accessed 21 June 2018. See DI STEFANO, A., “Bio-ethics 
under Human Rights Scrutiny: Toward a Right to Pre-implantation Genetic Testing under the 
ECHR?”, Strasbourg Observers, 20 September 2012, available at https://strasbourgobservers.com/
category/cases/costa-and-pavan-v-italy/ last accessed 18 July 2018, and “Tutela del corpo femminile 
e diritti riproduttivi: biopotere e biodiritto nella vicenda italiana in tema di diagnosi preimpianto”, 
Osservatorio di Diritti Umani, La Comunità Internazionale, Fascicolo n° 4, (2013), pp. 745-772.
156  Ibid., para. 69.
157  Ibid., para. 70.
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as stressed in the S.H. ruling.158 In the Costa and Pavan case, the ECtHR found 
that Italian legislation pursued a legitimate aim under Article 8(2) of the ECHR, 
namely “protecting morals and the rights and freedoms of others”.159 The Court 
carried out a careful scrutiny of proportionality that nevertheless included 
considerations connected to the doctrine of the margin of appreciation when the 
Court recalled that, out of the thirty-two States whose legislation was analysed, 
only Italy, Switzerland and Austria did not allow pre-implantation diagnosis. In 
light of the test of proportionality, the Court found that “[t]he consequences of 
[Italian] legislation for the right to respect for the applicants’ private and family 
life are self-evident. In order to protect their right to have a child unaffected by 
the disease of which they are healthy carriers, the only possibility available to 
them is to start a pregnancy by natural means and then terminate it if the prenatal 
test shows that the foetus is unhealthy”.160 Abortion is evidently a more grievous 
alternative if compared to PGD, when the sufficient reasons for State’s interference 
are considered according to the second level of the proportionality test.161 In this 
regard, the “standard of the sufficient reasons” requires that the State adopt the 
less grievous mean for pursuing the legitimate aim. What is more, the view of the 
Court offered important clarification also in relation to possible concerns of 
eugenics, which the Italian State had expressed when it held that the applicants 
were alleging a violation of their right to have an healthy child.162 However, the 
Court dismissed such allegation, clarifying that “the right relied on by the 
applicants is confined to the possibility of using ART and subsequently PGD for 
the purposes of conceiving a child unaffected by cystic fibrosis” 163since “PGD 
cannot exclude other factors capable of compromising the future child’s health”.164 
The Court recalled Article 12 of the Oviedo Convention, which allows predictive 
genetic tests and the corresponding Paragraph 83 of the Explanatory Report as 
relevant international law but, then, it did not incorporated these references in its 
legal reasoning. Possibly, incorporation as a support to the interpretation of the 
ECHR may have enhanced the Court’s arguments, with special reference to 
Paragraph 83 where it clarifies that “Article 12 as such does not imply any 
limitation of the right to carry out diagnostic interventions at the embryonic stage 
to find out whether an embryo carries hereditary traits that will lead to serious 
diseases in the future child”. In fact, although Italy has signed but not yet ratified 
158  S.H. and Others v. Austria, cited above n. 137, para. 92.
159  Costa and Pavan v. Italy, cited above n. 154, para. 59.
160  Costa and Pavan v. Italy, cited above n. 154, para. 65.
161  The first level of the proportionality test focuses on whether State’s interference pursued a 
legitimate aim and, in this regard, the standard to meet is less strict, since “relevant” and not 
“sufficient” reasons for the interference are required to justify it. See GARCÍA SAN JOSÉ, D.I., 
International Bio Law. An International Overview of Developments in Human Embryo Research and 
Experimentation, cited above n. 10, pp. 175 ff.
162  Costa and Pavan v. Italy, cited above n. 154, para. 44; 53. 
163  Costa and Pavan v. Italy, cited above n. 154, para. 53.
164  Costa and Pavan v. Italy, cited above n. 154, para. 54.
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the Oviedo Convention, the State is under an obligation not to defeat the object 
and the purpose of the treaty pursuant to Article 18 of the VCLT. What is more, 
some further support to accessibility to IVF might have been interestingly 
advanced by recalling Article 15 of the ICESCR, which protects the right to 
benefit from scientific progress, this time in line with Article 31(3)(c) of the 
VCLT, as Italy is Party to the Covenant. Viability of a similar approach was 
suggested by the Judges Tulkens, Hirvelä, Lazarova Trajkovska and Tsotsoria 
who, in their Dissenting Opinion in the S.H. case have recalled Article 12 and 
Article 15 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(ICESCR), on the right to health and on the right to science to stress the need to 
ensure access to IVF, since it is not “a question of choice between different 
techniques but, more fundamentally, a restriction on access to heterologous in 
vitro fertilisation constituting denial of access to available treatment”.165 However, 
so far, the Court has not adopted this kind of approach in its case law, showing a 
tendency to be more self-referential than other human rights bodies. Therefore, so 
far, the steps ahead towards the definition of individual rights and corresponding 
States’ obligations in relation to access to scientific progress in the reproductive 
field have basically been the result of the use of its usual decisional paths, that 
means relying on the doctrine of the margin of appreciation and the test of 
proportionality. In this regard, thus, we may conclude that the common core of 
the conception of the reproductive rights to some extent can be found in the 
jurisprudence of Strasbourg Court. Whilst, on the one hand, the Court’s self-
restraint in the field of abortion rights may be plausible, however it is to wish that 
the “backward step”166 taken in the S.H. v. Austria judgment, with that disputable 
reading of regional consensus and its possible distorted effects in practice, 
remains an isolated case.
4. The evolutionary approach to reproductive rights in the 
jurisprudence of the IACtHR
On the other side of the Atlantic Ocean, the role of the Inter-American 
Court of Human Rights has been of basic importance for the promotion of 
reproductive rights and their protection. The regional framework that the Court 
has to deal with is quite different from the European one: on the one hand, national 
realities are more homogeneous, as the twenty-five countries that are Parties to 
the Convention - only twenty-one of which have accepted the competence of the 
Court - are all Latin American States. In practice, these States have a common 
165  S.H. and Others v. Austria, cited above n. 137, Joint Dissenting Opinion of Judges Tulkens, 
Hivelä, Lazarova Trajkovska and Tsotsoria, para. 9.
166  Ibid., para. 8. 
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cultural core and they have been through a process of democratization during the 
Nineties in light of which they now can be defined as “new democracies”.167 On 
the other hand, the regional framework on reproductive rights is more delicate 
and sometimes controversial than the European scenario. Latin America is 
currently undergoing an important process in relation to abortion rights: in 
2017, Chile has legalized abortion when mother’s life is in danger, when the 
pregnancy is the result of rape and when the foetus is not viable; moreover, 
it is very recent news that the Argentinian Chamber of Deputies has passed a 
bill that provides legalization of elective abortion within the fourteenth week 
of pregnancy, and even beyond this term in case of danger to mother’s life, 
rape and in cases the foetus suffers severe conditions incompatible with life 
outside the womb. Brazil, otherwise, is facing an opposite situation, as some 
restrictive trends seem to be progressively gaining ground in the country, where 
the Supreme Court is assessing the possibility to criminalize abortion, which 
now is allowed in the country in case the mother’s life endangered, when the 
pregnancy is the result of rape and when the foetus is affected anencephaly. 
States’ approach is usually restrictive: Dominican Republic, El Salvador and 
Nicaragua are three emblematic examples, as in the first two countries abortion 
is banned except in case the mother’s life is endangered, whilst in Nicaragua 
the ban is total and allows no exceptions.168 Otherwise, ARTs, including IVF 
have found generalized acceptance in Latin America, with the only exception 
of Costa Rica: it is emblematic that in 1990, the Latin American Registry of 
Assisted Reproduction (RLA) was established as the first multinational and 
regional registry of assisted reproductive technology.169 
The Inter-American Court of Human Rights has not had as many chances 
as the Strasbourg Court to deal with reproductive rights; nevertheless, its 
approach stands out for being proactive and for having effectively promoted 
their protection in the region. The relevant decisions of the Court came more 
than thirty years after the Inter-American Commission of Human Rights 
(IACHR) was called on to take a decision in the field of abortion rights for 
the first time in the Inter-American human rights system in the early Eighties, 
in the Baby Boy v. the United States case.170 Called on to consider the issue 
167  Groppi, T., Lecis Cocco-Ortu, A. M., “Le citazioni reciproche tra la Corte Europea e la Corte 
Interamericana dei Diritti dell’Uomo: dall’influenza al dialogo”, Federalismi.it, n. 19, (2013), pp. 
1-38, 9. 
168  For an overview about Latin American landscape, see Corrêa, S., De La Dehesa, R., Parker, R. 
G., “Sexuality and Politics: Regional Dialogues from the Global South, Volume 1”, Rio de Janeiro, 
Sexuality Policy Watch, 2015. 
169  Zegers-Hochschild, F., Enrique Schwarze, J., Crosby, J. A., Musri, C., Urbina, R. T., “Assisted 
reproductive techniques in Latin America: The Latin American Registry, 2014”, JBRA Assisted 
Reproduction, No. 21(3), (2017), pp. 164-175, 164.
170  Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Resolution No. 23/81 of 16 October 1981, Case 
2141 (“Baby Boy v. the United States of America”), available at http://bcn.cl/1v5kf last accessed 21 
June 2018.
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of the beginning of life under circumstances that concerned a belated elective 
abortion, 171 the Commission relied on the American Declaration of the Rights 
and Duties of Men (ADRDM),172 as the United States have signed but not 
ratified the ACHR. However, some reference was also made to the Convention, 
since the parties had specifically vested the Commission with assessing 
whether it could be considered as a support to the interpretation of the State’s 
duties under the Declaration. The interpretive task in which the Commission 
engaged was delicate, as emerges when the content of the relevant provisions 
is taken into consideration: Article 1 of the ADRDM provides that “[e]very 
human being has the right to life” and Article 4(1) of the ACHR enshrines a 
highly disputed provision, where it foresees that “[e]very person has the right 
to have his life respected. This right shall be protected […], in general,173 from 
the moment of conception”. The Commission based its interpretation on the 
travaux préparatoires of both instruments:174 with regard to the ADRDM, the 
formulation of the provision contained in the draft submitted to the Juridical 
Committee included an explicit reference to “the right to life [that] extends to 
the right to life from the moment of conception”. This reference was then erased 
from the text, and instead of “every person” now the provision refers to “every 
human being”. This was considered as the clear intention to exclude prenatal life 
from the scope of the provision, as the view among the negotiating States was 
divergent. The debate during the travaux préparatoires of the ACHR evolved 
in a similar fashion, as States still had different views and, above all, different 
legislations on abortion.175 However, the reference to the “conception” was kept 
in the text, and the locution “in general” was incorporated for the purpose of 
reconciliating the distinct opinions. 176 Consistently with this perspective, the 
171  The Baby Boy case originated in the Roe v. Wade case, a milestone in the domestic American 
jurisprudence, as it represented the culmination of a line of jurisprudence that considered that women’s 
right to abortion was encompassed in the right to define their own private sphere. U.S. Supreme Court, 
22 January 1973, No. 70-18, Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). See Rodotà, S., Trattato di Biodiritto, 
ll Governo del Corpo, Milano, Giuffré Editore, p. 890.
172  Organisation of the American States, Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR), 
American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, 2 May 1948, available at http://www.oas.org/
en/iachr/mandate/Basics/declaration.asp last accessed 22 June 2018.
173  Emphasis added.
174  In scholarship, the interpretive criterion adopted by the Commission was criticized, as Article 
32 of the VCLT includes the preparatory works among the supplementary means of interpretation 
of treaties. See Díaz, Á. P., “Estatus del no nacido en la Convención Americana: un ejercicio de 
interpretación”, Revista Ius et Praxis, n° 1, Año 18, (2012), pp. 75 ff.
175  During the negotiations, Brazil, soon joined by the United States, had held that no reference to 
conception should be included in the provision, while Venezuela was one of the greatest supporters of 
the protection of life since conception and the need to incorporate this statement, unconditionally and 
without any further locution as “in general” in the text of the Convention. See DÍAZ, Á. P., “Estatus 
del no nacido en la Convención Americana: un ejercicio de interpretación”, cited above n. 173, pp. 
61 – 112.
176  In scholarship, it was stressed that the final formulation of Article 4(1) of the ACHR is a 
“solution of principles, not of concessions among American States”. Nevertheless, the debate is 
still “alive and kicking”: it still was when Mexico, almost thirty years later, made an interpretive 
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Commission came to the conclusion that the ADRDM had not incorporated 
the notion that the right to life exists from the moment of conception, as “the 
conference faced this question but chose not to adopt the language that would 
clearly have stated this principle”.177 Thus, the IACHR found no violation of 
Article I of the ADRDM178 and, as to Article 4(1) of the ACHR, the Commission 
held that “the legal implications of the clause “in general, from the moment 
of conception” are substantially different from the shorter clause “from the 
moment of conception”.179 Nevertheless, this did not affect the case, as the 
United States had not ratified the Convention and “it would be impossible to 
impose upon [them] an international obligation based upon a treaty that [they] 
had not duly accepted or ratified”.180 The view expressed by the Commission is 
clear: the unborn does not have the right to life. 
When the issue was brought before the Court, the results achieved were 
different from several viewpoints: the IACtHR did not affirm that the unborn 
has the right to life. Nonetheless, it recognized that some protection that is 
due, dependent on the progressive conception of its development that the Court 
adopts; therefore, the balance has to be stricken under the specific circumstances 
between the rights of the unborn and the rights of the mother. These outcomes 
were not achieved all at once in the case law of the Court, but followed some 
interesting steps: previously, on some occasions, the Court had addressed the 
unborn using the words “children”,181 “minors”,182 “babies”, as it was the case 
for its judgments Miguel Castro-Castro Prison v. Peru,183 Goiburú et al. v. 
Paraguay184 and Gómez-Paquiyauri Brothers v. Peru,185 often recognizing a 
compensation for the consequences affecting the unborn and that were caused 
by the physical suffering, the distress or the ailment suffered by the mothers 
under the peculiar circumstances of each case. The case of Sawhoyamaxa 
reservation clarifying that “legislation to protect life “from the moment of conception,” [is a] matter 
[that] falls within the domain reserved to the States”. In scholarship it was stressed that this statement 
should be considered not an interpretive declaration but a reservation, since it changes the scope of the 
duty assumed by Mexico. In this regard, ibid., pp. 17, 83, 84.
177  Baby Boy v. the United States of America, cited above n. 170, para. 19(h). 
178  Ibid., para. 1, among the resolutions of the IACHR.
179  Ibid., para. 30.
180  Ibid., para. 31. In fact, the United States are under an obligation not to defeat the object and 
the purpose of the treaty pursuant to Article 18 of the VCLT, but of course no use of the ACHR as a 
support to the interpretation of the ACHR could be made pursuant to Article 31(3)(c).
181  Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Case of the Miguel Castro-Castro Prison v. Peru, 
Judgment of 25 November 2006, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Series C No. 160. In the judgment 
the Court recognized them compensation for their non-pecuniary damages, such as “feelings of 
anguish, despair, and fear for the lives of their children (at para. 292 of the judgment).
182  Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Case of Goiburú et al. v. Paraguay, Judgment of 22 
September 2006, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Series C No. 153, at 91, 104, para. 160(b)(iii).
183  Case of the Miguel Castro-Castro Prison v. Peru, cited above n. 180.
184  Case of Goiburú et al. v. Paraguay, cited above n. 181, para 91.
185  Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Case of Gómez-Paquiyauri Brothers v. Peru, Judgment 
of 8 July 2004, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Series C No. 110, 1 71. See paras. 67(x) and 216.
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Indigenous Community v. Paraguay186 is arguably the most interesting example 
for our purposes, as the Court affirmed that “States must […] adopt special 
measures to secure women, especially during pregnancy, delivery and lactation, 
access to adequate medical care services”, in relation to State duty to adopt 
the special measure under Article 19 of the Convention that were necessary 
to protect the – born - children’s life.187 However, in all these judgments, the 
protection ensured by the Court addressed the unborn indirectly, as a result of 
the protection granted to the right to physical and psychic integrity or the right 
to health of the mother and her right to access to adequate medical services 
during pregnancy and after the child’s birth. This case law is interesting for 
understanding how the system of the Convention has tackled the protection of 
maternity. Nevertheless, the status of the unborn in that line of jurisprudence 
is not directly tackled and defined, although some recognition and protection, 
as stressed, is indirectly granted. The first opportunity that the IACtHR had to 
expressly grapple with the status of the unborn was the case of the Xákmok 
Kásek Indigenous Community v. Paraguay,188 but it skirted the question.
The case was basically focused on the protection of the ancestral land 
of the Xákmok Kásek Community, as the deprivation of their land had also 
caused the deprivation of the necessary means for living. The Court found a 
breach of the right to property of the applicants and also found that Paraguay 
had not adopted the necessary measures for protecting their right to life. Among 
the victims of the precarious living conditions, two nascituri were mentioned. 
Nonetheless, the Court held that “the representatives and the Commission have 
not presented arguments regarding the alleged violation of the right to life of 
the “unborn””, thus it “lack[ed] facts on which to form an opinion as to the 
State’s responsibility in these cases”.189 However, since the causal link between 
the precarious living conditions of the Community and the deaths of the unborn 
children had been ascertained, it was reasonably stressed in scholarship that 
the Court’s argument seems to clash with the principle iuva novit curia.190 
Otherwise, when two years later the IACtHR was called upon to assess whether 
a right to access to IVF was protected under the ACHR in the Artavia Murillo 
v. Costa Rica case,191 it could not and did not skirt the issue of the status of 
the unborn again. The Court engaged in a careful interpretation of Articles 
186  Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Case of Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous Community v. 
Paraguay, Judgment of 29 March 2006, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Series C No. 146.
187  Ibid., para. 177.
188  Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Case of Xákmok Kásek Indigenous Community v. 
Paraguay, Judgment of 24 August 2010, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Series C No. 214, para. 2.
189  Ibid., para 228.
190  See Díaz, Á. P., “Estatus del no nacido en la Convención Americana: un ejercicio de 
interpretación”, cited above n. 173, p. 103.
191  Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Case of Artavia Murillo et al. (“In vitro fertilization”) 
v. Costa Rica, Judgment of 28 November 2012, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and 
Costs, Series C No. 257.
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4(1), 11, 17 of the ACHR when assessing the compatibility with ACHR of the 
decision of Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court of Costa Rica which, 
consistently with an absolute conception of the right to life from conception, 
had annulled the Executive Decree No. 24029-S of 1995, of the Ministry of 
Health of Costa Rica,192 that allowed IVF for married couples and regulated it.
The IACtHR, differently from the Strasbourg Court, made no use of the 
doctrine of the margin of appreciation, on which actually the IACtHR rarely 
relies in its case law and which was invoked by Costa Rica, when it claimed 
that no regional consensus existed on IVF and, thus, the matter was deferred to 
the discretional evaluation of the domestic legislator. Although some reference 
to regional consensus emerged in the Court’s reasoning when dealing with the 
protection of the right to life with respect to IVF, as the technique is generally 
allowed in Latin America, nevertheless the Court’s scrutiny was basically 
focused on proportionality. 
Primarily, the interpretive efforts of the Court focused on the definition of 
the scope of application of Article 4(1) of the ACHR, by recalling thoroughly 
various techniques of interpretation.193 The Court relied on the method of the 
most favourable interpretation and highlighted that the aim of the wording 
of Article 4(1) is to allow appropriate balance between conflicting rights and 
interests, which excludes an absolute protection of the embryo that annuls other 
rights.194 However, at Paragraph 264 the IACtHR clarifies that the different 
methods of interpretation used “have led to similar results according to which 
the embryo cannot be understood to be a person for the purposes of Article 4(1) 
of the American Convention”. Then, having also retraced the scientific debate 
on the beginning of life and the multidisciplinary approaches to the issue, the 
Court goes straight to the hub coming to the conclusion “that “conception” 
in the sense of Article 4(1) occurs at the moment when the embryo becomes 
implanted in the uterus, which explains why, before this event, Article 4 of 
the Convention would not be applicable”. Moreover, embracing a progressive 
view on the development of the human embryo, the Court clarified that “it can 
be concluded from “the words “in general” that the protection of the right to 
life under [Article 4(1)] is not absolute, but rather gradual and incremental 
according to its development, since it is not an absolute and unconditional 
192  Executive Decree No. 24029-S of February 3, 1995, issued by the Ministry of Health.
193  The decision offers a thorough assessment based on the criteria of the ordinary meaning to be 
given to the terms of a treaty, the historical and systematic interpretation, the evolutive interpretation 
and the most favourable interpretation. In this regard, the Court respectively clarified that the locution 
“in general” allows exceptions, but it cannot be specified which according to the first method of 
interpretation used; secondly, systematic interpretation does not suggest that the embryo can be 
considered “a person” according to the relevant international instruments, the travaux préparatoires 
of the Convention and the rights enshrined in the ACHR and the ADRDM; nor evolutive interpretation 
through comparison among the regulations concerning the status of the embryo and the relevant IVF 
regulations and practices suggested that embryo could be considered “a person”.
194  Case of Xákmok Kásek Indigenous Community v. Paraguay, cited above n. 190, paras. 257 ff.; 164.
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obligation, but entails understanding that exceptions to the general rule are 
admissible”.195 The consequences of this view are of outstanding importance, 
as this reading of Article 4 of the ACHR paves the way for accommodating 
scientific progress within the human rights framework of the Convention. Of 
course, some criticism addressed the decision from the opposite viewpoint. 
It was said that the ruling had prioritized the interests of biotechnology over 
the protection of early embryos, at odds with the Convention’s wording that 
makes explicit reference to “conception”.196 In this regard, in support of the 
ruling, it could be argued that, however, such reading is not clearly at odds with 
an evolutive interpretation of the ACHR.197 The Court’s favour for scientific 
progress emerges also from the subsequent passages of the ruling, a with the 
results it has achieved comprehensively, as is analysed below.
After defining the scope of application of Article 4(1) of the Convention, 
the Court carried out a thorough test of proportionality when assessing Costa 
Rica’s interference with the rights at stake in the case, namely personal integrity, 
personal liberty, private life, intimacy, reproductive autonomy, access to 
reproductive health services and the right to found a family, protected under 
Articles 5(1), 7, 11(2) and 17(2) of the ACHR. The Court provided an accurate 
and interesting definition of the scope and the content of the right to private life 
and its interconnection with the other entitlements involved.198 Similarly to the 
Strasbourg Court, the IACtHR has clarified that “the decision of whether or not 
to become a parent is part of the right to private life and includes, in this case, 
the decision of whether or not to become a mother or father in the genetic or 
biological sense”.199 More in detail, the Court clarified that the case “addresse[d] 
a particular combination of different aspects of private life that are related to the 
right to found a family [that, according to the HRC, encompasses the possibility 
of procreating],200 the right to physical and mental integrity and, specifically, the 
reproductive rights of the individual.”201 In this regard, the Court specified that the 
right to private life encompasses reproductive autonomy that, in light of Article 
195  Ibid., para. 264.
196  Chia, E. A., Contreras, P., “Análisis de la Sentencia Artavia Murillo y Otros (“Fecundación In 
Vitro”) vs. Costa Rica de la Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos”, Estudios Constitucionales, 
vol. 12, n° 1, (2014), pp. 567-585. Centro de Estudios Constitucionales de Chile. Santiago, Chile. 
Also see: Centro de Bioética, Admin, “Para la Corte Interamericana, el embrión no es persona”, 21 
December 2012, available at http://centrodebioetica.org/2012/12/para-la-corte-interamericana-el-
embrion-no-es-persona/ last accessed 23 June 2018.
197  Arévalo Narváez, C. E., Patarroyo Ramirez, P. A., “Treaties over Time and Human Rights: A 
Case Law Analysis of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights”, Anuario Colombiano de Derecho 
Internacional (ACDI), n° 10, (2017), pp. 295-331.
198  Case of Artavia Murillo et al. (“In vitro fertilization”) v. Costa Rica, cited above n. 90, para. 
146. Moreover, in this respect, “[t]he Court has indicated that motherhood is an essential part of the 
free development of a woman’s personality”, at para. 143.
199  Ibid., para. 143.
200  Ibid., para 145.
201  Ibid., para. 144.
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16(e) of the Convention for the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 
against Women, includes the couple’s decision to become genetic parents,202 and 
“access to reproductive health services, which includes the right to have access 
to the medical technology necessary to exercise this right.”203 Recognizing the 
“connection between personal autonomy, reproductive freedom, and physical 
and mental integrity”,204 the IACtHR affirmed that “the rights to private life and 
to personal integrity are also directly and immediately linked to health care [and] 
[t]he lack of legal safeguards that take reproductive health into consideration 
can result in a serious impairment of the right to reproductive autonomy and 
freedom”.205 In this respect, through its purposeful approach that recalls the 
relevant international reference instruments and jurisprudence, the Court 
incorporated in its legal reasoning the generalized understanding of sexual health 
that is shared at the international level, and framed it within the framework of the 
ACHR, by stating that “[t]he right to reproductive health entails the rights of men 
and women to be informed and to have free choice of and access to methods to 
regulate fertility, that are safe, effective, easily accessible and acceptable”, which 
also includes access to IVF.206 This legal reasoning led the Court to specify that 
“the right to private life and reproductive freedom is related to the right to have 
access to the medical technology necessary to exercise that right” and, differently 
from the Strasbourg Court, the IACtHR affirmed and protected in the case “the 
right to enjoy the benefits of scientific progress [that] has been internationally 
recognized”.207 Curiously enough, the Court recalled Article 15 of the ICESCR 
in a footnote208 and did not expressly incorporate it in the text of the judgement as 
could be expected in line with its usual approach considered above. Otherwise, in 
Artavia Murillo judgment, when affirming “[t]he right to have access to scientific 
progress in order to exercise reproductive autonomy and the possibility to found 
a family”,209 the Court basically elucidated its scope by making reference to 
the Inter-American system, which provides references of basic importance and 
helped the Court to give a proactive reading of this right. In particular, the Court 
relied on Articles 11(2) and 17(2) in light of the principle pro persona210 pursuant 
202  Ibid., para. 146.
203  Ibid.
204  Ibid., para. 147.
205  Ibid.
206  In particular, the IACtHR recalled the jurisprudence of the UN Committee on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights, the Cairo Programme of Action of the International Conference on Population 
and Development, and the Declaration and Platform for Action of the Fourth World Conference on 
Women. In this regard, see Ibid., para. paras. 146 and 149.
207  Ibid., para. 150.
208  Ibid., footnote 251.
209  Ibid., para. 150.
210  Feria Tinta, M., The Landmark Rulings of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights on the 
Rights of the Child. Protecting the Most Vulnerable at the Edge, Leiden, Boston, Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers, 2008; Burgorgue Larsen, L., Ubeda de Torres, A., The Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights: Case Law and Commentary, Oxford, New York, Oxford University Press, 2011.
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to Article 29(b) of the ACHR, in connection with Article XIII of the ADRDM 
and Article 14(1)(b) of the Protocol of San Salvador.211 As a result, the Court held 
that the right under consideration “gives rise to the right to have access to the best 
health care services in assisted reproduction technology, and, consequently, the 
prohibition of disproportionate and unnecessary restrictions, de iure or de facto, 
to exercise the reproductive decisions that correspond to each individual”.212 
In relation to this assessment, the Court scrutinized the proportionality of the 
interference caused by Costa Rica, by analysing thoroughly the impact of the 
absolute protection granted to the right to life of the human embryo and finding 
that “one of the direct interferences in private life is related to the fact that the 
Constitutional Chamber’s decision prevented the couples from deciding whether 
or not they wished to submit to this treatment to have children in Costa Rica”.213 In 
fact, the IACtHR considered that having to look for IVF abroad as the only viable 
route for accessing the treatment was unfair;214 this is very a different view from 
the one expressed by the ECtHR in the S.H. v. Austria judgment with reference 
to accessibility to cross-border healthcare. Moreover, IACtHR found that the 
interference of Costa Rica had a disproportionate impact and caused an indirect 
discrimination on the grounds of disability, gender and financial conditions.215 
Finally, the Court scrutinized the proportionality of the State’s interference in 
relation to the embryonic loss in IVF and, in this regard, it considered that since 
“embryonic loss exists in both natural pregnancy and in […] other reproduction 
techniques permitted in Costa Rica, the protection of the embryo sought by 
banning IVF has a very limited and moderate scope”.216
It is in light of all these considerations that the IACtHR came to the conclusion 
that the “Constitutional Chamber based itself on an absolute protection of the 
embryo that, by failing to weigh up or take into account the other competing 
rights, involved an arbitrary and excessive interference in private and family life 
that makes this interference disproportionate [and] moreover, the interference had 
discriminatory effects”.217 Having said that, the Court explicitly held that it was 
not taking into consideration State’s arguments about the margin of appreciation 
although, as anticipated above, in the ruling, some reference to consensus 
emerged in its legal reasoning, when it underline that Costa Rica was the only 
country that prohibits IVF in the region and, then, does not practice it.218 
211  Organization of American States (OAS), Additional Protocol to the American Convention on 
Human Rights in the Area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (“Protocol of San Salvador”) 
(adopted 16 November 1999, entered into force 16 November 1999) A-52, available at http://www.
oas.org/juridico/english/treaties/a-52.html last accessed 23 June 2018.
212  Case of Artavia Murillo et al. (“In vitro fertilization”) v. Costa Rica, cited above n. 90, para. 150.
213  Ibid., para. 277.
214  Ibid., paras. 279, 304, 347 ff.
215  Ibid., para. 316.
216  Ibid., para. 313.
217  Ibid., para. 316.
218  Ibid.
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One year after the Artavia Murillo judgment, in 2013, the IACtHR was 
called upon to express its view in the case of Beatriz; what emerges, again, from 
the Court’s legal reasoning is that the protection of the unborn is not absolute and 
the balance has to be properly stricken among the safeguarding of the nasciturus 
and the conflicting rights of the mother at stake. In the Beatriz case, the focus was 
set on the foetus and the Court had to decide on a provisional measure concerning 
abortion rights in El Salvador, a country that contemplates one of the strictest 
regulations in the region in this field. Criminalization of abortion is particularly 
severe in the country, as women are exposed to up to fifty-years imprisonment in 
case the facts are legally qualified as aggravated murder. The ban on abortion is 
outright in the country and the applicant, who was named “Beatriz” for protecting 
her privacy, had a very delicate situation: she suffered from several severe 
autoimmune diseases, namely Systemic Lupus Erythematosus aggravated with 
lupus nephritis and rheumatoid arthritis, and the pregnancy posed a threat to her 
physical and mental integrity and, eventually, to her life. 219 What is more, several 
ultrasounds had shown that the foetus was affected by anencephaly and had very 
little chances of survival after birth. 
Notwithstanding this and despite the IACHR had requested that El 
Salvador “adopt[ed] the necessary measures to implement the treatment 
recommended by the Medical Committee of the National Hospital […] aiming 
to protect the life, personal integrity and health of [Beatriz]”220, the Salvadoran 
Supreme Court considered that the threat to the life of Beatriz was not “actual 
or imminent”. Then, according to the test of proportionality it carried out, it 
concluded that right to life of the mother and the right to life of the foetus 
deserved equal protection and did not allow the termination of pregnancy 
under those circumstances.221 In its resolution on the provisional measure, the 
IACtHR, requested to act by the Commission, under the circumstances of the 
219  The situation was so serious that it raised the attention of the international community: it 
triggered a mediatic storm and a Group of Experts of the United Nations issued an appeal to El 
Salvador for authorizing Beatriz to undergo the necessary therapeutic abortion Among the Experts 
were included: the Special Rapporteur on violence against women, Rashida Manjoo; the Chairperson 
of the Working Group on the issue of discrimination against women in law and practice, Kamala 
Chandrakirana; the Special Rapporteur on torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment 
or punishment, Juan Méndez; and the Special Rapporteur on the right of everyone to the enjoyment 
of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health, Anand Grover. An overview of the 
UN Group of Expert’s intervention and appeal can be found here: https://newsarchive.ohchr.org/EN/
NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=13404&LangID=E last accessed 13 June 2018. See: 
BASOĞLU, M., Torture and Its Definition in International Law: An Interdisciplinary Approach, 
Oxford, New York, Oxford University Press, 2017, pp. 233 ff.; OBERMAN, M., Her Body, Our 
Laws: On the Front Lines of the Abortion War, from El Salvador to Oklahoma, Boston, Beacon Press, 
2018, pp. 14 ff.
220  Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Matter of B., order of 29 May 2013, Provisional Measures 
regarding El Salvador, Order of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights of 29 May 2013.
221  Arango Olaya, M., “Inter American Court of Human Rights provisional measures adopted in 
B. v. El Salvador case and the strengthening of reproduction rights in the inter-American system”, 
Anuario de Derechos Humanos, n° 10, (2014), pp. 177-185
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case prioritized the right to life and the right to physical and mental integrity of 
the mother over the alleged right to life of the foetus. 222
The Court found that all the requirements for granting the provisional 
measure, namely extreme seriousness, urgency and the risk of an irreparable 
harm, were met: first of all “Beatriz” was in need of constant medical treatment 
and the aggressive medications she took posed a risk to her health and, definitely, 
to her life; her health conditions might have become critical unpredictably; 
finally, pregnancy and the condition of anencephaly that affected the foetus 
might exacerbate her health conditions and, moreover, she was undergoing 
such psychological suffering that she had begun to show some psychosomatic 
symptomatology.223 Therefore, the IACtHR, conclusively, “require[d] that the 
State of El Salvador adopted and guaranteed, with urgency, all the necessary and 
effective measures so that the medical staff treating Mrs. B. can adopt, without 
any interference, the medical measures considered appropriate and convenient 
for ensuring due protection to the rights enshrined in Articles 4 and 5 of the 
American Convention and, in this way, to prevent irreparable harm to the rights 
to life and physical integrity and health of Mrs. B”.224 The resolution confirmed 
the view expressed by the Court in the Artavia Murillo judgment, namely that 
the protection of the unborn is progressive and gradual. It means that under 
distinct circumstances the Court may strike a different balance between the 
conflicting interests at stake and prioritize the protection of the nasciturus.225 
In scholarship, it was suggested that the Court’s view in the Artavia Murillo 
judgment and in the resolution on the case of Beatriz was in line the conception 
that the Court has embraced that only persons are entitled the rights enshrined 
222  For a wider overview of provisional measures in the jurisprudence of the IACtHR, see Pasqualucci, 
J. M., The Practice and Procedure of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Cambridge, New York, 
Melbourne, Madrid, Cape Town, Cambridge University Press, 2013, pp. 254 ff.
223  See respectively paragraphs 12, 13 and 14 of the resolution. With regard to the irreparable 
harm, the anencephaly from which the foetus suffered might have caused such diseases as obstetric 
haemorrhage, worsening of lupus, renal insufficiency and serious preeclampsia and the related 
complications that it might bring about. Moreover, from the psychological viewpoint, Beatriz was 
facing a situation of profound distress, which was in part related to her concerns about her survival 
and, thus, the possibility to take care of her son, who was few years old; in this regard, as stressed 
above, she was already showing some psychosomatic symptomatology. 
224  Translation by the Author. The original text of the Resolution reads as follows: [La Corte 
resuelve] “Requerir al Estado de El Salvador que adopte y garantice, de manera urgente, todas las 
medidas que sean necesarias y efectivas para que el grupo médico tratante de la señora B. pueda 
adoptar, sin interferencia alguna, las medidas médicas que se consideren oportunas y convenientes 
para asegurar la debida protección de los derechos consagrados en los artículos 4 y 5 de la Convención 
Americana y, de este modo, evitar daños que pudiesen llegar a ser irreparables a los derechos a la 
vida y la integridad personal y a la salud de la señora B., conforme a lo expresado en los párrafos 
considerativos 11 a 17 de la presente Resolución”. In practice Beatriz did not abort, but she was 
authorized to terminate pregnancy with a caesarean section, as she was already 27 weeks pregnant.
225  See Arango Olaya, M., “Inter American Court of Human Rights provisional measures adopted 
in B. v. El Salvador case and the strengthening of reproduction rights in the inter-American system”, 
cited above n. 220.
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in the Constitutions.226 The human embryo or the foetus would not be included 
in this notion and, therefore, they would enjoy a protection that is defined 
according to the potential of life they enshrine. 
From a comprehensive viewpoint, the outcome is that the IACtHR has 
played a basic role for the affirmation and the protection of reproductive rights in 
the region and has adopted a proactive reading capable of embracing the right to 
enjoy advanced reproductive techniques and biotechnology, through a proactive 
reading of States’ duties and individuals’ rights under the system of the ACHR 
and the Inter-American human rights instruments. In this regard, the Court has 
enhanced the authoritativeness of the protection it has ensured and promoted,227 
through incorporation in its legal reasoning and in the definitions provided 
of the internationally shared views. The incorporation of the internationally 
shared understanding of sexual health and reproductive rights is a paradigmatic 
example. This approach upholds the Court’s legitimation228 in its relationship 
with States Parties, which is particularly important, for example, to establish 
a balanced dialogue with national courts as to their role in the conventional 
scrutiny since, as well as the legislator, they have to incorporate into domestic 
jurisprudence the standard elaborated by the IACtHR in its case law.229 A 
cooperative approach is fundamental for preventing a clash between the two 
levels of jurisdiction, that might the authoritativeness of the decisions of the 
IACtHR. The sensitiveness of the situation has clearly emerged in both Artavia 
Murillo and Beatriz cases. In this regard it is interesting to recall that some 
Latin American States have incorporated, in their Constitutions, a clause called 
“bloque de constitucionalidad”.230 According to this kind of clauses, which 
were initially incorporated in the European Constitutions of Portugal and Spain 
and which can be found, for instance, in the Latin American Constitutions of 
226  See Chia, E. A., Contreras, P., “Análisis de la Sentencia Artavia Murillo y Otros (“Fecundación 
In Vitro”) vs. Costa Rica de la Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos”, cited above n. 190, p. 
576.
227  See Valerio, C., Vargas, K., Raventós, H., “IVF in Costa Rica”, JBRA Assisted Reproduction, n° 
21(4), (2017), pp. 366-369. See also VON Bogdandy, A., Ferrer Mac-Gregor, E., Morales Antoniazzi, 
M., Piovesan, F., Transformative Constitutionalism in Latin America: The Emergence of a New Ius 
Commune, Oxford, New York, Oxford University Press, 2017, pp. 61 ff.
228  See: Chia, E. A., Contreras, P., “Análisis de la Sentencia Artavia Murillo y Otros (“Fecundación 
In Vitro”) vs. Costa Rica de la Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos”, cited above n. 190; 
Lemaitre, J., Sider, R., “The Moderating Influence of International Courts on Social Movements: 
Evidence from the IVF Case Against Costa Rica”, Health and Human Rights Journal, (6 June 2017), 
available at https://www.hhrjournal.org/2017/06/the-moderating-influence-of-international-courts-
on-social-movements-evidence-from-the-ivf-case-against-costa-rica/ last accessed 25 June 2018.
229  Chia, E. A., Contreras, P., “Análisis de la Sentencia Artavia Murillo y Otros (“Fecundación In 
Vitro”) vs. Costa Rica de la Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos”, cited above n. 190. See: 
Inter-American Court of Huan Rights, Gelman vs. Uruguay, Judgment of 24 February 2011, Merits 
and Reparations, Serie C N° 221
230  Ruiz Miguel, A., Derecho a la Vida y Constitución: Consecuencias de la Sentencia de la Corte 
Interamericana de Derechos Humanos “Artavia Murillo v. Costa Rica””, Estudios Constitucionales, 
Año 12, n° 1, (2014), pp. 71-104, p. 77.
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Argentina, Bolivia, Colombia, Mexico and Venezuela,231 international human 
rights law is constitutionalized, that means it is incorporated within the national 
legal order with constitutional rank.232 This entails that national institutions, 
either political or jurisdictional, should foster the convergence of international 
human rights law and constitutional law, easing the correspondence between 
their scope and content.233 That being said, it should be stressed that there is 
also another relevant consequence related to the bloque de constitucionalidad, 
namely the prevalence of the rules of international human rights law when it 
provides a higher threshold of protection, consistently with the principle pro 
persona.234 As the Court’s ruling in the Artavia Murillo case demonstrates, this 
principle may be fruitfully used for paving the way for generalized enjoyment 
of reproductive rights, also through access to the most advanced achievements 
of scientific progress. For sure, there is still a long way to go, although the 
“wind of change” blowing on Latin America actually seems to be promising 
for the success of the process promoted in the Inter-American jurisprudence.
5. A comparison between the jurisprudence of the IACtHR and of the 
ECtHR and some proposals for judicial dialogue and enhancement of 
the protection ensured
The assessment carried out in the previous paragraphs shows that a 
core conception of reproductive rights and sexual and reproductive health 
has emerged at the international level and the ECtHR and the IACtHR have 
incorporated this view in their jurisprudence, although with some differences 
231  Ibid.
232  A comparison might help to clarify the relevance of the bloque de constitucionalidad: for 
example, in Italy, international law shares the same rank as the provision or set of provisions that 
incorporate it within the national legal order. Customary international law has constitutional rank 
because Article 10 of the Italian Constitution is the provision that incorporates it, whilst conventional 
law has the rank of ordinary law, although Italian scholarship has recognized that they have “special 
resistance”, which means that their rank is “enhanced” in comparison with ordinary law.
233  This view are expressed and thoroughly dealt with in the article Ruiz Miguel, A., Derecho a la 
Vida y Constitución: Consecuencias de la Sentencia de la Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos 
“Artavia Murillo v. Costa Rica””, cited above n° 229. Moreover, it is interesting to mention few rulings 
of Latin American Constitutional Courts concerning the influence of the Inter-American jurisprudence 
over domestic institutions. Of course, the decisions of the IACtHR are binding only on the States they 
address pursuant to Article 68 of the ACHR. Nevertheless, some Constitutional Courts have theorized 
they can provide some guidance for the national courts, as the Mexican Supreme Court, that held 
that the decisions of the IACtHR are “orientadoras”, that is, they should guide, Mexican judges. In 
an arguably less incisive way, the Supreme Court of Argentina has maintained that the interpretation 
of the ACHR is informed by the reading and the guidance provided by the IACtHR. Otherwise, the 
Supreme Court of Uruguay has held that no duty of international law exists in the sense of following 
the jurisprudence of the IACtHR and remarked that the Constitutional itself is the body ultimately 
tasked with the interpretation of the Constitution.
234  Ibid., p. 77 on this view.
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and to a distinct extent. In the case law of the IACtHR, the proactive 
approach embraced and thoroughly underpinned by reference to the relevant 
international instruments and jurisprudence has adopted an advanced reading 
of reproductive rights, capable of promoting the process of rejuvenation 
of human rights law in order to keep the pace with scientific progress. 
Otherwise, the ECtHR has a more evident tendency to self-restrain, although 
some important results were achieved. The R.R. v. Poland and the Costa and 
Pavan v. Italy judgments are effective examples. 
Therefore, we could wonder what we may expect from the evolution 
of the case law of the two Courts and whether judicial dialogue might be a 
fruitful route to take. In this respect, primarily, some considerations should 
be made on the reasons for the differences in their approach, in order to 
assess how the existing limitations but also the viable paths to enhanced and 
scientifically advanced protection of reproductive rights in international law 
may interact with the Court’s views.
First off, the IACtHR is generally more proactive than the Strasbourg 
Court and also less self-referential. The reason has to be sought in the process 
of affirmation of the IACtHR, that had to struggle more than the ECtHR 
in this respect: reference to the relevant hard and soft law instruments of 
international law and to international jurisprudence helped the Court to 
provide more authoritativeness to its decisions. Additionally, it has helped 
to increase the threshold of protection, as the San José Court recalls to the 
relevant international references aiming to ensure the highest standards of 
protection possible, according to the more favourable protection clause, in 
a way which was effectively defined in scholarship as “cherry picking”.235 
Furthermore, the IACtHR can rely on a wider catalogue of human rights 
enshrined in the ACHR, that can offer useful legal bases when dealing with 
reproductive rights. 
In this regard, in the Artavia Murillo judgment, the Court has stressed 
that “unlike the European Convention on Human Rights, which only protects 
the right to family life under Article 8 […] the American Convention contains 
two articles that protect family life in a complementary manner”, namely 
Article 11(2) and Article 17 of the Convention that protect “the rights of the 
family” that the family’s right to protection entails, among other obligations, 
facilitating, in the broadest possible terms, the development and strength of the 
family unit”. However, in this respect, it should be considered that the ECHR, 
235  Groppi, T., Lecis Cocco Ortu, A.M., “Le citazioni reciproche tra la Corte Europea e la Corte 
Interamericana dei Diritti dell’Uomo: dall’influenza al dialogo?”, cited above n. 166, p. 36. For wider 
analysis of the use of the more favourable protection clause in the jurisprudence of the ECtHR and of 
the IACtHR, see Rachovitsa, A., “Treaty Clauses and Fragmentation of International Law: Applying 
the More Favourable Protection Clause in Human Rights Treaties”, Human Rights Law Review, n. 16 
(1), (1 March 2016), pp. 77–101.
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besides Article 8, contains also Article 12, that protects the right to marry and 
to found a family. Nevertheless, this provision was not recalled by the Court in 
relation to reproductive rights, even when it might have helped to better define 
and underpin the human rights framing of the issues considered, for example, 
in the Costa and Pavan and Parrillo rulings. In that regard, it should be taken 
into account that Article 12 protects the right to marry and to found a family 
“according to the national laws governing [their] exercise” but does not contain 
additionally a similar statement as the ACHR, which adds “insofar as such 
conditions do not affect the principle of non-discrimination”. However, some 
guidance for defining better the scope of Article 12 of the ECHR and how it 
interrelated with national laws, is provided by the Court’s case law in the field 
of same-sex couples marriage. For example, in the case of Schalk and Kopf v. 
Austria,236 the Strasbourg Court had the chance to restate, as it had often done 
in its established case law, that “[although t]he exercise of this right […] is 
“subject to the national laws of the Contracting States”, […] the limitations 
thereby introduced must not restrict or reduce [it] in such a way or to such an 
extent that the very essence of the right is impaired”, but usually has allowed a 
wide margin of appreciation. 
Moreover, the catalogue of human rights protected in the Inter-
American system is complemented by the Protocol of San Salvador that 
contains a specific legal basis concerning the right to enjoy the benefits 
of scientific progress, namely Article 14 on the right to the benefits of 
culture, that has paved the way to the affirmation of access to reproductive 
technology in the Artavia Murillo judgment, where the Court had affirmed 
the “right to have access to the medical technology necessary to exercise 
th[e] right [to private life and to reproductive freedom]”.237 Although not 
all States Parties to the ACHR have signed and ratified the Protocol of San 
Salvador, Article XIII of the ADRDM238 would provide a legal basis as well 
with regard to the right to the benefits of culture, as it foresees the right “to 
participate in the benefits that result from intellectual progress, especially 
scientific discoveries”. In this regard, the Strasbourg Court cannot rely 
on a similar targeted legal basis in the ECHR system, which makes its 
interpretive efforts harder. 
Furthermore, as anticipated in the previous paragraph, the conception 
of the right to life adopted in the Inter-American jurisprudence, has played 
an important role for helping the Court to affirm access to reproductive 
236  European Court of Human Rights, Schalk and Kopf v. Austria, Judgment of 24 June 2010, Appl. 
No. 30141/04, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 2010. para. 49, available at https://hudoc.echr.
coe.int/eng#{%22fulltext%22:[%22kopf%22],%22documentcollectionid2%22:[%22GRANDCHA
MBER%22,%22CHAMBER%22],%22itemid%22:[%22001-99605%22]}
237  Artavia Murillo et al. (“In vitro fertilization”) v. Costa Rica, cited above n. 90, para. 150.
238  In particular, Article XIII of the ADRDM at para. 1 provides that: “Every person has the right […] 
to participate in the benefits that result from intellectual progress, especially scientific discoveries.”
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technologies and the enjoyment of reproductive rights, including abortion, 
under the ACHR system. Indeed, by affirming that the right to life of the 
unborn is not absolute and that it deserves progressive protection, the Court 
has tackled the issue of the beginning of life in a way that attempts to provide 
a balanced protection to both the unborn and the conflicting reproductive 
rights, and that allows a case by case scrutiny. In this respect, the standard of 
proportionality has allowed a wider assessment to the Court: although in the 
Artavia Murillo case, possibly, the application of the margin of appreciation 
would have led to similar conclusions due to the existence of a regional 
consensus on IVF, the same can hardly be said in relation to the scrutiny 
on abortion rights, as they do not find the same acceptance regionally. 
Nevertheless, the results achieved by the Strasbourg Court should not be 
underestimated. Basically, because the Court has been capable of making the 
guarantees enshrined in the Convention effective by turning a treaty adopted 
in the 1950 into a “living instrument” capable of encompassing biorights. It 
is clearly praiseworthy. The Court has succeeded to include within the scope 
of the ECHR genetic parenthood and access to PGD and prenatal diagnosis. It 
has succeeded to provide at least procedural protection to abortion rights but, 
nonetheless, the variety of regional views on the beginning of life precludes 
any scrutiny on the issue substantially. In this regard, the slash criticism 
raised by the decision issued by the other European major Court, the Court 
of Justice of the European Union (ECJ) in the Brüstle case,239 in relation to 
239  European Court of Justice (Grand Chamber), Oliver Brüstle v Greenpeace eV., Judgment of 
18 October 2011. Reference for a preliminary ruling: Bundesgerichtshof – Germany, Case C-34/10, 
European Court Reports of Cases 2011 I-09821. In that ruling, the ECJ was called upon provide 
interpretive guidance in relation to the notion of human embryo relevant under Article 6(2)(c) of 
Directive 98/44/EC. The ECJ held that “including any human ovum after fertilisation, any non-
fertilised human ovum into which the cell nucleus from a mature human cell has been transplanted 
and any non-fertilised human ovum whose division and further development have been stimulated 
by parthenogenesis constitute a ‘human embryo’”, due to their capacity of “commencing the process 
of development of a human being”. This view was criticized as it was considered too limitative for 
research, especially in light of the “variable geometry” of research on embryo in Europe (in this 
regard, see García San José, D. I., European Normative Framework for Biomedical Research in 
Human Embryos, cited above n. 10, p. 98. Regulation on human embryo research in Europe ranges 
from the permissive legislation of Spain and the United Kingdom, which allow embryo creation for 
research purposes, to the strict regulation provided by Italy and Germany, for example, that cannot 
create human embryonic stem cells but can import them). Nor the more flexible reading advanced 
three years later in the International Stem Cells judgment where the Court focused on the definition 
of which stage marked the development of the human embryo into the human being, was uncriticized 
(see: European Court of Justice (Grand Chamber), International Stem Cell Corporation v Comptroller 
General of Patents, Designs and Trade Marks, Judgment of 18 December 2014. Request for a 
preliminary ruling from the High Court of Justice (England & Wales), Chancery Division (Patents 
Court). Case C-364/13, Digital reports (Court Reports - general). That being said, this example is 
emblematic of the difficulties that the ECtHR would meet in case it attempted to tackle the beginning 
of life. So far, the recognition of the “potential of life” of the human embryo is an interesting step and 
may help reconciling the different domestic view. However, it does not arguably allow such a scrutiny 
as the notion adopted by the IACtHR.
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Directive 98/44/EC240 and human embryo research, confirms how pluralism is 
hard to tackle in Europe. This helps to clarify why the doctrine of the margin 
of appreciation has played a basic role in the jurisprudence of the Court,241 
in general and especially in the field of biorights. Indeed, it has helped to 
establish a balanced relationship between the ECtHR and States Parties, 
although the Court has not needed to struggle as much as the Inter-American 
Court for its affirmation in its regional framework. However, in the last years, 
some countries have shown some reluctance and have demonstrated to be 
unwilling to comply with the Court’s judgments.242 
The Strasbourg Court is aware of the pressure that is put on it, even more 
when it comes to scrutinizing bioethically sensitive cases and it has emerged 
in its case law. In fact, the Judges Tulkens, Hirvelä, Lazarova Trajkovska and 
Tsotsoria, in their Joint Dissenting Opinion in the case of S.H. v. Austria, in 
relation to the consideration given by the Court to the consensus on gamete 
240  Directive 98/44/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 July 1998 on the legal 
protection of biotechnological inventions, available at https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/
TXT/?uri=celex%3A31998L0044 last visited 20 July 2018.
241  This is arguably so especially since the 1990s, when the number of Member States of the COE 
and thus the figure of the States Parties to the ECHR and subject to the jurisdiction of the Court has 
increased at an appalling rate. And, of course, also the variety and pluralism of views and ethical 
standards to reconcile and to protect in the human rights language of the Convention. The theory of 
the margin of appreciation has ensured a balanced interrelationship between the ECtHR and the States 
also in the long term.
242  For example, it was the case for the United Kingdom in relation to the issue of the 
disenfranchisement of prisoners, as in the Hirst case, or Russia, especially with respect to the 
Konstantin Markin case. The tension between the Court and the States Parties seemed to culminate 
in the Draft Copenhagen Declaration - especially with respect to its approach to subsidiarity and to 
the margin of appreciation – which was intended to review the ECtHR, that seemed to “empower the 
executives of states and weaken the Court”. (which is available at https://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/
Opinion_draft_Declaration_Copenhague%20ENG.pdf last visited 15 July 2018. In this regard, see 
https://www.ejiltalk.org/the-draft-copenhagen-declaration-whose-responsibility-and-dialogue/). See: 
European Court of Human Rights, Hirst v. the United Kingdom (2), Judgment of 6 October 2005, 
Appl. No. 74025/01, available at https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng#{%22dmdocnumber%22:[%227874
85%22],%22itemid%22:[%22001-70442%22]} last visited 12 July 2018; European Court of Human 
Rights, Konstantin Markin v. Russia, Judgment of 22 March 2012, Appl. No. 30078/06, available at 
https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng#{%22fulltext%22:[%22konstantin%22],%22documentcollectionid2%
22:[%22GRANDCHAMBER%22,%22CHAMBER%22],%22itemid%22:[%22001-109868%22]} 
last visited 12 July 2018. See FLEIG-GOLDSTEIN, R. M., “The Russian Constitutional Court 
versus the European Court of Human Rights: How the Strasbourg Court Should Respond to Russia’s 
Refusal to Execute ECtHR Judgments”, Columbia Journal of Transnational Law, available at http://
jtl.columbia.edu/the-russian-constitutional-court-versus-the-european-court-of-human-rights-how-
the-strasbourg-court-should-respond-to-russias-refusal-to-execute-ecthr-judgments/ last visited 12 
July 2018. It seems interesting to recall also that, for the first time in history after the entry into force 
of Protocol No. 14, that introduced Section 4 in the text of Article 46 of the ECHR, the Committee 
of Ministers has started an infringement proceeding against Azerbaijan due to the non-enforcement 
of the Mikayil Mammadov v. Azerbaijan (European Court of Human Rights, Mikayil Mammadov 
v. Azerbaijan, Judgment of 17 December 2009, Appl. No. 4762/05, available at https://hudoc.echr.
coe.int/eng#{%22fulltext%22:[%22mammadov%22],%22documentcollectionid2%22:[%22GRAND
CHAMBER%22,%22CHAMBER%22],%22itemid%22:[%22001-96337%22]} last visited 12 July 
2018). 
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donation for the purpose of IVF, have highlighted that “[t]he current climate 
is probably conducive to such a backward step”. Moreover, the Judges warned 
about the risks, as the fact that “[t]he differences in the Court’s approach to the 
determinative value of the European consensus and a somewhat lax approach 
to the objective indicia used to determine consensus are pushed to their limit 
here, engendering great legal uncertainty”.243
Therefore, also for preventing such risks in the Strasbourg jurisprudence, 
it is interesting to consider whether and to which extent the protection of 
reproductive rights may benefit from judicial dialogue between the results 
achieved by the ECtHR and the IACtHR. Judicial dialogue, or cross-
fertilization, would also arguably benefit the case law of the two Court by 
curbing fragmentation: this seems particularly important in such a field as 
reproductive rights that is required to face transboundary and global challenges 
and where reproductive tourism244 poses serious threats to social justice, since 
only wealthy couples have the chance to travel for accessing to reproductive 
service available abroad. And, in this respect, it is compelling to “assum[e] 
justice as fairness in the distribution of the benefits and burdens of public policy 
in a pluralistic society”,245 and human rights, including reproductive rights, 
implementation at the domestic level can help. 
In light of the comparison between the results achieved by the two Courts, 
it may be argued that, as a primary step, the Strasbourg Court may benefit 
from some reference to the jurisprudence of the IACtHR through judicial 
dialogue. Despite its traditional self-referential approach, the Strasbourg Court 
has already begun to adopt a renewed perspective and to progressively make 
increasing reference to the San José case law. This trend began in the 2000s, 
when the ECtHR had to face new challenges due to the renewed composition 
of States Parties begun in the Nineties, and the experience of the IACtHR in the 
field of some gross violations turned out to be a precious reference.246 Despite 
in general the ECtHR has developed a wider and established experience in 
the field of biolaw, some reference to the views elaborated in San José would 
243  S.H. and Others v. Austria, cited above n. 137, Joint Dissenting Opinion of Judges Tulkens, 
Hivelä, Lazarova Trajkovska and Tsotsoria, para. 9.
244  Rodotà, S., Il diritto di avere diritti, cited above n. 9, p.88; Farnós Amorós, E., “¿Debe permitirse 
la gestación por sustitución en España? Estado de la cuestión y algunas reflexiones”, cited above n. 
142, pp. 195, 234, 222 ff.; Yildiz, M. S., Khan, M. M., “Opportunities for reproductive tourism: 
cost and quality advantages of Turkey in the provision of in-vitro Fertilization (IVF) services”, BMC 
Health Services Research, n° 16, (2016), pp. 378-385.
245  García San José, D.I., International Bio Law. An International Overview of Developments in 
Human Embryo Research and Experimentation, cited above n. 10, p. 162. Also see: Chevernak, F. 
A., Mccullough, L. B., “How physicians and scientists can respond responsibly and effectively to 
religiously based opposition to human embryonic stem cell research”, Fertility and Sterility, vol. 90, 
n° 6, (2008), pp. 2056-2059. 
246  Groppi, T., Lecis Cocco Ortu, A.M., “Le citazioni reciproche tra la Corte Europea e la Corte 
Interamericana dei Diritti dell’Uomo: dall’influenza al dialogo?”, cited above n. 166, pp. 35, 37. 
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help to enhance the guarantees ensured in the field of reproductive rights in the 
ECHR system. Curiously enough, in this regard, the IACtHR has been capable 
of valorising more the nature of the ACHR as a living instrument, in line with 
that “idem sentire”247 that it shares with the Strasbourg Court in this respect.
In particular, the Strasbourg Court would benefit from reference to the 
proactive and less self-referential approach of the San José Court and its capacity 
to recall the relevant international sources of both hard and soft law in order to 
enhance the protection of the conventional rights.248 This would be beneficial 
for the Strasbourg Court for improving the incorporation in its case law of the 
generally recognized core conception of sexual and reproductive health and 
reproductive rights, through an enhanced reading of the rights protected under 
the ECHR, primarily Article 8. In this regard, the Artavia Murillo judgment 
is a paradigmatic example, and reference would be particularly helpful with 
regard to access to ARTs and, in particular, IVF. This is true, especially, 
when it is considered that this approach, as analysed above, has allowed the 
IACtHR to advance a reading of the scope of the right to private life capable of 
encompassing access to reproductive health services that includes “the right to 
have access to the medical technology necessary to exercise this right”249 and 
a reading of Articles 11(2) and 17(2) of the ACHR in light of the principle pro 
persona according to which “the scope of the rights to private life, reproductive 
autonomy and to found a family, derived from [those provisions] extends to the 
right of everyone to benefit from scientific progress and its applications”.
The incorporation of access to reproductive services and to the necessary 
reproductive technology, including scientific progress and its applications, 
as an integral component of private life would help the Strasbourg Court to 
provide wider generalized protection to reproductive rights and would also 
enhance the affirmation of such important entitlements as those affirmed in the 
R.R. and Costa and Pavan rulings, that is the right to access to the information 
that is decisive for exercising personal autonomy, with specific regard in the 
case to prenatal diagnosis, and the right to have a child unaffected by the 
disease of which the parents are healthy carriers. Incorporation of this view 
would also help to enhance the protection of abortion rights, with reference 
to the procedural guarantees that have to be ensured under Article 8 of the 
ECHR and which are already intended, in the Court’s jurisprudence, as access 
247  See Cassetti, L., “La “Costruzione” dei Diritti Sociali nell’approccio della Corte Interamericana 
e della Corte Europea di Strasburgo: Contenuto, Limiti e Prospettive della “Comunicazione” 
Giurisprudenziale”, Federalismi.it - Focus Human Rights, n. 2, 2014, pp. 1-23, 7.
248  Interestingly, this approach of the IACtHR was defined in scholarship as “cherry picking”, in 
light of the capacity and the intent of the Court to properly identify the references apt to enhance the 
protection ensured in an effective and targeted way. In this regard, see Groppi, T., Lecis Cocco Ortu, 
A.M., “Le citazioni reciproche tra la Corte Europea e la Corte Interamericana dei Diritti dell’Uomo: 
dall’influenza al dialogo?”, cited above n. 166, p. 36. 
249  Case of Artavia Murillo et al. (“In vitro fertilization”) v. Costa Rica, cited above n. 90, para. 146. 
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to abortion in case a given State allows it. Of course, it seems very unlikely that 
it might ease the affirmation of abortion rights and access to abortion services 
in relation to the substantial limb of private life, as the Court’s view on the 
beginning of life and its self-restrained approach are hard to change due to the 
lasting regional pluralism on the issue. 
Despite the ECHR system does not contemplate any provision similar 
neither to Article 14 of the Protocol of San Salvador nor to Article XIII of 
the ADRDM, reference could be made to Article 15(1)(b) of the ICESCR 
consistently with the Article 31(3)(c) of the VCLT, as all States Parties to the 
ECHR are also Parties to the ICESCR.250 Actually, the provision was already 
recalled in the Strasbourg case law in the Judges’ Separate Opinions and 
with divergent reading of its content and its impact on the interpretation of 
conventional rights. In their Joint Dissenting Opinion in the case of S.H. and 
Others v. Austria, Judges Tulkens, Hirvelä, Lazarova Trajkovska and Tsotsoria, 
referred to Article 12(1), on the right of everyone to enjoy the highest standard 
of physical and mental health, and 15(1)(b) of the ICESCR, to clarify that “what 
is at stake here is not a question of choice between different techniques but, 
more fundamentally, a restriction on access to heterologous in vitro fertilisation 
constituting denial of access to available treatment”.251 In a different vein, in the 
Parrillo case, in his Concurring Opinion, Judge Pinto de Albuquerque clarified 
that the “freedom [indispensable for scientific research protected under Article 
15(1)(b) of the ICESCR] may be restricted in order to promote the “general 
welfare in a democratic society” and that, in particular, “[t]he protection of 
unborn human life as an indispensable social value in a democratic society, 
which concerns the welfare not only of present but also future generations, 
falls squarely within the restriction clause of Article 4 of the ICESCR […]”.252 
Beyond the contextualization of the Judges’ Separate Opinions, since the facts 
as well as the legal issues raised in the cases were different, it seems that the 
view expressed by Judge Pinto de Albuquerque can extend beyond the question 
of the donation of human embryos to research, providing guidance on the 
protection to be ensured to the unborn beyond the specific circumstances of the 
case, when the scientific progress is at stake before the ECtHR.
From the considerations made, it results all the more delicate but also 
important for the Strasbourg Court to make reference to the ICESCR. It could 
be possibly made through a combined reading of Article 12(1) and 15(1)(b) 
when dealing with reproductive rights and access to reproductive services, 
in a way that is consistent with the generally recognized core conception of 
250  All countries in the world are Parties to the ICESCR, except for Botswana, Brunei, Malaysia, 
Mozambique, South Sudan.
251  S.H. and Others v. Austria, cited above n. 137, Joint Dissenting Opinion of Judges Tulkens, 
Hivelä, Lazarova Trajkovska and Tsotsoria, para. 9.
252  Parrillo v. Italy, cited above n. 112, Concurring Opinion of Judge Pinto de Albuquerque, para. 2.
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reproductive rights. In this regard, the above-mentioned General Comment No. 
22 (2016) would be a helpful reference for clarifying the content of States’ 
duties under Article 12(1) of the Covenant, above all where it states that “[t]he 
failure or refusal to incorporate technological advancements and innovations in 
the provision of sexual and reproductive health services, such as medication for 
abortion, assisted reproductive technologies, and advancements in the treatment 
of HIV and AIDS, jeopardizes the quality of care”.253 In this respect, this 
statement arguably seems to establish a fil rouge between the Article 12(1) and 
Article 15(1)(b) of the Covenant which ensure the protection of reproductive 
rights in relation to the techniques made available by scientific progress, 
although further precious guidance will only be offered by forthcoming General 
Comment on the right to science on Article 15(1)(b). What is more, it may also 
be argued that a similar approach, which underpins the Court’s legal reasoning 
by reference to the relevant international landscape, would also help to shield 
the Strasbourg jurisprudence from States’ interferences, which would help to 
prevent future “backward steps” as the one that the ECtHR took in the S.H. and 
Others v. Austria case.
That being said, keeping in mind that the IACtHR has had only two 
chances for expressing its view on reproductive rights, the achievements in San 
José are more advanced than those of the ECtHR. However, this promising first 
steps do not exclude that the IACtHR may benefit from the achievements of the 
ECtHR concerning the right to become genetic parents and, above all, prenatal 
diagnosis and PGD to strengthen its case law, in line with its usual approach. It 
is not surprising that, for example, in the Artavia Murillo judgment the IACtHR 
has recalled the ECtHR decisions in the Vo, A, B, C, Evans, S.H. and Others and 
Costa and Pavan judgments.254
Arguably, another feasible path may be suggested for the improvement 
of the Inter-American case law in the reproductive field. In fact, besides the 
provisions considered above, the ACHR contains also another suitable legal 
basis, namely Article 26 on “Progressive development”, according to which 
“States Parties undertake to adopt measures [for achieving] full realization of 
the rights implicit in the economic, social, educational, scientific, and cultural 
standards set forth in the Charter of the Organization of American States”. 
This provision, that the Court did not use in the Artavia Murillo judgment, is 
253  UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General comment No. 22 (2016) on 
the right to sexual and reproductive health (article 12 of the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights), cited above n. 88, para. 21. The ‘4-A scheme’ hinges on availability, 
accessibility, acceptability and adaptability which turns into quality when health is at stake and has 
helped to elucidate the content of States’ duties under the Covenant.
254  These references, that were recalled at paras. 237-242 as relevant international references from 
the ECHR system can be found incorporated in the legal reasoning of the Court various times. More 
specifically, for instance, the Vo, S.H. and Others and Costa and Pavan rulings were recalled when the 
IACtHR dealt with the legal status of the embryo.
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interesting from several viewpoints. Primarily, because it may arguably offer 
some protection to sexual and reproductive health even with respect to those 
States that are not Parties to the Protocol of San Salvador and, thus, are not 
bound to Article 14 thereof. What is more, it seems interesting to consider the 
kind of scrutiny that Article 26 of the ACHR would allow to the IACtHR in the 
field of reproductive rights. It may be advanced, that the Court would benefit 
from the use of this provision since it recalls the Charter of the OAS, which 
makes specific reference to scientific and technological progress in relation to 
the integral development for the peoples of the Member States of the OAS. 
This is of basic importance as scientific progress is intended in relation to the 
protection of man’s potential and as a foundation of social justice. This would 
arguably help to affirm some guarantees under the ACHR in relation to the 
achievements of scientific progress in the field of reproduction and that such 
achievement should not be exclusive, but generally accessible. Furthermore, 
reference to Article 26 would allow the Court to scrutinize States’ compliance 
with the duty of non-regression, that here would imply to ensure the progressive 
development of the protection of reproductive and sexual health and rights also 
through adequate allocation of resources. Arguably, use of Article 26 of the 
ACHR would require some efforts to the Court as, so far, this provision has 
been used beneath its potential;255 its use seems desirable as it would be helpful 
to promote the access to advanced medical reproductive technology through 
appropriate States funding. 
The ECHR system does not contain any comparable provision; 
nevertheless, some interesting reference is offered by the Oviedo Convention 
that, at Article 3, foresees States’ duty to ensure “equitable access to health 
care of appropriate quality”, according to health needs and to the resources 
available. This could be used as a support to the interpretation by the Strasbourg 
Court of the obligations under the ECHR. Clearly, the impact of this provision 
is different from Article 26 of the ACHR: not all States Parties to the ECHR 
are also Parties to the Oviedo Convention and its scope does not expressly 
encompass scientific progress. Nonetheless, the standard of quality could 
be intended as encompassing a full understanding of health and health care, 
according to the generally accepted notion of sexual and reproductive health 
and reproductive rights.
That being said, it could be questioned whether some further development 
may be expected in the case law of the ECtHR and the IACtHR with particular 
reference to the most advanced reproductive achievements that scientific 
255  Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Case of Five Pensioners v Peru, Judgment of 
28 February 2003, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Series C No. 98. See: CASSETTI, L., “La 
“Costruzione” dei Diritti Sociali nell’approccio della Corte Interamericana e della Corte Europea di 
Strasburgo: Contenuto, Limiti e Prospettive della “Comunicazione” Giurisprudenziale”, cited above 
n. 246.
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progress is making available and which need an adequate legal response, as law 
always “lag behind science”.256 Reference here is made in particular to genome 
editing and its possible therapeutic applications concerning human embryos 
in the field of reproduction, seeking solutions capable of framing scientific 
evolution in the human rights discourse related to reproduction that, at the same 
time, are respectful of the unborn. Next paragraph, then, explores the viability 
of a human rights-based approach for ensuring accessibility to such biomedical 
and biotechnological opportunities and, for this purpose, it assesses which 
paths are allowed under international law and might be incorporated, even if 
not immediately, in the generally accepted core conception of reproductive and 
sexual health and reproductive rights.
6. Scientific progress and reproduction: viability of a human rights-
based approach before the ECtHR and the IACtHR 
The evolution of scientific progress and the innovative applications that 
it offers and that might suit important reproductive needs and wishes, pose 
huge challenges to international human rights law and in particular to such 
major regional Courts as the ECtHR and the IACtHR. Indeed, biomedicine, 
biotechnology and genetic engineering are in constant evolution and already 
offer prodigious means, which have culminated with the achievement of the 
CRISPR-Cas9, a technique that, as anticipated, even allows to edit the human 
germline. 
The ways in which scientific progress and its achievements can intertwine 
with reproductive rights are various: of course, they concern human germline 
editing. The eugenic risks are evident and human germline editing is a 
particularly debated question: since it affects the oocyte, sperm and early 
embryo, it entails alterations that are transmissible to the descendants. This is 
the feature which distinguishes it from human somatic cells alterations, that 
affect body cells and, thus, concern only the subject treated. Human germline 
alterations may be carried out for two distinct purposes, namely for therapeutic 
ends or for human enhancement.257 Focusing on therapeutic modifications, 
different kinds of interventions are now available and they range, just to 
mention some possibilities, from the replacement of an altered gene to fixing 
256  García San José, D. I., International Bio Law. An International Overview of Developments in 
Human Embryo Research and Experimentation, cited above n. 10, 149, 164, 179, 189, 192.
257  In practice, it is not always easy to distinguish the two kinds of interventions. The criterion 
of “normality” was advanced as the standard for identifying “therapeutic” interventions of genome 
editing, which entail “corrective” interventions on the genome, in order to prevent the onset of genetic 
diseases. Enhancing alterations, instead, are intended to bring about an improvement of some traits of 
the subject treated, even when no pathological exigency requires it. For example, for increasing the 
intellectual capacity of an individual.
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up such alterations. The research carried out by the Chinese scientists in order 
to repair the genetic mutation causing beta-thalassemia is a paradigmatic 
example.258 Another interesting scientific achievement is represented by 
mitochondrial replacement techniques (MRTs), which can help to prevent the 
onset of genetic diseases transmissible from the mother to the child and which 
was allowed in 2015 in the United Kingdom.259 This preserves the genetic 
kinship between the couple and the child and, at the same time, it prevents the 
baby from developing a specific genetic disease. These techniques may also be 
a precious means for female same-sex couples, as they would make possible 
for the mothers to have a child that is genetically related to both of them. These 
techniques go beyond the possibilities offered by preimplantation genetic 
diagnosis (PGD) and preimplantation genetic screening (PGS),260 which do not 
imply human germline alterations but allow the implantation of the “healthy” 
embryos, and beyond prenatal diagnosis on the foetus, which is carried out after 
implantation.261 It appears quite evident how all these interesting practices and 
258  Cyranoski, D., Reardon, S., “Chinese scientists genetically modify human embryos. Rumours 
of germline modification prove true — and look set to reignite an ethical debate”, Nature, 22 April 
2005, available at https://www.nature.com/news/chinese-scientists-genetically-modify-human-
embryos-1.17378 last visited 14 July 2018. 
259  In practice, MRTs allow replacing the mother’s mitochondrial DNA with the one from a woman 
donor. ORCUT, M., “The Unintended Consequence of Congress’s Ban on Designer Babies. The testing 
of new therapies to prevent a debilitating mitochondrial genetic disease in babies has hit a dead end”, 
MIT Technology Review, 26 August 2016, available at https://www.technologyreview.com/s/602219/
the-unintended-consequence-of-congresss-ban-on-designer-babies/ last visited 14 July 2018.
260  Rodotà, S., Trattato di Biodiritto, ll Governo del Corpo, p. 381. The preimplantation diagnostic 
screening is performed when the couple has no specific indication as to the possibility to bear a child 
affected by a genetic disease, but some peculiar conditions might expose the parents to this possibility 
due to such particular conditions as the advanced age of the mother, serial miscarriage and severe 
male factor infertility.
261  However, under some circumstances PGD and PGS cannot be helpful, for instance with respect 
to dominant late-onset genetic diseases, such as Huntington’s disease, or in those cases where a 
given genetic disease-causing mutation is widely spread in the population, as for instance the tumor 
suppressor genes BRCA1 and BRCA2, which increase the risk of developing breast and ovarian 
cancer even when inherited in a single copy (because of loss of the unaffected copy of the gene), 
the Tay-Sachs disease and other early-onset lysosomal storage diseases caused by the inheritance 
of two copies of recessive mutations. Another limitation that, in general, concerns these diagnostic 
techniques is that they can provide information about the genotype, but not about the phenotype, 
therefore they offer no indication about how the genetic heritage of an embryo will interact with the 
environment in the future and the epigenetic evolution it might get through. National Academies of 
Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine , Human Genome Editing: Science, Ethics and Governance, 
Washington, The National Academies Press, 2017. Another interesting practice, which goes beyond 
the scope of this paper, is represented by the “saviour siblings”. In this case, PGD techniques and ARTs 
are used for the identification and implantation of an embryo that is viable for curing the diseases 
from which some close relatives, especially sibling, are affected. For example, with regard to human 
leukocyte antigen (HLA) compatible siblings, that may help to treat their brothers or sisters through 
allogeneic haematopoietic stem cell transplantation with reference to various congenital diseases, as 
beta-thalassemia, by using the cells taken from the umbilical cordon or through spinal cord transplant. 
Scientific progress is currently attempting to devise also the alternative route of gametes genome 
editing, that is the modification of the genome of eggs and sperm which, would allow preselection of 
targeted gametes in vitro before fertilization and implantation of the embryo. So far, this technique 
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achievements may benefit reproductive rights but they might importantly affect 
the unborn, thus their compatibility with international law and their framing 
within human rights law requires to be assessed. 
Very few instruments contain pertinent provisions in this respect. The 
relevant references are offered by the Oviedo Convention262 and by the 
UNESCO Universal Declaration on Human Genome and Human Rights 
(UNESCO UDHGHR).263 Both instrument build upon the principle of human 
dignity, which represents the ultimate bioethical principle from which the 
protection of fundamental rights flows264 and which should be preserved from 
the risks of eugenics and the distorted applications of scientific progress. In 
this regard, the UNESCO UDHGHR expressly holds that “everyone has a 
right to respect for their dignity and for their rights regardless of their genetic 
characteristics” at Article 2(a) and the Oviedo Convention, in its Preamble, 
recalls “ the need to respect the human being both as an individual and as 
a member of the human species and recognis[es] the importance of ensuring 
the dignity of the human being”, that might be endangered by the “misuse of 
biology and medicine”. As seen in paragraph two, human dignity is identified 
by a huge part of constitutional jurisprudence worldwide as the founding 
value that justifies the protection to be granted to the “potential of life” that 
the unborn enshrines, even if personhood and, thus, the bearing of the right 
to life are excluded. The protection of human dignity is the essential point of 
the relevant provisions which can offer guidance for assessing feasibility of 
the use of advanced scientific applications in the field of reproductive rights, 
respectful of the unborn. In this regard, the protection of the unborn and its 
dignity from the “misuse of biology and medicine” can be intended, with 
reference to both instruments, in relation the duty of mankind to protect future 
generations and the principle of responsibility, which in scholarship was a pillar 
of the philosophy of Hans Jonas, who claimed that human nature has to be 
is experimental on mice and several other mammals, importantly including non-human primates as 
well, but there is still a long way to go for mainstreaming it for humans. Baetens, P., Van De Velde, 
H., Camus, M., Pennings, G., Van Steirteghem, A., Devroey, P., Liebaers, I., “HLA-matched embryos 
selected for siblings requiring haematopoietic stem cell transplantation: a psychological perspective”, 
Reproductive Biomedicine Online, n° 10(2), (February 2005), pp. 154-163. Rodotà, S., Trattato di 
Biodiritto, ll Governo del Corpo, p. 381.
262  Council of Europe, Convention for the protection of Human Rights and Dignity of the Human 
Being with regard to the Application of Biology and Medicine: Convention on Human Rights and 
Biomedicine (adopted 4 April 1997, entered into force 1 December 1999), ETS No. 164, available at 
https://rm.coe.int/168007cf98 last accessed 3 July 2018.
263  UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO), Universal Declaration on the 
Human Genome and Human Rights, 11 November 1997, Adopted unanimously and by acclamation 
by the General Conference of UNESCO at its 29th session on 11 November 1997, available at http://
portal.unesco.org/en/ev.php-URL_ID=13177&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201.html 
last accessed 3 July 2018.
264  See Andorno, R., “Biomedicine and international human rights law: in search of a global 
consensus”, Bulletin of the World Health Organization, n° 80, 2002, pp. 959-963, 960.
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preserved at all costs.265 In this regard, when the protection of the descendants 
is at stake, human germline modifications, either concerning the gametes or 
the human embryos require thorough consideration, especially because of the 
intergenerational and transgenerational transmissibility of these alterations, 
which may clash with the principles under consideration. Indeed, as clarified 
by the Explanatory Report of the Oviedo Convention, “the developments in 
medicine and biology […] should be used only for the benefit of present and 
future generations and not be diverted in ways that run counter to their proper 
objective”, as scientific progress has to serve always the “benefits of progress 
to the whole of mankind”.266 Importantly, this statement is echoed by Paragraph 
89 concerning Article 13 of the Oviedo Convention267 which provides that “[a]
n intervention seeking to modify the human genome may only be undertaken 
for preventive, diagnostic or therapeutic purposes and only if its aim is not to 
introduce any modification in the genome of any descendants”, a view that 
is specified and complemented by Paragraph 91 of the Explanatory Report 
where it stresses that “[c]onsequently, in particular genetic modifications of 
spermatozoa or ova for fertilisation are not allowed”. Similarly, the UNESCO 
UDHGHR, at Article 12(b), provides that “that the application of research “shall 
seek to offer relief from suffering and improve the health of individuals and 
humankind as a whole” and, at Article 24, explicitly qualifies human germline 
alterations as a practice contrary to human dignity.268 The UNESCO and the 
COE269 recently have restated their reluctancy about human germline editing,270 
265  Jonas, H., The Imperative of Reponsibility - In Search of an Ethics for the Technological Age, 
Chicago, London, The University of Chicago Press, 1984. Also see: MORRIS, T., Hans Jonas’s Ethic 
of Responsibility: From Ontology to Ecology, Albany, State University of New York Press, 2013.
266  Explanatory Report to Convention for the protection of Human Rights and Dignity of the 
Human Being with regard to the Application of Biology and Medicine: Convention on Human Rights 
and Biomedicine, Oviedo, 4 April 1997, ETS No. 164, Paragraph 15.
267  In particular, Paragraph 89 of the Explanatory Report, concerning Article 13 of the Oviedo 
Convention on the interventions on human genome, stresses that “developments in th[e] field [of 
human genome editing] may lead to great benefit for humanity, misuse of these developments may 
endanger not only the individual but the species itself”.
268  It seems relevant to recall here the conception, in a symbolic sense, of the human genome as 
“heritage of mankind” contained in Article 1 of the UNESCO Declaration embodies the concerns but 
also the hopes of the international community and of the scientific community, that also led to the Joint 
Statement of 14 March 2000 of the then President of the United States of America Bill Clinton and the 
then British Prime Minister Tony Blair, which claimed that “fundamental data on the human genome, 
including the human DNA sequence and its variations, should be made freely available to scientists 
everywhere”. The possibility to access freely to the “fundamental data on the human genome” is 
instrumentally linked to the “benefit of mankind” and the beneficial results which, for that purpose, 
scientific progress may achieve. Of course, the reproductive field is no exception in this sense.
269  Council of Europe, Parliamentary Assembly, Recommendation 2115(2017) on “The use of new 
genetic technologies in human beings”, Assembly debate on 12 October 2017 (35th Sitting) (see Doc. 
14328, report of the Committee on Social Affairs, Health and Sustainable Development, rapporteur: 
Ms Petra De Sutter). Text adopted by the Assembly on 12 October 2017 (35th Sitting), available at 
http://assembly.coe.int/nw/xml/XRef/Xref-XML2HTML-EN.asp?fileid=24228&lang=en last visited 
14 July 2018.
270  Council of Europe, Committee on Bioethics, “Statement on genome editing technologies”, 8th 
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inviting States to take a wise and cautious approach to the advanced techniques 
offered by scientific progress and making explicit reference to the eugenic risks 
related to reproduction. What is more, so far the prohibition of human germline 
alterations, together with the ban on reproductive cloning, is one of the two 
biolegal practices about which the international community has expressed 
its consensus.271 Therefore, under the instruments considered and according 
to the international view emerged so far, the unborn would receive absolute 
protection from any modification of its human germline; correspondingly, 
no room for the affirmation of the reproductive rights concerning access to 
the advanced techniques mentioned above would seem to be left under the 
Oviedo Convention and the UNESCO UDHGHR. However, some scholars 
and some scientists have begun to suggest a different viewpoint, that would 
entail the reconsideration of the rigour of the prohibition.272 What is more, the 
UNESCO and the COE themselves although restating their reluctance, have 
recognized that the ethical debate on human germline alterations is still open273 
and that some techniques, as MRTs, were used “despite the considerable ethical 
controversy and scientific uncertainty about the long-term effects”.274
Meeting, 1-4 December 2015, available at https://rm.coe.int/168049034a last accessed 14 July 2018. 
Further information available at https://www.coe.int/en/web/bioethics/-/gene-editing?desktop=true last 
visited 14 July 2018. In particular, it seems interesting to stress that the Committee on Bioethics of the 
COE declared to be “convinced that the Oviedo Convention provides principles that could be used as 
reference for the debate called for at international level on the fundamental questions raised by these 
recent technological developments”. UNESCO, International Bioethics Committee, Report of the IBC 
on Updating Its Reflection on Human Genome and Human Rights, SHS/YES/IBC-22/15/2 REV.2, Paris, 
2 October 2015, available at http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0023/002332/233258E.pdf last accessed 
15 July 2018. In particular, the Report of the UNESCO International Bioethics Committee called for a 
moratorium on human germline alterations due to the still uncertain results of this kind of modifications, 
“at least as long as the safety and efficacy of the procedures are not adequately proven as treatments”. 
This statement might leave some margin of manoeuvre to the possibility to reconsider human germline 
editing as a viable path when it becomes safer and more effective as “treatments”, including in the field of 
reproduction. In Recommendation 2115 (2017), the COE expressly “urge[d] member States [to] ratif[y] the 
Oviedo Convention […] or […] to put in place a national ban on establishing a pregnancy with germ-line 
cells or human embryos having undergone intentional genome editing”. However, it also gave recognition 
to the fact that some countries allow MRTs and that amendment of the Oviedo Convention is possible after 
appropriate debate according to Article 28 thereof, in light of the developments of biology and medicine.
271  In this regard, it is indicative that the UNESCO Universal Declaration on Human Genome and 
Human Rights was endorsed unanimously by the General Assembly.
272  In late 2015, the Organizing Committee for the International Summit on Human Gene Editing, 
in which outstanding researchers in the field participated, published a summit statement where it did 
not exclude running in-vitro human germline genetic interventions. Some other scientists joined the 
debate arguing that in-vitro research implying human germline editing may be a feasible route. See: 
HARRIS, J., Enhancing evolution. The ethical case for making better people, Princeton, Princeton 
University Press, 2007; Gomes De Andrade, N. N., “Human Genetic Manipulation and the Right to 
Identity: the Contradictions of Human Rights Law in Regulating the Human Genome”, SCRIPTed, 
Volume 7, Issue 3, December 2010, pp. 429-452, 432-433,437; GUNDERSON, M., “Enhancing 
Human Rights: How the Use of Human Rights Treaties to Prohibit Genetic Engineering Weakens 
Human Rights”, Journal of Evolution and Technology, vol. 18(1), (2008), pp. 27-34.
273  UNESCO, International Bioethics Committee, Report of the IBC on Updating Its Reflection on 
Human Genome and Human Rights, cited above n. 269, para. 118.
274  Council of Europe, Recommendation 2115 (2017), cited above n. 269, para. 2.
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Thus, it should be questioned whether a redefinition of this view may be 
desirable and expectable, especially in light of the benefits to the health of the 
unborn and of future generations that scientific progress has made possible in 
the last twenty years after the adoption of the instruments under consideration, 
and whether access to these advanced outcomes of scientific progress may 
be theorized as a component of reproductive rights from an evolutionary 
viewpoint. 
A key conception, for this purpose, is represented by the restricted notion 
of the right to genetic identity,275 which is related to the protection of human 
dignity. As held in scholarship, the restricted notion of this entitlement would 
encompass only core personal traits276 and, thus, would allow human germline 
alterations for therapeutic purposes, but not those aimed at enhancement.277 In 
this respect, the concept of genetic “identity” should not be overlapped with 
the conception of genetic “integrity”, that implies the right to a non-modified 
genetic heritage. In scholarship, it was highlighted that “it is important to 
understand that not every intervention on the human genome aimed at modifying 
the germline necessarily equates to an eugenic practice” and that “the right to 
genetic integrity is no longer formulated in terms of a general right to a non-
modified genetic heritage or as an equivalent of a right to genetic identity”. 
This emerges in international human rights law too and a remarkable example 
is offered by Article 3 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European 
275  Genetic identity and genetic integrity are two important conceptions with regard to genome 
editing: an interesting reading was advanced in scholarship with regard to genome alterations in adult 
subjects, which were justified by the right to genetic identity as a reaffirmation of the individual sphere 
against the genetic integrity of human species, that would hamper genetic alterations. See Gomes 
De Andrade, N. N., “Human Genetic Manipulation and the Right to Identity: the Contradictions of 
Human Rights Law in Regulating the Human Genome”, cited above n. 271.
276  A specification should be made about the conception of genetic identity, that is closely related 
to human dignity. The main reasons are that present generation do not have the right to genetically 
predetermine genetic characteristics of future generation according to their contingent conception of 
what is “good” or what is “bad”. Moreover, future generations might perceive themselves as mere 
objects due to such alterations. See Andorno, R., “Biomedicine and international human rights law: in 
search of a global consensus”, cited above n. 63, p. 961. The extreme result of this perspective is that 
alteration in human germline might amount to crimes against humanity. (in this regard, see Annas, G. 
J., Andrews, L. B., Isasi, R. M., “Protecting the endangered human: Toward an international treaty 
prohibiting cloning and inheritable alterations”, American Journal of Law and Medicine, 28(2-3), 
(2002), pp. 151-178. The concerns are so serious that it was advanced the idea to adopt a “Convention 
on the Preservation of the Human Species”. In this sense, see Gunderson, M., “Enhancing Human 
Rights: How the Use of Human Rights Treaties to Prohibit Genetic Engineering Weakens Human 
Rights”, cited above n. 271. 
277  In this regard, it is not at odds with the fact that therapeutic interventions also determine an 
enhancement of the human conditions, as far as it concerns health, as clarified by John Harris. Harris, 
J., Enhancing evolution. The ethical case for making better people, cited above n. 271. Of course, also 
opposite views were authoritatively expressed. For example, Jürgen Habermas and Michael Sandel 
rule out any modification, basically respectively in the name of an “anthropologic universality” and 
for the risk to compromise such founding human and social values as humility, responsibility and 
solidarity”. See: Sandel, M., Contro la perfezione, Milano, Vita e Pensiero, 2008; Habermas, J., Il 
futuro della natura umana. I rischi di una genetica liberale, Torino, Einaudi, 2002;
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Union (CFR), which recalls as an example of eugenic practices those aimed 
at the selection of persons and which makes reference also to reproductive 
cloning but does not mention human germline alterations. Again, with even 
wider consequences, scholarship has highlighted that the conception of human 
dignity embraced by the CFR refers to any born person, thus it does not concern 
pre-natal life, as can be inferred from the fact that the Charter, in Title I on 
“Dignity”, incorporated the prohibition on human cloning in Article 3, on the 
right to integrity, and not in Article 2, on the right to life.278 Interestingly, it 
was additionally held that “[t]he association of the right to genetic integrity 
[…] with the right to genetic identity […]focuses solely upon the perils of the 
[genetic manipulation] latter without considering the potential benefits that can 
be derived from human genetic interventions” and that “[t]he right to genetic 
identity, therefore, should both foresee the integrity but also the changeability 
of one’s genetic architecture.”279
The possibility to rely on preventive and therapeutic human germline 
alterations in the reproductive field should all the more be reconsidered according 
to those scholars that have clarified that genetic identity, our authenticity and our 
278  As stated above, some interpretive guidance on the scope of integrity may be inferred from 
Article 3 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (CFR) where it prohibits 
eugenic practices such as “those aimed at the selection of persons”. See: European Union: Council of 
the European Union, Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (2007/C 303/01) (adopted 
14 December 2007, entered into force 14 December 2007) C 303/1, available at http://www.europarl.
europa.eu/charter/pdf/text_en.pdf last accessed 15 July 2018. In scholarship, see Gomes De Andrade, 
N. N., “Human Genetic Manipulation and the Right to Identity: the Contradictions of Human Rights 
Law in Regulating the Human Genome”, cited above n. 271, p. 437. On the conception of human 
dignity under the CFR see: García San José, D. I., European Normative Framework for Biomedical 
Research in Human Embryos, cited above n. 10, pp. 99-100. GARCÍA SAN JOSÉ, D. I., “Derecho de 
la Unión, Investigación embrionaria humana y patentes biológicas”, Revista de Derecho Comunitario 
Europeo, Madrid, n° 41, enero/abril, 2012, pp. 161-180, 175 ff.
279  The whole quotation reads: “[It] is important to understand that not every intervention on the 
human genome aimed at modifying the germline necessarily equates to an eugenic practice. Therefore, 
it is more appropriate to follow the drafting example of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the 
European Union’s art 3, “Right to the integrity of the person”, which unlike the Oviedo Convention, 
does not enshrine any general prohibition of germline genetic modifications. Art 3, refers instead to 
the prohibition of eugenic practices (in particular those aiming at the selection of persons) specifically 
and to the reproductive cloning of human beings (art 3.2). Contrary to the initiatives in the 1980s and 
1990s led by European institutions, the right to genetic integrity is no longer formulated in terms of a 
general right to a non-modified genetic heritage or as an equivalent of a right to genetic identity. The 
association of the right to genetic integrity (and, subsequently, the right to a non-modified genetic 
heritage) with the right to genetic identity constitutes an old fashioned, narrow and detrimental view 
of human genetic manipulation, which focuses solely upon the perils of the latter without considering 
the potential benefits that can be derived from human genetic interventions. The right to genetic 
identity, therefore, should both foresee the integrity but also the changeability of one’s genetic 
architecture: the right to personal identity may perfectly encompass the right to individual genetic 
modification.” Gomes De Andrade, N. N., “Human Genetic Manipulation and the Right to Identity: 
the Contradictions of Human Rights Law in Regulating the Human Genome”, cited above n. 271, 
p. 437. Also see, in particular, pp. 432-433. Moreover, the individual genetic identity and integrity 
should not be overlapped with the genetic identity and integrity of the species.
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uniqueness should not “spawn a human right”280 like, arguably, the enjoyment 
of reproductive rights in relation the benefits of scientific progress.281 What is 
more, the prevention of the onset of a genetic disease does not seem to be at 
odds with human dignity; otherwise, the protection of the unborn from possible 
future suffering seems to be coherent with this rationale.282 In particular, it does 
not seems to be qualifiable as a “misuse of biology and medicine” capable 
of endangering the “dignity of the human being” and the “potential of life” 
that characterizes the unborn as constitutional jurisprudence has stressed in 
various countries. Again, this view would arguably be consistent with the 
Oviedo Convention, in particular as Paragraph 90 of the Explanatory Report 
clarifies that “any intervention which aims to modify the human genome must 
be carried out for preventive, diagnostic or therapeutic purposes” and that “[i]
nterventions aimed at modifying genetic characteristics not related to a disease 
or to an ailment are prohibited”. 
What is more, viability of human germline modifications for therapeutic 
purposes might be reconciled with Article 14 of the Oviedo Convention, 
which prohibits the selection of the future’s child sex “except where serious 
hereditary sex-related disease is to be avoided”. Then, this provision might 
also be read as leaving some margin to therapeutic interventions on human 
embryos in the context of assisted reproductive technology, which also seems 
all the more arguable when one considers that authoritative scholarship affirms 
the right to be born with dignity,283 whose scope may encompass therapeutic 
interventions.284 Moreover, the issue of the lack of consent of the unborn might 
be dealt with as for “children who are too young to consent for themselves”.285 
That being said, once the possibility to advance the reconsideration 
of the prohibition of the use of preventive and therapeutic human germline 
modifications in the field reproduction is taken into account, it should be 
assessed whether and how it could be framed in the human rights discourse for 
280  Annas, G. J., Andrews, L. B., Isasi, R. M., “Protecting the endangered human: Toward an 
international treaty prohibiting cloning and inheritable alterations”, cited above n. 275.
281  Häyry, M., “Another look at dignity”, Cambridge quarterly of healthcare ethics, n° 13(1), 
(2204), pp. 7-14.
282  Netherlands Commission on Genetic Modification (COGEM), Health Council of the 
Netherlands (Gezondheidsraad),
“Editing Human DNA: Moral and social implications of germline genetic modification”, Bilthoven, 
the Netherlands, COGEM, 2017; Nuffield Council on Bioethics, “Genome Editing and Human 
Reproduction: social and ethical issues”, London, Nuffield Council on Bioethics, 2018.
283  In fact, although the right to be born with dignity requires due self-restraint when approached, 
therapeutic purposes stands out, as “nobody would disagree in principle with therapies for treatment of 
diseases”. García San José, D.I., International Bio Law. An International Overview of Developments 
in Human Embryo Research and Experimentation, cited above n. 10, p. 53.
284  Moreover, this would seem in line with the principle of human dignity intended in the Kantian 
sense that no one – neither the unborn – should be used as a mean but as an end, as the aim would be 
the improvement of the health of the unborn itself.
285  In this regard, see Chadwick, R., “Gene Therapy”, in A Companion to Bioethics, Kuhse, H., 
Singer, P. (eds.), Hoboken, Wiley-Blackwell, 1998, pp. 205-215, 209.
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the purpose of analysing its incorporation in the jurisprudence of the ECtHR 
and of the IACtHR. In particular, it should be assessed whether and how this 
view might complement the core conception of reproductive rights that has 
found general acceptance under international law and which already includes 
such techniques as ARTs and IVF, as stated above. This may be suggested as a 
feasible path for fostering jurisprudential “rejuvenation” in light of relentless – 
reproductive - scientific progress. 
In this regard, it still seems early to affirm the incorporation of the right 
to access and enjoy these technologies into the generally accepted conception 
of reproductive and sexual health and reproductive rights. Currently specific 
indications in this sense still lack, in part due to the fact that some techniques 
are still at an experimental stage and practice at the moment has not given the 
chance to express their view to international judicial and non-judicial human 
rights bodies, whose jurisprudence has played a fundamental role for making 
the core conception of reproductive health and rights keep the pace with time. 
Inclusion of ARTs and IVF is indicative in this sense and helps to argue that 
also therapeutic human germline editing may be incorporated in this conception 
in the future. It is arguable also because the relevant human rights bases seem 
capable of including it and, which concerns us more closely, also of making 
feasible its incorporation in the case law of the ECtHR and of the IACtHR.
Once again, for the IACtHR it would be an easier task, as suitable legal 
bases can be sought in the Inter-American Human Rights system, namely 
the above-mentioned Article 18 of the Protocol of San Salvador and Article 
XIII of the American Declaration. This seems particularly true in light of the 
proactive interpretation that the Court has given to these provisions, also by 
relying on the principle pro persona. In fact, the IACtHR has held that “in 
keeping with Article 29(b) of the American Convention, the scope of the rights 
to private life, reproductive autonomy and to found a family […] extends to 
the right of everyone to benefit from scientific progress and its applications” 
and that “[t]he right to have access to scientific progress in order to exercise 
reproductive autonomy and the possibility to found a family gives rise to the 
right to have access to the best health care services in assisted reproduction 
techniques286”.287 Arguably, most advanced techniques available may be 
considered to be encompassed in the notion as best health care services in the 
field of reproduction.
In a similar vein, an appropriate legal basis can be sought, at the universal 
level, in Article 12 of the ICESCR, as read by the Committee on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights in General Comment No. 22 (2016). So far, the 
Committee has not included therapeutic human germline alterations in the 
286  Emphasis added. 
287  Case of Artavia Murillo et al. (“In vitro fertilization”) v. Costa Rica, cited above n. 90, para. 150. 
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field of reproduction within the scope of the right to health and the right to the 
highest attainable standards of health, although the conception of quality288 as 
incorporation of “technological advances and innovations in the provision of 
sexual and reproductive health services”289 seems a promising statement. In 
the future, this understanding of the entitlement may arguably be capable of 
encompassing also the techniques under consideration within its scope.
Last but not least, a particularly suitable legal basis seems to be offered 
by Article 15(1)(b) of the ICESCR, since the provision may encompass the 
enjoyment of the advanced techniques of genome editing as a therapeutic 
means for improving the health of the offsprings and preventing them from 
suffering from a given genetic disease. This is arguable because according 
to this provision States are under an obligation to ensure that “everyone 
[…] enjoy[s] the benefits of scientific progress and its applications”. The 
scope of this entitlement may be interpreted more specifically by making 
reference to Article 27 of the UDHR, which is the archetype of UN human 
rights treaties. Article 27 provides that everyone has the rights to “share in 
scientific advancement and its benefits” which, through reference to the verbs 
“participer” and “participar” respectively used in the French and Spanish 
version of the UDHR, should be intended as the right to actively participate 
in scientific progress and its benefits.290 Including access to therapeutic human 
germline alterations in the field of reproduction within the scope of the provision 
seems all the more arguable when one additionally considers that States are 
under an obligation to take all the steps to achieve the “full realization” of 
this rights, “includ[ing] those necessary for the conservation, the development 
and the diffusion of science”, pursuant to Article 15(2) of the ICESCR. So far, 
the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights has not expressed its 
view on the right to enjoy the benefits of scientific progress and, as anticipated 
above, there are great expectations about the General Comment of the right 
to science, which is going to be issued soon, in order to have some guidance. 
The view advanced seems all the more arguable if we consider that the 1997 
UNESCO UDHGHR says that ‘‘benefits from advances in biology, genetics 
and medicine, concerning the human genome, shall be made available to 
288  See: Donders, Y., The right to enjoy the benefits of scientific progress: in search of state 
obligations in relation to health, Medicine, Health Care, and Philosophy, n° 14(4), (November 2011), 
pp. 371–381.
289  UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General comment No. 22 (2016) on 
the right to sexual and reproductive health (article 12 of the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights), cited above n. 88, para. 21.
290  Mancisidor, M., “Is There Such a Thing as a Human Right to Science in International Law? “, 
ESIL Reflections, n° 4(1), (7 April 2015), available at http://www.esil-sedi.eu/node/896 last visited 13 
July 2018; Mancisidor, M., “Historia del Derecho Humano a la Ciencia”, in Die Subversive Kraft der 
Menchenrechte, Huhle, N., Huhle, T., (eds.), Oldenburg, Paulo Freire Verlag, 2015. For further views 
and assessments on human rights in general and, in particular, on the right to science, it may also 
be interesting to visit the blog of Professor Mikel Mancisidor at http://mikelmancisidor.blogspot.it/. 
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all”.291 In this regard, for having some clarification on how the conception of 
“benefit sharing”292 may be intended at the international level, Article 19 of 
the UNESCO Universal Declaration on Human Genetic Data293 may offer an 
interesting reference where it provides that “benefits […] should be shared with 
the society as a whole and the international community”, a principle to which 
States shall provide effectiveness by ensuring “provision of new diagnostics, 
facilities for new treatments or drugs stemming from the research” besides 
“support to health services”. If this view is applied to our reflections, it may 
arguably suggest that the innovative reproductive techniques made available 
through human germline editing could be considered as benefits to be shared. 
Of course, both the ECtHR and the IACtHR would benefit from incorporation 
of such standards in their case law when dealing with reproductive rights, in 
line with the usual and established approach of the IACtHR and with some 
more efforts for the Strasbourg Court for using these references as a support for 
the interpretation of conventional duties under the ECHR in line with Article 
31(3)(c) of the VCLT. Maybe we cannot expect this to happen immediately, 
but relentless scientific progress requires to consider paths of jurisprudential 
“rejuvenation” as soon as possible, in order to not to be unprepared in front of 
the challenges posed by medical and biological evolution.
7. Conclusions 
The definition of the interplay between the protection of the unborn and 
reproductive rights represents a challenging issue for international human 
rights jurisprudence, and has been tackled on several occasions by both judicial 
and non-judicial human rights bodies.
Beyond reflecting the nature of reproductive rights as not “independent 
rights”, the international jurisprudence has also contributed, along with the 
relevant soft law sources, to promote and highlight the existence of a core 
conception of sexual and reproductive health and reproductive rights that 
has received generalized acceptance at the international level, and which has 
proven capable of encompassing the achievements of scientific progress in the 
reproductive field, as ARTs and IVF.
This has not been an easy task, especially considering the strong pluralism 
of views and the delicate moral implications that characterize this question. 
291  UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO), Universal Declaration on the 
Human Genome and Human Rights, cited above n. 262, Article 12.
292  In this regard, it is interesting to read SCHROEDER, D., “Benefit sharing: it’s time for a 
definition”, Journal of Medical Ethics, n° 33(4), (April 2007), pp. 205–209.
293  UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO), International Declaration 
on Human Genetic Data, 16 October 2003, available at http://portal.unesco.org/en/ev.php-URL_
ID=17720&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201.html last accessed 15 July 2018.
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This is why the results achieved by the two major regional human rights 
Court taken into consideration are praiseworthy. Of course, the threshold 
and the content of the protection ensured are not the same, as their reference 
operational frameworks are different as to the legal bases contemplated and 
as to the approach that the two bodies have developed also in line with their 
relationship with States Parties and domestic landscapes. 
In this respect, the reading of States’ obligations related to reproductive 
rights in the Inter-American system is outstanding and it is of basic importance 
when we consider the current process of “rejuvenation” that Latin America 
is currently facing in the field of abortion rights and that sometimes is 
not generally welcomed. It is particularly important especially when one 
considers that often politics and conservative faith-based activism try to 
curb the affirmation of reproductive rights in the region, and Brazil offers a 
paradigmatic example in this regard. The relevance of the results achieved 
by the IACtHR and of the solutions it may adopt in perspective can have a 
noteworthy impact at the national level. In this respect, domestic obligation 
deriving from the ACHR would imply a commitment to make reproductive 
scientific progress accessible, underpinned by the duty of non-regression in 
its implementation and its funding according to Article 26 of the ACHR. The 
impact would be particularly interesting in those domestic legal orders that 
provide the “bloque de constitucionalidad”: in fact, the consequence would be 
a the “constitutionalisation” of the duties set by the conventional system in the 
reproductive field, also in light of the interpretation given by the Court.
The promotion of common and advanced standards of protection of 
reproductive rights is likely to be constantly enhanced before the IACtHR, also 
thanks to the nature of the conception of the rights to life adopted, capable 
of suiting the different exigencies that specific circumstances can pose on a 
case by case basis. This task seems harder for the Strasbourg Court, which 
has to tackle a peculiar unprecedented States’ reluctancy to implement its 
decisions, besides the delicate pluralism of views. Any “step backward” should 
be hopefully avoided, through enhancement of the promising results so far 
achieved. In this regard, despite some self-restraint is unavoidable, the Court 
can rely on its capacity to interpret the ECHR as a living instrument that has 
characterized its case law including in the field of biolaw.
The promotion of common or at least closer standards of protection is a 
basic goal which also implies considerations of social justice. It goes without 
saying that “reproductive tourism” is capable of exacerbating social and 
economic gaps and it can preclude access to reproductive opportunities to less 
wealthy couples. This is clearly at odds with States’ obligation to ensure access 
to health care, including reproductive services, without any discrimination in 
both human rights frameworks considered, according to the resources available. 
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This is particularly relevant from a budgetary perspective, since ensuring full 
and indiscriminate access to reproductive services is an ambitious and expensive 
objective, even more when considered in relation to perspective opportunities 
related to such advanced biotechnologies as genome editing. However, it is a 
fundamental aim as well, if we really want to prevent law to lag behind science 
and to be unprepared in front of the challenges posed by scientific progress. 
In particular, human rights protection is not imaginable without appropriate 
framing, timely devised. 
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